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Essays in Monetary Policy
Abstract
This dissertation presents three chapters addressing issues pertaining to monetary policy, in-
formation, and central bank communication. The ￿rst chapter studies optimal monetary policy
in an environment where policy actions provide a signal of economic fundamentals to imperfectly
informed agents. I derive the optimal discretionary policy in closed form and show that, in contrast
to the perfect information case, the signaling channel leads the policymaker to be tougher on in￿ a-
tion. The strength of the signaling e⁄ect of policy depends on relative uncertainty levels. As the
signaling e⁄ect strengthens, the optimal policy under discretion approaches that under commitment
to a forward-looking linear rule, thereby decreasing the stabilization bias. This contributes to the
central bank ￿nding it optimal to withhold its additional information from private agents. Under
a general linear policy rule, in￿ ation and output forecasts can respond positively to a positive in-
terest rate surprise when the signaling channel is strong. This positive response is the opposite of
what standard perfect information New Keynesian models predict and it matches empirical patterns
found by previous studies. Chapter 2 provides new empirical evidence supporting the predictions of
the model presented in Chapter 1. More speci￿cally, I ￿nd that the responses of in￿ ation forecasts
to interest rate surprises is especially positive when there is greater uncertainty regarding the pre-
vious forecast. Finally, Chapter 3 examines whether communications by the Federal Open Market
Committee might have the ability to in￿ uence ￿nancial market responses to macroeconomic news.
In particular, I am able to relate labor-related word use in FOMC statements and meeting minutes
to the amount by which interest rates￿response to labor-related news exceeds their response to
other news.
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Uncertainty and the Signaling
Channel of Monetary Policy:
Theoretical Analysis
1.1 Introduction
It has become widely accepted that expectations play a key role in the decisions that drive
economic ￿ uctuations. How these expectations are formed has been a subject of much
debate. With a few exceptions, the majority of macroeconomic models feature private agent
expectations of economic fundamentals that are formed independently of policy actions.
However, there is a growing body of both anecdotal and empirical evidence supporting the
view that monetary policy actions, in fact, communicate information about the economy to
the public, and thereby a⁄ect agents￿expectations. Thus, it follows that optimal policy may
be altered when policy actions also in￿ uence the economy through this channel.
In this paper, I study a setting where asymmetric information exists between the pol-
icymaker and private agents. I assume that the policymaker has more information about
the state of the economy than private agents. This assumption captures the central bank￿ s
1private information about policy targets and its access to some con￿dential data. A central
bank can also be better informed due to devoting more resources to processing data available
to all agents1. In this environment, rational private agents gain information from observa-
tions of monetary policy actions that respond to these fundamentals. This process through
which policy a⁄ects private agents￿beliefs about the state of the economy is what I refer to
as the signaling channel.
My ￿rst key result is that, for a given monetary policy, the model can produce positive
responses of in￿ ation and output forecasts to positive interest rate surprises. Second, I
provide a closed-form solution for optimal policy under no commitment. The main conclusion
is that the signaling channel alters the policymaker￿ s tradeo⁄ in a way that allows him to
credibly implement an equilibrium closer to the one possible under commitment. This is
one of the reasons behind my third key result showing that it can be bene￿cial for the
policymaker to withhold his extra information from the public.
The analysis is conducted using a standard New Keynesian model with consumers and
￿rms who have homogeneous, but imperfect information about exogenous shocks. Firms are
monopolistically competitive and face a nominal price-setting friction. These two elements
lead to a standard monopoly distortion and relative price distortions when there are ￿ uctua-
tions in nominal marginal costs. The allocative distortion resulting from in￿ ation means that
zero in￿ ation is e¢ cient. In this setting, welfare is maximized when in￿ ation and output are
stabilized around their e¢ cient levels2. The central bank can always achieve zero in￿ ation
and bring output to the level that would prevail under ￿ exible prices by stabilizing nominal
marginal costs so that ￿rms never want to change prices. Therefore, the policymaker is able
to achieve the ￿rst-best outcome when ￿ exible-price output coincides with the e¢ cient level.
However, shocks that drive a wedge between the ￿ exible-price and e¢ cient output levels
create an in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ for the policymaker.
1With costly information processing, a central bank that devotes more resources to information processing,
relative to private agents, is ultimately better informed about relevant economic fundamentals.
2I assume a constant wage bill subsidy ￿nanced by lump sum taxes that o⁄sets the average monopoly
distortion and that there is no inherited price dispersion in the economy.
2In the baseline model, there are two exogenous shocks: government demand and a time-
varying target for the gap between actual output and the ￿ exible-price level3. The output gap
target summarizes exogenous variation in the wedge between the e¢ cient and ￿ exible-price
levels of output coming from real imperfections not otherwise captured by the model. It can
also represent exogenous variation in a politically-motivated output target that di⁄ers from
the socially e¢ cient level. The government demand shock does not create an in￿ ation-output
tradeo⁄ for the policymaker while variations in the output gap target do. The policymaker
is better informed than private agents about both shocks and sets the nominal interest rate
conditional on this extra knowledge, thus making it a signal to private agents about these
fundamentals. This setup re￿ ects a narrative often seen in the popular press: upon seeing a
negative interest rate surprise, private agents can interpret this as a countercyclical response
to weakness in the economy (lower demand) or a desire to further boost activity (a higher
output gap target).
Private agents form beliefs through a signal extraction problem, thus making the sig-
naling e⁄ect of policy actions dependent on the relative uncertainty over the two shocks.
When uncertainty about demand is high relative to uncertainty about the policy target,
interest rate surprises lead to larger belief revisions about demand and smaller revisions to
beliefs about the output gap target. The recent crisis provides a good example of a time
when uncertainty about economic strength was particularly high and indeed, the press has
interpreted many recent policy actions as indicators of economic strength. Following the
release of the December 2007 FOMC meeting minutes, a New York Times story entitled
"Discussion of a Fed Cut Only Stirs Up Concerns About a Weak Economy"? stated that
"while investors usually cheer an impending rate cut, the minutes only fueled anxiety that
the economy would fall into a recession". Later on, after the February 2010 decision to raise
the discount rate, the Financial Times released an article entitled "Fed Discount Rate Rise
Sends Recovery Signal"?. Interestingly, this was despite the Federal Reserve￿ s press release
3Similar policy target shocks have been used by Faust and Svensson (2001) and Mertens (2011).
3explicitly stating that "the modi￿cations [...] do not signal any change in the outlook for
the economy or for monetary policy".
My ￿rst key result is that when the policy response to demand shocks is inadequate
and positive interest rate surprises are a strong enough signal of higher demand, the model
produces a positive response of in￿ ation and output gap forecasts to these surprises. For this
result, the output gap target shock merely acts as a source of noise preventing agents from
perfectly inferring the demand shock from the interest rate. This mechanism can explain
the empirical patterns documented by Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell, Evans, Fisher,
and Justiniano (2012), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) which show small increases in
forecasts of in￿ ation and real economic activity following positive federal funds rate surprises.
The model further predicts that the responses of in￿ ation and output gap forecasts to interest
rate surprises will vary with uncertainty levels in the economy and Tang (2014a) provides
empirical evidence of this fact.
Turning to the question of optimal discretionary interest rate policy, I show in closed
form that the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect on private agents￿beliefs about the output
gap target makes accommodation of these target shocks more costly. That is, bringing
output closer to its target now leads to larger in￿ ation ￿ uctuations compared to the perfect
information case. This change in the in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ reduces the stabilization bias
that typically exists when the policymaker cannot commit and private agents are forward-
looking. This stabilization bias generally results in excessively large in￿ ation ￿ uctuations. To
better understand the source of this bias and the intuition behind the result, note that raising
the output gap in response to a positive target shock incurs short-run in￿ ation determined
by the price-setting behavior of ￿rms. This in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄is summarized by a New
Keynesian Phillips curve linking in￿ ation to the output gap and expected future in￿ ation. A
discretionary policy typically accommodates output gap target changes too much relative to
the optimal response under commitment due to contrasting e⁄ects of policy on this expected
4future in￿ ation4.
In￿ ation expectations can be split into agents￿expectations of two components: (i) future
fundamentals and (ii) future policy responses to those fundamentals. In a perfect information
setting, a policymaker who cannot commit to future policy has no e⁄ect on either part.
Therefore, he does not account for the e⁄ect of his current actions on previous periods￿
in￿ ation expectations. On the other hand, a central banker who commits to a policy rule
internalizes this intertemporal e⁄ect. He recognizes that committing to maintain smaller
responses of in￿ ation to shocks will reduce in￿ ation expectations in prior periods and allow
for greater stabilization.
When the policymaker has an information advantage, a discretionary policymaker￿ s choice
of the interest rate level now a⁄ects in￿ ation expectations through a signaling e⁄ect on ex-
pectations of future fundamentals. I show that greater accommodation of output gap target
shocks gives rise to greater belief revisions, thus leading to larger changes in in￿ ation ex-
pectations. This tilts the discretionary policymaker￿ s short-run in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ in
favor of accommodating these shocks less and maintaining relatively smaller in￿ ation ￿ uctu-
ations. Hence, the signaling channel allows a policymaker to be credibly tougher on in￿ ation
without making explicit policy commitments. The policy￿ s departure from the optimal dis-
cretionary policy under perfect information depends on the size of policy￿ s signaling e⁄ect
on private agents￿beliefs about the output gap target shock. As this e⁄ect approaches its
largest possible value, I show that the optimal discretionary policy becomes equivalent to
the policy under commitment to a forward-looking interest rate rule. Therefore, maintaining
an information advantage imposes welfare-improving discipline on discretionary interest rate
policy5 which contributes to my next result on communication policy.
4This is in contrast to the positive average in￿ ation bias that occurs when the policymaker targets a level
of output that is above the ￿ exible-price level on average. Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003) provide explanations of both the stabilization and average in￿ ation biases in similar New Keynesian
models.
5The signaling channel will generally not allow optimal policy under discretion to achieve the same
welfare possible under an unrestricted commitment. In particular, optimal discretionary policy continues
to be forward-looking with the interest rate responding to past shocks only through their e⁄ect on current
beliefs. This contrasts with an explicit commitment of responding to lagged shocks for the purpose of
5Using this model, I address communication policy by examining whether direct com-
munication of the policymaker￿ s additional information to the public improves welfare. In
addition to the baseline no direct communication case, I consider noiseless communication
of both or either one of the exogenous states to private agents. I assume that the interest
rate follows the optimal discretionary policy corresponding to each case. Here, I ￿nd that
the welfare is lowest under full communication of both states so that there is a bene￿t of
maintaining some information advantage. The gains from intransparency come from two
sources: (i) a reduction in the stabilization bias as discussed above, and (ii) smaller overall
￿ uctuations under imperfect information even absent a reduction in the stabilization bias.
Keeping information away from ￿rms reduces the e⁄ects of shocks on ￿rms￿expectations of
future marginal cost changes which reduces ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations on average. Thus, some
form of intransparency is always bene￿cial in this setting6. I also show that the current
welfare e⁄ect of choosing partial versus no communication will always depend on the current
realizations of shocks. Therefore, the communication policy problem in this environment
will generally exhibit time-inconsistency.
Lastly, I explore a few extensions of the model which illuminate some general properties
of optimal policy when the interest rate has a signaling role. One property is that, if the
policymaker only has superior information about shocks that do not generate an in￿ ation-
output tradeo⁄, the optimality condition characterizing interest rate policy is invariant to
the presence of a signaling channel. I also show using a di⁄erent set of shocks that when
the interest rate has a signaling role, optimal policy responses to shocks can change even for
shocks that are common knowledge to all agents. This occurs because the signaling channel
incentivizes the policymaker to maintain smaller in￿ ation deviations conditional on any shock
to the economy. With an added shock to the ￿rms￿price-setting condition, the signaling
improving the set of achievable outcomes intertemporally which has been shown to lead to higher welfare in
the perfect information setting (Woodford (2003)).
6Note that I show this under the assumption that direct communication by the central bank is noiseless
and costless. Gains from intransparency would only increase if this communication were obscured by signal
noise or a friction such as sticky information a la Mankiw and Reis (2002) or rational inattention as in Sims
(2003).
6channel can lead the policymaker to be too tough on in￿ ation relative to a policymaker who
commits to a forward-looking interest rate rule.
In another extension, I explore the case where the central bank￿ s information advantage
lies in a time-varying in￿ ation target rather than an output gap target. I again show that
it￿ s possible under certain conditions to observe increases in in￿ ation and output following
interest rate surprises. Optimal discretionary interest rate policy continues to be character-
ized by smaller in￿ ation ￿ uctuations and a reduction in the stabilization bias arising from a
lack of commitment. However, the implications di⁄er for communication policy since, in this
case, the central bank is better able to achieve its stabilization goals when private agents
know the true in￿ ation target in equilibrium. Here, I show that the expected future welfare
loss is lowest when the central bank communicates only the level of demand to private agents
while allowing them to perfectly infer the in￿ ation target from the realization of the interest
rate.
The next subsection reviews the related literature. Section 1.2 sets up the model. I
discuss equilibrium dynamics under a general linear interest rate rule in Section 1.3 to build
intuition about the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect. I turn to the main question of optimal
discretionary interest rate policy in Section 1.4 with a discussion on the value of information
in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 outlines extensions of the model and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several literatures. My theoretical results complement previous
work on the signaling e⁄ect of monetary policy actions by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986),
Faust and Svensson (2001), Geraats (2007), Walsh (2010), Berkelmans (2011), and Mertens
(2011). Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001), and Geraats (2007)
focus on how the signaling channel ameliorates the average in￿ ation bias present when the
central bank has a positive average output target. In this paper, I show that the signaling
channel can also lessen the stabilization bias present when there is no average in￿ ation bias.
7Another di⁄erence lies in the fact that Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson
(2001) both use models where agents￿behavior depends on lagged expectations which are
a function only of past policy actions. Thus, the presence of a signaling channel does not
a⁄ect the policymaker￿ s short-run incentives in their models as it does here. Walsh (2010)
and Berkelmans (2011) focus on using numerical methods to study the signaling channel in
models where agents have heterogeneous information.
The paper closest to mine is Mertens (2011). However, he focuses on a case where
the central bank is more informed only about their policy objective and not other economic
fundamentals. By allowing the central bank to also have an information advantage regarding
a demand shock, I show that this framework is able to produce the empirical results found in
Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2013). Furthermore, this paper sharpens the intuitions given for the numerical
simulations in Mertens (2011) by providing closed-form expressions and illustrating links
between discretionary and commitment policies.
My result on the bene￿ts of central bank intransparency are consistent with the numerical
analyses in Faust and Svensson (2001), Walsh (2010), and Mertens (2011). In contrast
to these papers, I precisely characterize the sources of gains from intransparency. This
￿nding di⁄ers from the conclusions reached in models where private agents￿lack of perfect
information is the only friction such as those in the spirit of Lucas Jr. (1972) and Barro
(1976)7. In a more stylized setting, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) shows that less information
can be bene￿cial in an economy that is ine¢ cient under perfect information.
7Even when information frictions are the only frictions, full communication may be suboptimal if the
central bank cannot give perfect, homogeneous information to all agents (Adam (2007), Baeriswyl and
Cornand (2010)).
81.2 Model
1.2.1 Setup
I study the signaling channel of monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian economy with
monopolistically competitive ￿rms and sticky prices in the style of Calvo (1983). Fluctuations
are driven by two shocks: an exogenous government spending shock and a shock to the policy
target for the output gap. I assume that the monetary authority has perfect information
while consumers and ￿rms have homogeneous but imperfect information regarding these
shocks. Private agents observe shocks perfectly with a one-period lag and get information
about current values from observations of a nominal interest rate that responds linearly to
current state variables. I ￿rst describe the model structure and then provide details on the
information structure and belief formation.
Consumers
There is a representative household who maximizes utility that is additively separable in
time, labor, and consumption of a composite good made up of a continuum of varieties
maxE
1 X
t=0
￿
t [U (Ct) ￿ V (Lt)], where Ct ￿
￿Z 1
0
C
"￿1
"
jt dj
￿ "
"￿1
, " > 1
The economy is cashless. Each consumer gets pro￿ts from all ￿rms, pays a lump sum
tax, and can trade in a riskless nominal one-period bond so that the budget constraint is
Z 1
0
PjtCjtdj + Bt ￿ Rt￿1Bt￿1 + WtLt ￿ Tt +
Z 1
0
￿jtdj
Consumer optimization results in a standard intertemporal Euler equation and an intratem-
9poral labor supply relation involving the price of the composite good
UC;t = ￿RtE
￿
UC;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
￿ ￿ ￿
￿It
￿
VL;t
UC;t
=
Wt
Pt
where It is a time-t information set to be de￿ned below.
The resulting consumer demand for each variety j is
Cjt =
￿
Pjt
Pt
￿￿"
Ct
and the price of the composite good becomes
Pt =
￿Z 1
0
P
1￿"
jt dj
￿ 1
1￿"
Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods that each maximize pro￿ts
subject to demand from consumers and the government. I assume that the government
consumes the same composite good as consumers and allocates their demand across varieties
in the same way. Then, ￿rm j faces total demand of
Yjt =
￿
Pjt
Pt
￿￿"
Yt
where Yt is aggregate real output de￿ned as
Yt ￿
1
Pt
Z
Pjt (Cjt + Gjt)dj = Ct + Gt
Production technologies are identical across ￿rms and linear in each ￿rms￿labor
Yjt = ALjt
10The labor market is perfectly competitive while ￿rms also receive a constant proportional
subsidy ￿ on their wage bills so that each ￿rm￿ s total cost of production is
  (Yjt) = (1 ￿ ￿)
Wt
A
Yjt
Each ￿rm faces a 1 ￿ ￿ probability of being able to reset their prices in each period. Firms
who cannot reset prices charge their previous price. Each resetter maximizes the net present
value of pro￿ts discounted according to the consumer-owners￿stochastic discount factor
￿
k ￿t+k
￿t where ￿t+k is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumers￿budget constraint which
re￿ ects the shadow value of wealth in period t + k.
P
￿
jt = argmax
P
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k E
￿
￿t+k
￿t
[PYj;t+k ￿   (Yj;t+k)]
￿ ￿ ￿
￿It
￿
Since ￿rms employ identical technologies and hire workers from a centralized labor mar-
ket, all resetters choose the same optimal price in a given period (i.e., P ￿
jt = P ￿
t 8j). Then,
the aggregate price level evolves as
Pt =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(P
￿
t )
1￿" + ￿P
1￿"
t￿1
￿ 1
1￿"
1.2.2 Equilibrium conditions
Unless otherwise noted, let lower-case letters represent log deviations from steady-state values
(i.e., xt ￿ ln(Xt=X)) and let private agents￿expectations be denoted by xt0jt ￿ E [xt0jIt].
Then, log-linearizing the above optimality conditions around the deterministic steady state
leads to two equations characterizing aggregate output and in￿ ation dynamics.
~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ dt ￿ dt+1jt (1.1)
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt (1.2)
11where dt is an aggregate demand shock that originates from government spending
dt ￿
’
￿ + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gt
~ yt represents the gap between output and its natural (i.e., ￿ exible-price) level
~ yt ￿ yt ￿ y
n
t where y
n
t =
￿
’
dt
The coe¢ cients can be expressed in terms of steady-state values and structural parameters.
￿ ￿ ￿
UccY
Uc
; ’ ￿
VllL
Vl
; ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
(￿ + ’) (1.3)
The ￿rst equilibrium condition in equation (1.1) stems from the resource constraint and
the consumers￿Euler equation
ct = ct+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
The real interest rate is the price of consumption today relative to tomorrow and so its level
determines the di⁄erence between period t and expected t+1 consumption. When it is kept
at zero, consumption stays at its steady-state level. To determine the relationship between
the output gap in period t and the expected t + 1 output gap, the expected growth rate of
government spending net of variations in the natural level of output also has to be accounted
for. This is captured by the natural real rate of interest
r
n
t ￿ ￿
￿
dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿
The New Keynesian Phillips curve in equation (1.2) is derived from ￿rms￿pricing behav-
ior, consumers￿labor supply, the resource constraint and the evolution of aggregate prices.
I now de￿ne a real interest rate gap between the actual real rate and the natural rate
~ rt ￿ it ￿ ￿t+1jt ￿ r
n
t
12This real interest rate gap a⁄ects the output gap in the same way that the real interest
rate a⁄ects consumption. When it is kept at zero, output stays at its natural level. In this
model, this also gives zero in￿ ation. When I examine output gap and in￿ ation responses to
interest rate surprises in the next section, it will be convenient to do so through the lens of
~ rt. Equations (1.1) and (1.2) can be rearranged to show that shocks a⁄ect current outcomes
through expectations of next period￿ s outcomes and the real interest rate gap
~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
~ rt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt+1jt ￿
￿
￿
~ rt
The model is closed with speci￿cations for the nominal interest rate it ￿ ln(Rt=R) and
the shocks. For now, I assume that the interest rate responds linearly to the demand shock,
an output gap target shock ￿ yt and private agents￿beliefs.
it = fddt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt (1.4)
￿ yt is the policymaker￿ s time-varying target for the output gap. The role of this target will
be clari￿ed when I present the optimal policy problem. For now, it should be apparent that
this shock a⁄ects equilibrium output and in￿ ation in a way similar to an exogenous interest
rate shock since it only enters the model￿ s equilibrium conditions through the interest rate. I
will ￿rst characterize the equilibrium under general policy coe¢ cients to illustrate the e⁄ect
of the interest rate signaling mechanism in this model. I later show a case where optimal
discretionary monetary policy results in interest rate setting behavior that matches the form
in (1.4).
I assume that both shocks follow AR(1) processes
dt = ￿ddt￿1 + ￿d;t (1.5)
￿ yt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + ￿￿ y;t (1.6)
13where ￿d;t is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and variance
￿2
d;t￿1. Similarly, ￿￿ y;t is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and
variance ￿2
￿ y;t￿1. The two shocks are uncorrelated with each other and I do not restrict the
stochastic properties of ￿2
d;t￿1 and ￿2
￿ y;t￿1 for now. This timing of the variances is chosen so
that the one-period-ahead conditional distributions of the levels remain normal with known
variances. This timing is also used in the uncertainty shock literature by Bloom (2009).
1.2.3 Information structure and belief formation
I assume that agents know the structure of the model and the true values of all parameters,
including those in the interest rate rule. However, they do not see the true current values
of shocks. This implies that private agents cannot see the true current values of ~ yt and ￿t
(otherwise, they can infer dt). My preferred explanation of this setup is that it describes a
situation where individuals face idiosyncratic shocks and are not aware of current aggregate
conditions. They also do not see current aggregate outcomes as these are based on deci-
sions made simultaneously by other individuals. The Appendix provides a derivation of the
equilibrium conditions for aggregate variables in this type of environment and shows that
the only di⁄erences are extra terms in the aggregate in￿ ation equation which depend on
the exogenous shocks ￿d;t and ￿￿ y;t. I choose not to proceed with a setup using idiosyncratic
shocks in order to abstract from the issues involved with an interest rate providing public
information when private agents have heterogenous information.8
I assume that they observe lagged state variables perfectly (perhaps through observations
of lagged aggregate outcomes) which mimics the information setup used in Lucas (1973) and
many subsequent papers. They also observe it which gives an additional piece of information
about the current shocks. Formally, the information set of private agents in period t is
It =
n
i
t;d
t￿1; ￿ y
t￿1;
￿
￿
2
d
￿t ;
￿
￿
2
￿ y
￿to
8Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), and Lorenzoni (2010) examine these issues in other
settings.
14Meanwhile, I assume that the central bank has perfect information about the entire history
of exogenous variables up to time t. Thus, the central bank￿ s information advantage is
captured by knowledge of the current shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg. A bene￿t of assuming that agents
can see lagged true values is that it limits the signaling e⁄ect of the interest rate to current
beliefs and allows me to focus on changes to the short-run incentives that are central to the
optimal discretionary policy problem. I discuss the case where lagged true values cannot be
seen as an extension in Section 1.6.3.
Since the shocks are AR(1) and past shocks are perfectly observed, previous observations
of the interest rate do not give additional information. Beliefs are optimally formed through a
static Gaussian signal extraction problem. There is a slight departure due to the dependence
of the interest rate on current private agent beliefs. This introduces circularity into the belief
formation problem which I resolve using the method outlined in Svensson and Woodford
(2003). The basic approach is to posit a form of beliefs and then to re-express the belief
formation problem in terms of errors from expectations made absent the interest rate signal.
In this form, there is no circularity issue and beliefs can be found using standard signal
extraction results. Here, I posit that beliefs take the form
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 + Kd;t
￿
it ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ fd;bdtjt ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 ￿ f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
￿
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + K￿ y;t
￿
it ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ fd;bdtjt ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 ￿ f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
￿
for some Kd;t;K￿ y;t that I will later solve for. Then, I can write the evolution of the shocks
and the interest rate in terms of expectational errors de￿ned as xerr
t ￿ xt ￿ E [xtjIt n it].
Note that this error for it corresponds to an interest rate surprise de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between the observed interest rate and the one expected based on all period t information
except for the interest rate itself. Thus, I use the notation i
surp
t to denote this expectational
15error.
d
err
t = ￿d;t
￿ y
err
t = ￿￿ y;t
i
surp
t = (1 + fd;bKd;t + f￿ y;bK￿ y;t)(fd￿d;t + f￿ y￿￿ y;t) (1.7)
This is now a standard signal extraction problem which gives
d
err
tjt =
fd￿2
d;t￿1
f2
d￿2
d;t￿1 + f2
￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
1
1 + fd;bKd;t + f￿ y;bK￿ y;t
i
surp
t
￿ y
err
tjt =
f￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d￿2
d;t￿1 + f2
￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
1
1 + fd;bKd;t + f￿ y;bK￿ y;t
i
surp
t
Since xtjt = xerr
tjt + E [xtjIt n it], beliefs will ￿t the form assumed above so that, in equi-
librium, they depend on lagged true states and current shocks
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 +
fd
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 + f2
￿ y
| {z }
Kd;t
(fd￿d;t + f￿ y￿￿ y;t) (1.8)
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 +
f￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 + f2
￿ y
| {z }
K￿ y;t
(fd￿d;t + f￿ y￿￿ y;t) (1.9)
The AR(1) form of dt and ￿ yt then implies that dt+hjt = ￿h
ddtjt and ￿ yt+hjt = ￿h
￿ y￿ ytjt.
Note the following properties of Kd;t and K￿ y;t:
1. fdKd;t + f￿ yK￿ y;t = 1
2.
Kd;t
K￿ y;t =
fd
f￿ y
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
The ￿rst property is equivalent to the expression
fddtjt + f￿ y￿ ytjt = fddt + f￿ y￿ yt
16The linear combination on the right can be perfectly inferred through it so the same linear
combination of their beliefs has to match the observed sum on the right. Then the belief
formation process can be understood as agents observing a sum of two unknown shocks
and assigning a portion of this value to each shock. The relative fraction assigned to each
underlying shock depends on the relative importance of that shock in the sum. The second
property shows that more of this observed sum is attributed to a demand shock when the
interest rate rule responds relatively more to demand shocks (
fd
f￿ y is high) or when the demand
shock is more variable (
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 is high). When agents are relatively more unsure about the
current demand level versus the central bank￿ s output gap target, then they ￿nd it likely
that the policy surprise is due mostly to a change in demand conditions.
1.3 Equilibrium dynamics
The model is described by a system of equations which summarize private agent optimiza-
tion ((1.1) and (1.2)), policy (equation (1.4)), shock evolution ((1.5) and (1.6)), and beliefs
((1.8) and (1.9)). This system of linear stochastic di⁄erence equations can be solved by
conjecturing that ~ yt and ￿t are linear in the true states and current private agent beliefs
￿
dt; ￿ yt;dtjt; ￿ ytjt
￿
with unknown coe¢ cients9. This allows ~ yt+1jt and ￿t+1jt to be expressed in
terms of current beliefs. Then, substituting (1.4) into (1.1) and (1.2) gives two equations in
terms of
￿
dt; ￿ yt;dtjt; ￿ ytjt
￿
which are used to solve for the unknown coe¢ cients.
With this linear solution, the response of a given outcome xt to the two structural shocks
can each be broken down into three parts
dxt
d￿￿ y;t
=
@xt
@￿ yt
+
@xt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+
@xt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
dxt
d￿d;t
=
@xt
@dt
+
@xt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿d;t
+
@xt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
9An interest rate rule of the form given in (1.4) will not guarantee that this equilibrium is unique. See
the latter part of Corollary 3 for an illustration of how the interest rate rule can be rewritten to guarantee
uniqueness while maintaining the same equilibrium behavior vis-￿-vis the state variables.
17The ￿rst term captures the direct e⁄ects of shocks on equilibrium conditions or the interest
rate. The last two terms capture an indirect expectational e⁄ect which works through
forward-looking terms in the equilibrium conditions as well as the interest rate￿ s response
to private agents￿beliefs. In this model, the serially correlated nature of the state variables
cause agents to form expectations of future outcomes based on today￿ s beliefs of demand
and output gap target levels. These revised expectations a⁄ect current outcomes through
the standard consumption smoothing and Calvo pricing mechanisms. It is predominantly
this expectational e⁄ect that is altered when information becomes imperfect. In the perfect
information case, beliefs are correct so that
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t =
d￿ yt
d￿￿ y;t = 1 and
ddtjt
d￿d;t = ddt
d￿d;t = 1 while
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t =
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t = 0. Here, these e⁄ects become
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
= f￿ yK￿ y;t 2 (0;1);
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
= f￿ yKd;t 2
￿
f￿ y
fd
;0
￿
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
= fdK￿ y;t 2
￿
fd
f￿ y
;0
￿
;
ddtjt
d￿d;t
= fdKd;t 2 (0;1)
Thus, the expectational e⁄ects of the two shocks now "spill over" into each other. When
a shock hits the economy, agents observe this through an unexpected change in the interest
rate. This observation does not allow them infer the source of the shock and so they update
their beliefs of both the current demand level and the output gap target by a fraction of the
interest rate surprise.
The marginal responses of forecasts behave similarly
dxt+1jt
d￿￿ y;t
= ￿￿ y
￿
@xt
@￿ yt
+
@xt
@￿ ytjt
￿
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+ ￿d
￿
@xt
@dt
+
@xt
@dtjt
￿
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
dxt+1jt
d￿d;t
= ￿d
￿
@xt
@dt
+
@xt
@dtjt
￿
ddtjt
d￿d;t
+ ￿￿ y
￿
@xt
@￿ yt
+
@xt
@￿ ytjt
￿
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
In the remainder of this section, I examine the comovement between current outcomes,
forecasts, and interest rate surprises. The interest rate surprise de￿ned in (1.7) is linear in
f￿￿ y;t;￿d;tg so I can characterize the comovements using the responses to these shocks.
I build intuition for the general case by ￿rst examining two benchmark cases.
181.3.1 Benchmark 1: Perfect information with an exogenous inter-
est rate shock
The model above can be made isomorphic to a perfect information model with an exogenous
interest rate shock by allowing agents to see the current value of dt. That is, I suppose for
this subsection that the agents￿information set is It =
n
it;dt; ￿ yt￿1;(￿2
d)
t ;
￿
￿2
￿ y
￿to
. Then,
with f￿ y 6= 0, the interest rate perfectly reveals ￿ yt so that beliefs are correct in equilibrium
dtjt = dt and ￿ ytjt = ￿ yt
Interest rate behavior simpli￿es to
it = (fd + fd;b)dt + (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) ￿ yt
and the interest rate surprise is a scaled output gap target shock
i
surp
t = (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿￿ y;t
Since agents are perfectly informed after observing it, the resulting responses of outcomes
to the interest rate surprise are the same familiar results obtained under perfect information.
In other words, this case gives a model that￿ s isomorphic to a perfect information model in
which (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) ￿ yt is an autocorrelated exogenous component of the nominal interest rate.
To get impulse responses that have the usual signs, I make the following assumption that
the shocks are not too persistent
Assumption 1 ￿d;￿￿ y 2 [0;￿ ￿) where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. (See Appendix for the exact expression for ￿ ￿.)
Under Assumption 1, the familiar perfect information channels of a positive interest rate
surprise are at work. First, it raises the current real interest rate gap which lowers the
19current output gap and in￿ ation holding expectations ￿xed.
d~ rt
di
surp
t
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
> 0
Secondly, the persistent nature of the output gap target shock means that future real interest
rate gaps also increase following a positive interest rate surprise.
d~ rt+h
di
surp
t
= ￿
h
￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
￿ 0
This contributes to lower expectations of future output gaps and in￿ ation
d~ yt+1jt
di
surp
t
= ￿￿￿ y
1
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
￿ 0
d￿t+1jt
di
surp
t
= ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
￿ 0
which pushes current values down further. In sum, both the current real interest rate gap
and future expectations channels push the current output gap and in￿ ation down following
a positive interest rate surprise
d~ yt
di
surp
t
= ￿
1
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
< 0
d￿t
di
surp
t
= ￿
￿
￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
< 0
The important properties of this benchmark case which contrast with the cases below
are that: (1) both the current output gap and in￿ ation as well as agents￿forecasts of future
outcomes respond negatively to an interest rate surprise and (2) the responses do not vary
with the relative variance
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1. Moreover, these responses do not depend on the values of
policy response coe¢ cients.
201.3.2 Benchmark 2: The policymaker perfectly o⁄sets dt
For this case, recall that ￿ uctuations in the natural real rate only a⁄ect the equilibrium
output gap and in￿ ation if they are passed through to ￿ uctuations in the real rate gap. The
policymaker can prevent this by setting fd = ￿ and fd;b = ￿￿￿d which results in a nominal
interest rate that moves one-for-one with changes in the natural real rate of interest while
also responding to ￿ uctuations in the output gap target and agents￿belief about it
it = r
n
t + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
This creates an equilibrium where there are no ￿ uctuations associated with changes in the
natural real rate (coming from dt or dtjt) and all movements are due to changes in the output
gap target and agents￿belief about its current level. That is,
@~ yt
@dt
=
@~ yt
@dtjt
=
@￿t
@dt
=
@￿t
@dtjt
= 0
Demand shocks only a⁄ect outcomes through agents￿belief about the output gap target.
Here, the responses of a given outcome xt to the shocks become
dxt
d￿￿ y;t
=
@xt
@￿ yt
+
@xt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
dxt
d￿d;t
=
@xt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
while the interest rate surprise is linear in the two shocks
i
surp
t = ￿d￿d;t + ￿￿ y￿￿ y;t
Since the interest rate surprise is now made up of two independent shocks, there are two
ways that I can analyze how outcomes move with interest rate surprises. I can look at the
"response" of some outcome xt to an interest rate surprise conditional on a shock to s 2 fd;yg
using the ratio
dxt=d￿s;t
di
surp
t =d￿s;t. Alternatively, I can also look at the statistic
Covt￿1(xt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t ) for
21a given outcome variable xt. This scaled covariance is analogous to the statistic that is
estimated by OLS regressions of the outcome variable on interest rate surprises with the
exception that I evaluate the moments using one-period-ahead conditional distributions due
to the presence of time-varying uncertainty.
I now state three additional coe¢ cient restrictions which help me to sign responses.
Assumption 2 f￿ y ￿ 0, f￿ y;b + f￿ y ￿ 0
Assumption 3 f￿ y ￿ 0, f￿ y;b ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + ￿
￿ + ￿
￿
f￿ y, ￿d 2
￿
0;￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + ￿
￿ + ￿
￿￿
Assumption 4 f￿ y ￿ 0, f￿ y;b ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
1 +
￿
￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
￿
f￿ y, ￿d 2
￿
0;￿￿ y
￿
1 +
￿
￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
￿￿
The ￿rst assumption can be understood as policy responding the "right way" to output
gap target shocks. Holding constant agents beliefs, f￿ y < 0 means that the nominal interest
rate is reduced when the output gap target is high. Additionally, f￿ y;b < ￿f￿ y ensures that
in￿ ation and the output gap are increasing in the output gap target shock in the perfect
information version of this model presented above. The second and third assumptions place
successively tighter bounds on the nominal rate￿ s response to private beliefs about the output
gap target and analogous bounds on ￿d which are needed to sign some of the responses below.
Turning ￿rst to the responses under each individual shock, I can show the following:
1. Under Assumption 2,
di
surp
t
d￿￿ y;t = ￿￿ y < 0 < ￿d =
di
surp
t
d￿d;t
2. Under Assumptions 1 and 4,
d~ yt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t < 0 and
d~ yt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t < 0; both increase with
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
3. Under Assumptions 1 and 3,
d￿t=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t < 0 and
d￿t=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t < 0; both increase with
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
To explain each of these, I again turn to the corresponding responses of the expected
future variables and the real interest rate gap. First, under Assumptions 1 and 2:
22￿
d~ yt+1jt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t =
d~ yt+1jt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t ￿ 0 and approach zero as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 increases.
￿
d￿t+1jt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t =
d￿t+1jt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t ￿ 0 and approach zero as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 increases.
Since the demand shock is perfectly o⁄set, expectations of future outcomes depend only
on expectations of the future output gap target level. A positive interest rate surprise origi-
nating from either underlying shock results in a weakly negative revision to this expectation
which results in negative responses of output gap and in￿ ation expectations. Forward-looking
behavior in this economy means that this negatively a⁄ects current outcomes. As
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 in-
creases, interest rate surprises result in smaller revisions to the believed value of the output
gap target and so this negative e⁄ect moves towards zero.
In terms of the real interest rate gap, I can show that
￿
d~ rt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t approaches zero as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 increases.
￿
d~ rt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t ￿ 0 and remains positive as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ! 1.
Signing the e⁄ect of a higher
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 on
d~ rt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t requires further restrictions on f￿ y;b, but
on net, these two channels produce the e⁄ects on current outcomes presented above.
Turning to the scaled conditional covariance between outcomes and interest rate surprises,
I obtain the following under Assumptions 1 and 2:
1.
Covt￿1(￿t;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t ) < 0 and is increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
Cov(￿t;i
surp
t )
V ar(i
surp
t ) ! 0 as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ! 1. The
same is true for the output gap.
2.
Cov(￿t+hjt;i
surp
t )
V ar(i
surp
t ) < 0 and is increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
Cov(￿t+hjt;i
surp
t )
V ar(i
surp
t ) ! 0 as
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ! 1. The
same is true for output gap forecasts.
This statistic is a weighted average of the responses to individual underlying shocks
so the intuition behind the signs of the individual shocks￿e⁄ects underlie the sign of this
statistic. An increase in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 a⁄ects the responses to individual shocks as outlined above,
23but also results in greater weights on the responses to ￿d;t in this statistic. As
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ! 1,
Covt￿1(￿t;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t ) approaches the response measured by
d￿t=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t which itself is zero in this
limit. The same logic applies to the output gap.
The main departure from the ￿rst benchmark case above is the responses￿dependence
on the relative uncertainty
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1. In this case, the interest rate policy is such that the true
level and agents￿belief about demand have no impact on current or future outcomes in
equilibrium. Thus, upon observing a positive interest rate surprise, private agents attribute
this partly to an increase in demand which has no e⁄ect in equilibrium, and partly to a
decrease in the output gap target, which has a negative e⁄ect on current outcomes and
forecasts (under appropriate coe¢ cient restrictions). Then, the net e⁄ect is always negative
but it is weaker when more of the interest rate surprise is attributed to a change in demand.
With the information structure in this model, this happens when uncertainty about demand
is high relative to uncertainty about the output gap target.
1.3.3 The general case
For the general case, I use the following restrictions on the interest rate￿ s response to demand
and agents￿belief about the current demand level.
Assumption 5 fd 2 (0;1), fd + fd;b 2 (0;￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))
Assumption 6 fd 2 (0;1), fd + fd;b 2
￿
0;￿
￿ ￿
￿￿d
(1￿￿d)(1￿￿￿d) ￿ ￿d
￿￿
The additional feature present under Assumption 5 is that the policy response to demand
shocks is not strong enough. Then, positive changes in true demand and agents￿belief about
it retain expansionary e⁄ects in equilibrium. This allows the model to produce positive
responses of current and expected outcomes to positive interest rate surprises.
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 1, 2, and 5
1.
di
surp
t
d￿￿ y;t = ￿￿ y < 0 < ￿d =
di
surp
t
d￿d;t
242.
d~ yt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t and
d￿t=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t can both be positive for large
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
3.
d~ yt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t and
d￿t=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t can both be positive for large
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 under Assumption 6.
4.
Covt￿1(￿t;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t ) is increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 and can be positive for a large enough
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1. The
same is true for the output gap.
5.
d~ yt+hjt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t =
d~ yt+hjt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t can be positive and are increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
6.
d￿t+hjt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t =
d￿t+hjt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t can be positive and are increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
7.
Cov(￿t+hjt;i
surp
t )
V ar(i
surp
t ) is increasing in
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 and can be positive for a large enough
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1. The
same is true for output gap forecasts.
Proof. See Appendix.
Again, the signs of e⁄ects on current outcomes can be understood by looking at the
e⁄ects on one-period-ahead expectations and the real interest rate gap:
￿
d~ rt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t can be negative for large enough
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1.
￿
d~ rt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t can be negative for large enough
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 under Assumption 6.
The part of the interest rate surprise that agents interpret as a demand increase now
has a positive e⁄ect on current outcomes and forecasts. When uncertainty about demand
is relatively high, this positive part of the interest rate surprises￿signaling e⁄ect on current
outcomes and forecasts is large so the total response can become positive.
This mechanism has been discussed as one reason behind the expansionary responses of
in￿ ation and unemployment forecasts to positive interest rate surprises found in Romer and
Romer (2000) and Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012). The theory presented
here also implies that this is particularly likely to be the case when (i) the policy response to
fundamental shocks is inadequate and (ii) private agents are relatively more uncertain about
the strength of the economy than they are about policy objectives. The recent recession
25was a period of time where these conditions were plausibly present since the federal funds
target e⁄ectively reached zero at the end of 2008 and there is also evidence of high economic
uncertainty prior to and during the recession, such as the in￿ uential work by Bloom (2009).
Tang (2014a) also presents new empirical evidence that the response of in￿ ation forecasts to
interest rate surprises does indeed have a signi￿cant interaction with forecasters￿subjective
uncertainty.
1.4 Optimal discretionary interest rate policy
In this section, I turn to the question of optimal discretionary interest rate policy. For now,
I do not allow the central bank to directly communicate their additional information to
the public aside from the information embodied in the interest rate. To retain tractability, I
limit attention to the case where variances are constant parameters and consider comparative
statics with respect to the relative variance
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y. I discuss the implications of time-varying
uncertainty for the optimal policy problem in Section 1.6.4. I also assume that the constant
wage bill subsidy ￿ o⁄sets the average monopolist pricing ine¢ ciency so that the steady state
is undistorted. Then, a second-order log approximation around the deterministic steady state
gives that the consumers￿lifetime utility from date t0 onwards is proportional to
Ut0;1 = ￿
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t01
2
￿
~ y
2
t +
"
￿
￿
2
t
￿
+ h:o:t:
where I￿ ve omitted constants and terms independent of policy.
I then consider a monetary authority that maximizes welfare derived from consumer util-
ity but with an exogenous time-varying target for the output gap. A similar time-varying
target has been used in other papers studying optimal policy in an imperfect information
context such as Mertens (2011) and Faust and Svensson (2001). My preferred interpretation
of this shock is that it summarizes short-run deviations of the e¢ cient level of output from
the natural ￿ exible-price level of output which are not captured by the above microfounda-
26tions. Then, ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt represents the deviation of actual output from the e¢ cient level. The
policymaker￿ s objective is to minimize the following loss
Lt0 = E
CB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t01
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿
2
t
￿
(1.10)
where the expectation is evaluated according to his own information set10.
In the imperfect information case, a policymaker who cannot commit chooses the interest
rate level in each period to minimize this loss subject to equilibrium conditions (1.1) and
(1.2) and taking private agents￿beliefs regarding future policy and the form of current policy
as given.
Beliefs regarding future policy a⁄ect the expectations
￿
~ yt+1jt;￿t+1jt
￿
. Since the equi-
librium of this model is linear in
￿
dt;dtjt;yt;ytjt
￿
while beliefs satisfy dt+1jt = ￿ddtjt and
￿ yt+1jt = ￿￿ y￿ ytjt, these expectations can be written in matrix form as
2
6 6
4
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
3
7 7
5 = M
2
6 6
4
dt+1jt
￿ yt+1jt
3
7 7
5 (1.11)
In equilibrium, the coe¢ cients in the matrix M are determined by the behavior of future
nominal interest rates. Then, taking private agents￿beliefs about future policy as given
amounts to the policymaker recognizing that his current choice does not have an e⁄ect on this
M matrix. However, the policymaker does recognize that his choice impacts
￿
dt+1jt; ￿ yt+1jt
￿
10The model equations can be rearranged into the canonical form studied in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler
(1999) where the output gap target shock shows up as both a positive cost-push shock and a negative
component of the demand shock.
Lt0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿￿
~ yCB
t
￿2
+
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
~ yCB
t = ~ yCB
t+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt ￿ rCB
t
￿
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yCB
t + vt
where ~ yCB
t ￿ ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt; rCB
t = ￿
￿
(dt ￿ ￿ yt) ￿
￿
dt+1jt ￿ ￿ yt+1jt
￿￿
and vt = ￿￿ yt
27and therefore has a marginal e⁄ect on current outcomes through
￿
~ yt+1jt;￿t+1jt
￿
. This is in
contrast to the discretionary policy problem under perfect information where the interest
rate level chosen today has zero impact on these expectations.
Unlike the perfect information case, private agents￿beliefs about the form of current
policy is now relevant since it determines private agents￿belief formation process. When
private agents suppose that the behavior of the current interest rate can be described by
it = fddt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt (1.12)
then beliefs follow
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 + Kdi
surp
t (1.13)
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + K￿ yi
surp
t (1.14)
where i
surp
t = it ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ fd;bdtjt ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 ￿ f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
as shown above, where Kd and K￿ y take the forms given in (1.8) and (1.9) with
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y now being
constant. To get around the circularity issue introduced by the interest rate surprise i
surp
t
itself being a function of beliefs, I rede￿ne the policy problem as a choice of a component of
the interest rate idis
t where the realized nominal rate is
it = i
dis
t + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
Since the policymaker is free to choose any value of idis
t , this still gives him full control over
the resulting behavior of it and so it does not impose any additional constraint on the policy
problem. The bene￿t of this relabeling is that beliefs can now be written neatly as a function
of idis
t and lagged exogenous state variables.
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 + Kd
￿
i
dis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + K￿ y
￿
i
dis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
28Then, a policymaker who takes private agents￿beliefs about current policy as given considers
a change in idis
t to have marginal e⁄ects of Kd and K￿ y on beliefs dtjt and ￿ ytjt, respectively.
To summarize, a policymaker who can only choose the interest rate level today and
cannot make credible commitments about future policy does not internalize the e⁄ect of
equilibrium interest rate behavior on the following objects: (i) the M matrix which captures
the relationship between beliefs about state variables and expectations
￿
~ yt+1jt;￿t+1jt
￿
as well
as (ii) the belief coe¢ cients Kd and K￿ y which capture the marginal e⁄ects of the interest rate
on beliefs. This is consistent with the notion that the policymaker chooses the current level
of the nominal interest rate but cannot commit to implementing a particular interest rate
rule. The main di⁄erence from the perfect information discretionary policy problem is that
the policymaker recognizes that he can in￿ uence expectations of future outcomes through
the beliefs in the vector
￿
dtjt ￿ ytjt
￿0 in equation (1.11).
Because the policymaker minimizes a quadratic loss function subject to linear constraints
of the same form in each period, the optimal interest rate ends up having the same form as
(1.12). Solving for an equilibrium under optimal policy then consists of ￿nding a solution
to the set of linear stochastic di⁄erence equations given by (1.1), (1.2), (1.5), (1.6), (1.13),
(1.14), and the policymaker￿ s optimality condition.
Proposition 2 The policymaker￿ s optimality condition is
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿R
"
￿
￿t (1.15)
where R ￿
d￿t
didis
t
d~ yt
didis
t
=
@￿t
@idis
t + @￿t
@￿ ytjtK￿ y
@~ yt
@idis
t +
@~ yt
@￿ ytjtK￿ y
in equilibrium
R is itself a function of interest rate response coe¢ cients and is therefore determined in
equilibrium. There may be multiple equilibrium values for R but those that satisfy R ￿ 0
exhibit the following properties when ￿￿￿ y > 0:
1. R 2
h
￿; ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
i
292. R is decreasing in
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
￿ As
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 1, K￿ y ! 0 and R ! ￿. In this limit, the interest rate has no e⁄ect on
￿ ytjt and the optimality condition for policy becomes equivalent to that in the case
of optimal discretionary policy when agents have perfect information.
￿ As
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 0, K￿ y ! 1
f￿ y and R ! ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y. In this limit, the interest rate has its largest
possible e⁄ect on ￿ ytjt and the optimality condition for policy becomes equivalent to
that in the case of commitment to a rule of the form
it = r
n
t + f
c
￿ y￿ yt + f
c
￿ y;b￿ ytjt
3. When ￿ = 0 or ￿￿ y = 0, R = ￿ in equilibrium for any value of
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y.
This optimal policy solution is unique under any initial supposed private sector belief about
current policy that results in beliefs dtjt and ￿ ytjt that are linear in idis
t . More speci￿cally, the
same solution is obtained if (1.12) is replaced with a belief that the current interest rate may
also respond linearly to the entire history of past fundamentals.
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal policy results in this environment can be understood by noting that the
signaling channel tilts the policymaker￿ s short-run tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and deviations
of the output gap from its target. To better understand this, note that the policymaker￿ s
problem can be recast as one in which he chooses ~ yt since there is a one-to-one mapping
between the nominal interest rate and ~ yt through equation (1.1). Then, the only remaining
constraint imposed on the policymaker is the second equilibrium condition, equation (1.2),
which I rewrite here in terms of the output gap deviation from its target.
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt) + ￿￿ yt
This New Keynesian Phillips curve then summarizes the policymaker￿ s tradeo⁄ between ￿t
30and ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt. In the perfect information setting, the discretionary policymaker has no impact
on ￿t+1jt. Therefore, the slope of this constraint is
R
PI =
@￿t=@idis
t
@~ yt=@idis
t
= ￿
When the policymaker has an information advantage, the nominal interest rate now
impacts the expectation ￿t+1jt through the belief ytjt since the policymaker recognizes that
￿t+1jt = M22￿￿ y￿ ytjt and
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
= K￿ y
where M22 is the lower right element of the matrix M that appears in (1.11). This changes
the slope of the policymaker￿ s constraint to
R =
@￿t
@idis
t + @￿t
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t + @￿t
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
@~ yt
@idis
t +
@~ yt
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t +
@~ yt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
Thus, the policymaker￿ s optimality condition retains the same form as the perfect informa-
tion setting where the goal is to maintain an optimal ratio between output and in￿ ation
deviations. The key di⁄erence is that the slope R governing this ratio now depends crucially
on the size of the e⁄ects that the interest rate has on beliefs.
In equilibrium, R depends only on the e⁄ect that interest rates have agents￿belief about
the output gap target and not their belief about demand. This is because the policymaker
perfectly o⁄sets the e⁄ects of changes in the belief about demand on outcomes so that @￿t
@dtjt =
@~ yt
@dtjt = 0 in equilibrium. Then, the interest rate still a⁄ects dtjt, but in￿ ation expectations
are not ultimately a⁄ected through this channel. On the other hand, changes in the true
level and belief about the output gap target will a⁄ect in￿ ation expectations under the
optimal policy. Thus, what ultimately matters for optimal policy is how much in￿ uence the
policymaker has on this belief.
Solving for the equilibrium value of R reveals that R ￿ ￿, meaning that it￿ s optimal
to maintain smaller in￿ ation deviations relative to output deviations when policy has a
31larger signaling e⁄ect on ￿ ytjt. This reduces the usual stabilization bias that occurs in perfect
information New Keynesian models where short-run in￿ ation ￿ uctuations are ine¢ ciently
large when a policymaker is not able to commit. As uncertainty about the output gap target
grows relative to uncertainty about demand shocks, policy￿ s signaling e⁄ect on ￿ ytjt becomes
larger and this stabilization bias is further reduced. In a more general setting where there
may be additional shocks to the rate-setting process, the key measures are uncertainty about
the output gap target relative to uncertainty about all other unobserved components of it.
At the limits of the interest rate￿ s in￿ uence on beliefs, the optimal discretionary policy
in this imperfect information model corresponds with some familiar benchmarks. When
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 1, the interest rate has no e⁄ect on beliefs about the output gap target shock and the
optimal discretionary policy under imperfect information coincides with that under perfect
information. When
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 0, the interest rate has its largest possible e⁄ect on beliefs about
the output gap target shock and the optimal discretionary policy coincides with the optimal
policy when the policymaker can commit to an interest rate rule of the form given above.
In other words, there is no bene￿t to this type of commitment at this limit.
In this particular example, the optimal discretionary policy at this limit also coincides
with the optimal policy under perfect information when the policymaker can commit to a
rule of the form considered in section 4.2.1 of Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (1999) which is
it = r
n
t + f
c
￿ y￿ yt
Lastly, there are two special cases where the equilibrium ratio R does not depend on
relative variances levels. This happens when ￿￿ y = 0 or ￿ = 0.
1. In the ￿￿ y = 0 case, the output gap target becomes white noise so expectations about
future levels are always zero. The policymaker only a⁄ects agents￿belief about the
current output gap target which has no direct impact on current outcomes.
2. In the case of ￿ = 0, in￿ ation expectations no longer a⁄ect the current policy tradeo⁄
32since prices are set by ￿rms who no longer take the future into account. Note that
the key discount factor that ￿ is capturing in this special case is the one used by ￿rms
in their price-setting decision. This result still holds if I assume that consumers, and
hence the central bank, maintain a positive discount factor di⁄erent from the ￿rms￿ .
The stationary equilibrium under this optimality condition features an output gap and
in￿ ation which are linear in ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿
R"
1 + R"
￿ yt ￿
R"￿￿￿ y ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿ ytjt (1.16)
￿t =
￿
1 + R"
￿ yt +
￿￿￿￿ y ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿ ytjt (1.17)
The next result characterizes the interest rate which implements this equilibrium.
Corollary 3 A nominal interest rate which can implement this policy is given by
i
￿
t = r
n
t + f
￿
￿ y (R) ￿ yt + f
￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ytjt
The interest rate moves one-for-one with the natural rate of interest while f￿
￿ y and f￿
￿ y;b are
functions of
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y through R. This interest rate behavior matches that assumed in the second
benchmark case above with coe¢ cients on ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt that satisfy Assumption 3. The exact
expressions for the functions f￿
￿ y (￿) and f￿
￿ y;b (￿) are given in the Appendix.
This can be compared to the nominal interest rate under optimal discretionary policy in
the perfect information case which can be written as
i
￿;PI
t = r
n
t +
￿
f
￿
￿ y (￿) + f
￿
￿ y;b (￿)
￿
￿ yt
To ensure unique implementation, the interest rate speci￿cation can be augmented by a
term that reacts more than one-for-one to deviations of in￿ation from its intended path
i
￿
t = r
n
t +
￿
f
￿
￿ y (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ yt +
￿
f
￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y;b
￿
￿ ytjt + ￿￿￿t
33where ￿￿ y;￿￿ y;b are the coe¢ cients on ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt in the equilibrium solution for ￿t. Choosing
￿￿ > 1 ensures that the intended equilibrium is the unique solution in the system of equations
de￿ned by (1.1), (1.2), (1.5), (1.6), (1.13), (1.14), and this interest rate rule.
Proof. See Appendix.
A necessary element in these results is that the policymaker has an information advantage
regarding an outcome-relevant state variable that has some persistence. I use the term
"outcome-relevant" to mean that it creates an in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄and therefore a⁄ects
equilibrium outcomes under the optimal policy. This provides the channel through which the
current interest rate level can a⁄ect expectations
￿
~ yt+1jt;￿t+1jt
￿
. Without a state variable
that has these features, optimal policy becomes invariant to the signaling channel.
To be precise, consider a model analogous to the one proposed above but with a more
general set of shocks. I denote the set of exogenous state variables with a vector zt that
evolves as a VAR(1) process with independent shocks
zt = ￿zt￿1 + et, et ￿ iid N (0;￿) where ￿ is diagonal
I partition this vector into two subvectors z1;t;z2;t where z1;t is perfectly observed by private
agents while they can only see the true value of z2;t with a lag. I also restrict ￿ so that z1;t
does not depend on lags of z2;t￿1 (i.e., ￿12 = 0) and assume that the eigenvalues of ￿ are
less than one in absolute value.
Again, the central bank￿ s information advantage is that they can observe the current z2;t
while private agents cannot. I then let private agents suppose that the interest rate it is
linear in
￿
z1;t;z2;t;z2;tjt
￿
which is the case under the optimal discretionary policy. Let the
equilibrium conditions in this model be
~ y
CB
t = ~ y
CB
t+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ ￿~ yzt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ y
CB
t + ￿￿zt
34where I now use ~ yCB
t to denote the welfare-relevant output gap under this alternate con￿g-
uration of shocks. Then, I obtain the following
Proposition 4 Suppose that the shocks in z2;t do not impose an output-in￿ation tradeo⁄.
That is, suppose that ￿￿zt = ￿￿;1z1;t so that only shocks in z1;t enter into the in￿ation
equilibrium condition. Then the equilibrium under the discretionary optimal policy features
d~ yCB
t
dz2;t = d￿t
dz2;t =
d~ yCB
t
dz2;tjt = d￿t
dz2;tjt = 0 while the policymaker￿ s optimality condition becomes the
same as the perfect information case
~ y
CB
t = ￿"￿t
Proof. See Appendix.
In the language of New Keynesian models, this result show that if the policymaker only
has an information advantage regarding demand or natural real interest rate shocks while not
having superior knowledge regarding cost-push-type shocks, then the policymaker optimally
maintains the same ratio between output gap and in￿ ation deviations as in the perfect
information case. While changes in the interest rate still have an e⁄ect on private agents￿
beliefs z2;tjt, the presence of this signaling channel does not impact optimal discretionary
policy when the information advantage is limited to this class of shocks.
1.5 The value of information
In this section, I consider whether it would be bene￿cial for the policymaker to directly
communicate information to private agents. I will ￿rst compare the welfare losses under
the two extremes of no communication and full communication. Later on in this section, I
examine the case of partial communication.
The no communication case is the one analyzed above where the policymaker can only
choose the interest rate under the given asymmetric information structure. Under full com-
munication, the central bank costlessly and noiselessly discloses the true values of both
35current exogenous states fdt; ￿ ytg to all private agents so that the setting is equivalent to the
standard perfect information case. In each of these cases, I presume that the central bank
is implementing the optimal discretionary interest rate policy.
The loss under no communication can be evaluated using the equilibrium shown in the
previous section. Meanwhile, optimal discretionary policy under full communication is
~ y
PI
t ￿ ￿ yt = ￿"￿
PI
t
Substituting this into (1.2) and solving forward gives the equilibrium solutions
~ y
PI
t ￿ ￿ yt =
￿"￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt and ￿
PI
t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt
The period t welfare loss consists of a current period loss and an expected future loss
Lt =
1
2
h
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿
2
t
i
| {z }
lt
+ E
CB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿t1
2
￿
(~ ys ￿ ￿ ys)
2 +
"
￿
￿
2
s
￿
| {z }
￿ECB
t Lt+1
Proposition 5 Under an equilibrium where R ￿ 0,
1. The expected future loss is always higher under full communication
E
CB
t Lt+1 ￿ E
CB
t L
PI
t+1
2. The current period loss under no communication may be higher or lower than the
full communication case. The di⁄erence depends on the current realizations of shocks
f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg.
Proof. See Appendix.
The gains from no communication relative to full communication comes from two sources.
The ￿rst is the reduction in the stabilization bias when the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect
on in￿ ation expectations leads a discretionary policymaker to be tougher on in￿ ation. The
36second bene￿t comes from imperfect information resulting in smaller in￿ ation and output
￿ uctuations even absent a reduction in the stabilization bias. To understand this better,
￿rst note that the policymaker is always able to fully o⁄set the e⁄ects of changes in demand.
Now, consider a positive shock to the output gap target which leads the policymaker to
boost output by lowering the interest rate. The in￿ ation ￿ uctuations created by this action
depend on both its impact on ￿rms￿current marginal costs as well as their forecasts of future
marginal costs where the latter depends on ￿rms￿beliefs. In the perfect information setting,
these components move in tandem since they both depend only on the true output gap
target. When ￿rms are imperfectly informed, their forecasts of future marginal costs depend
on their beliefs about the output gap target which now moves less than one-for-one with
true output gap target shocks while now also moving with demand shocks. Thus, for a given
deviation of output away from its e¢ cient level, the resulting in￿ ation ￿ uctuation is now
spread across both shocks and ends up being smaller on average. As an extreme example,
suppose that after setting the interest rate, the central bank can independently manipulate
beliefs by choosing any value of ￿ ytjt. Then, it￿ s clear from the equilibrium in (1.16) and
(1.17) that it￿ s always optimal to choose ￿ ytjt in a way that o⁄sets ￿ yt. Maintaining imperfect
information helps the policymaker to get closer to this ideal.
I can also show that these two bene￿ts of no communication operate independently.
Corollary 6 To isolate the bene￿t from an interest rate policy that now exhibits a smaller
stabilization bias, I exogenously impose that ￿ ysjs = ￿ ys for s > t in evaluating the welfare
losses. In this case,
E
CB
t Lt+1 ￿ E
CB
t L
PI
t+1 for R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
To isolate the bene￿t of beliefs that do not correlate perfectly with true states, I exogenously
37impose R = ￿. In this case,
E
CB
t Lt+1 ￿ E
CB
t L
PI
t+1
when V ar
CB
t
￿
￿ ysjs
￿
￿ V ar
CB
t (￿ ys) and Corr
CB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
￿ 1 for s > t
which is satis￿ed in this model.
Proof. See Appendix.
As a second exercise, I now consider partial communication where the central bank per-
fectly communicates the true value of one of the current exogenous states to private agents.
The true value of the remaining exogenous state is then perfectly inferred from the interest
rate so that all agents are perfectly informed in equilibrium as in the full communication
case. The key di⁄erence from the full communication case is that the interest rate retains
a signaling e⁄ect on private agents￿beliefs since it is used to infer the remaining exogenous
state which was not directly communicated.
I will ￿rst consider the case of the central bank communicating the true current state
of demand to agents. Then their belief about the current level of the output gap target is
inferred from the interest rate as
￿ ytjt =
1
f￿ y
￿
i
dis
t ￿ fddt
￿
Thus, a discretionary policymaker still faces a signaling e⁄ect of K￿ y ￿
d￿ ytjt
didis
t = 1
f￿ y when
choosing the interest rate though private agents￿beliefs will be correct in equilibrium. This
maximizes the marginal e⁄ect of the discretionary policymaker￿ s interest rate choice on in-
￿ ation expectations and results in an in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ characterized by R = ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y.
This achieves the largest possible reduction in the stabilization bias through the signaling
channel and raises welfare compared to both the no communication and full communication
cases. However, because agents are perfectly informed in equilibrium, beliefs about the out-
put gap target will now move in sync with true shocks which lowers welfare compared to the
38no communication case. On net, partial communication of only the demand shock is always
preferable to full communication but is not unambiguously preferable to no communication.
Proposition 7 Under an equilibrium where R ￿ 0 and with partial communication of only
the demand shock denoted by a d superscript,
1. Both the current and expected future welfare losses are higher under full communication
than under partial communication of only the demand shock
E
CB
t L
d
t+1 ￿ E
CB
t L
PI
t+1 and l
d
t ￿ l
PI
t for any realization of shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg
2. The expected future welfare loss under no communication may be higher or lower than
under partial communication of only the demand shock. The di⁄erence cannot be un-
ambiguously signed and depends on parameter values.
3. The current period loss under no communication may be higher or lower than under
partial communication of only the demand shock. The di⁄erence depends on the current
realizations of shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg even for a ￿xed set of parameter values.
Proof. See Appendix.
Partial communication of only the true current output gap target results in the same
optimal discretionary interest rate policy and welfare loss as full communication. In this
case, the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect is only on agents beliefs about demand. As discussed
in Section 1.4, demand shocks are perfectly o⁄set by the policymaker and do not a⁄ect
in￿ ation in equilibrium. Therefore, the interest rate does not have a signaling e⁄ect on
in￿ ation expectations through beliefs about demand which results in no reduction of the
stabilization bias.
The fact that the current period loss is not unambiguously lower under either no commu-
nication or partial communication of only the demand shock implies that this choice features
time inconsistency. For a ￿xed set of parameter values, the central bank always wants to
39commit to one of these communication policies for future periods. However, there may be
realizations of shocks that make the alternate communication policy preferable after taking
into account current welfare, which would go against the policymakers￿commitment. This
property also suggests that a full analysis of optimal discretionary communication policy in
this setting would involve private agents￿beliefs that are formed by a non-Gaussian signal
extraction problem. When it￿ s optimal for the policymaker to communicate only in certain
states, then a decision to withhold information is itself informative.
1.6 Extensions
1.6.1 Adding more structural shocks
In this section, I explore how the above results may change in environments with a richer
set of structural shocks. The optimal discretionary policy is a⁄ected by the existence of a
signaling channel only through a change in the slope of the short-run in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄
which, in turn, determines the optimal ratio maintained between output gap and in￿ ation
deviations. An immediate consequence of this property is that the interest rate should still
perfectly o⁄set shocks that a⁄ect only the natural real rate of interest regardless of whether
the policymaker possesses an information advantage on these shocks.
On the other hand, the presence of additional cost-push-type shocks, which the policy-
maker cannot perfectly o⁄set, produces more interesting results. First, consider the case of
adding a shock vt to the ￿rms￿price-setting equation so that it becomes
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt + vt
where vt = ￿vvt￿1 + ￿v;t with ￿v;t ￿ iid N
￿
0;￿
2
v
￿
and ￿v 2 [0;￿ ￿)
I ￿rst assume that both private agents and the policymaker can see the entire history vt at
time t so that the policymaker has no information advantage regarding this shock. Then, I
40obtain the following
Proposition 8 The optimal interest rate under discretionary policy with an additional cost-
push shock which the policymaker does not have an information advantage for is
i
￿
t = r
n
t + f
￿
￿ y (R) ￿ yt + f
￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ytjt + f
￿
v (R)vt
where R depends on underlying parameters in the same way as in the baseline model.
This can be compared to the optimal interest rate under perfect information
i
￿;PI
t = r
n
t +
￿
f
￿
￿ y (￿) + f
￿
￿ y;b (￿)
￿
￿ yt + f
￿
v (￿)vt
The expression for the function f￿
v (￿) is given in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
Despite the policymaker not having an information advantage about the cost-push shock
vt, the optimal response to this shock is still in￿ uenced by the signaling e⁄ect that the
interest rate has on private agents￿belief about the output gap target. The presence of
that signaling e⁄ect tilts the short-run in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ in a way that leads the
policymaker to enforce smaller in￿ ation deviations conditional on any shock to the economy.
Another result of adding a cost-push shock is that the optimal discretionary policy in
the limit when the interest rate has its largest e⁄ect on expectations no longer corresponds
to the optimal commitment to a rule of the form
it = r
n
t + f
c
￿ y￿ yt + f
c
￿ y;b￿ ytjt + f
c
vvt
in this limit. The Appendix shows that an optimal commitment to this type of rule implies
the same response coe¢ cients for ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt but a di⁄erent response to vt given by
f
￿;c
v = f
￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿v
￿
6= f
￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
41where the last term is the optimal discretionary response to vt in this limit as R ! ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y.
Since f￿
v (￿) is increasing in its argument, then if ￿v < ￿￿ y, the policymaker operating without
commitment actually chooses an interest rate that overreacts to the cost-push shock vt
relative to the policymaker who can commit to a rule of the form given above. Due to
this overreaction, it￿ s possible for full communication to be welfare-improving in this case
depending on the relative importance of the di⁄erent shocks.
I can also consider the case where the policymaker has an information advantage about
vt in addition to fdt; ￿ ytg. Moreover, beliefs are formed under the following supposed current
interest rate behavior which replaces equation (1.12)
it = fddt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt + fvvt + fv;bvtjt
Now there are three private agent beliefs
￿
dtjt; ￿ ytjt;vtjt
￿
all of which are linear in idis
t . If I
de￿ne Kv ￿
dvtjt
didis
t , then the optimal discretionary policy can be shown to be equivalent to
the one derived above in the baseline model with the exception that now, the equilibrium R
depends on Kv as follows:
R ￿
d￿t
didis
t
d~ yt
didis
t
=
@￿t
@idis
t + @￿t
@￿ ytjtK￿ y + @￿t
@vtjtKv
@~ yt
@idis
t +
@~ yt
@￿ ytjtK￿ y +
@~ yt
@vtjtKv
where K￿ y and Kv will now depend on
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y,
￿2
v
￿2
￿ y, and the policy coe¢ cients.
1.6.2 Time-varying in￿ ation target
Here, I will show the case of an in￿ ation target ￿ ￿t rather than the time-varying output gap
target. That is, suppose that the policy objective in (1.10) is replaced with
Lt0 = E
CB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t01
2
￿
~ y
2
t +
"
￿
(￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t)
2
￿
42where
￿ ￿t = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿t￿1 + ￿￿ ￿;t (1.18)
with ￿￿ ￿;t being serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and variance
￿2
￿ ￿;t￿1. All other aspects of the setup remain parallel with the baseline case of an output
gap target. In particular, the central bank continues to have perfect information while the
information set of private agents is given by
It =
n
i
t;d
t￿1; ￿ ￿
t￿1;
￿
￿
2
d
￿t ;
￿
￿
2
￿ ￿
￿to
For equilibrium dynamics under a general linear interest rate rule, suppose that the
interest rate in (1.4) is replaced with the following expression which is now linear in the
in￿ ation target along with beliefs about the in￿ ation target
it = fddt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ ￿￿ ￿t + f￿ ￿;b￿ ￿tjt
Then, belief formation will mirror the baseline case so that they are given by
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 +
fd
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ ￿;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ ￿;t￿1
+ f2
￿ ￿
| {z }
Kd;t
(fd￿d;t + f￿ ￿￿￿ ￿;t)
￿ ￿tjt = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿t￿1 +
f￿ ￿
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ ￿;t￿1
+ f2
￿ ￿
| {z }
K￿ ￿;t
(fd￿d;t + f￿ ￿￿￿ ￿;t)
The equilibrium is now characterized by the system of equations given by (1.1), (1.2),
(1.5) and (1.18) along with the above policy rule and belief formation equations. Since ￿ ￿t
and ￿ ￿tjt enter into this system of equations in the exact same way as ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt in the baseline
model, the results related to the output gap target in Section 1.3 continue to hold here with
the in￿ ation target.
43In terms of the optimal discretionary policy problem, assuming now that the variances
of shocks are constant and following the same steps as in Section 1.4 yields the following
optimality condition
~ yt = ￿R
"
￿
(￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t)
where R ￿
d￿t
didis
t
d~ yt
didis
t
=
@￿t
@idis
t + @￿t
@￿ ￿tjtK￿ ￿
@~ yt
@idis
t +
@~ yt
@￿ ￿tjtK￿ ￿
in equilibrium
It can again be shown that R 2
h
￿; ￿
1￿￿￿￿ ￿
i
where R approaches its lower bound as
￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿
! 1
so that private agents attribute any change in the interest rate to a demand shock. When
￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿
! 0, interest rate changes have their largest possible e⁄ect on in￿ ation target beliefs and
R approaches its largest possible equilibrium value. In fact, since this optimality condition
is identical to (1.15) with R "
￿￿ ￿t in place of ￿ yt, the implied equilibrium interest rate behavior
will also mirror the case of an output target shock with this change of variables.
The stationary equilibrium under this optimality condition is given by
~ yt =
R "
￿
1 + R"
￿ ￿t ￿
1
￿ (R")
2 ￿￿￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R")(1 + R")
￿ ￿tjt
￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t = ￿
1
1 + R"
￿ ￿t +
R"￿￿￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R")(1 + R")
￿ ￿tjt
The results so far have coincided with the output gap target case. The main di⁄erences in
these two cases are in the implications for communication policy. In the case of an in￿ ation
target, partial communication of only demand now becomes unambiguously optimal for the
expected future loss. The best communication strategy for the current period loss will still
depend on the realizations of shocks. The following proposition states these results where I
again denote the case of partial communication of only the demand shock by a superscript
d.
Proposition 9 Under an equilibrium where R ￿ 0,
441. The expected future loss is always lowest under communication of only dt, that is
E
CB
t L
d
t+1 ￿ E
CB
t L
PI
t+1 and E
CB
t L
d
t+1 ￿ E
CB
t Lt+1
2. For the current period loss, communication of only dt is always preferable to full com-
munication.
l
d
t ￿ l
PI
t for any realization of shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ ￿;tg
However, whether it is preferable to no communication depends on the current realiza-
tions of shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ ￿;tg.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason for this di⁄erence is that, in contrast to the output gap target case, it￿ s less
costly for the central bank to bring in￿ ation closer to the in￿ ation target when this target is
known by private agents. To better understand the intuition, consider the case of a positive
shock to the output gap target. If ￿rms are aware of this higher target, they will raise
prices more today in anticipation of equilibrium output being higher for some time. This
increased in￿ ation will have a negative e⁄ect on consumer demand, thus undermining the
central bank￿ s e⁄orts to boost output towards the higher target. In the case of a positive
shock to the in￿ ation target, making ￿rms aware of this elevated target will also lead them
to raise prices more today for a given level of current output. However, this is now bene￿cial
to the central bank￿ s e⁄orts to achieve a higher in￿ ation target.
In summary, when interest rate changes have an e⁄ect on private agents￿beliefs about
either an output gap target and or in￿ ation target, it￿ s possible to observe increases in
in￿ ation and output following interest rate surprises. In addition, signaling e⁄ects about
either type of shock will lead a discretionary policymaker to choose to maintain smaller
in￿ ation deviations from target than he would under perfect information, thus resulting
in a reduction in the stabilization bias arising from a lack of commitment. However, the
45implications di⁄er for communication policy in that the central bank is better able to achieve
its stabilization goals when private agents￿beliefs about the in￿ ation target move with the
true in￿ ation target.
1.6.3 Lagged states not observed
When agents cannot see the true lagged states, then beliefs are formed through a Kalman
￿lter rather than a static signal extraction problem. This is the information structure which
is more commonly found in the recent literature studying imperfect information in New
Keynesian models such as Lorenzoni (2009), Mertens (2011), Berkelmans (2011). The same
technique from Svensson and Woodford (2003) used above to deal with the circularity issue
present in the belief formation problem can also be applied here. With ￿d;￿￿ y < 1 and
constant variances, this Kalman ￿lter converges to a steady state where beliefs are given by
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t ￿ fddtjt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿ ytjt￿1
￿
where dt+1jt = ￿ddtjt and ￿ yt+1jt = ￿￿ y￿ ytjt. In this steady state, the ^ Kd; ^ K￿ y coe¢ cients are
functions of the parameters
￿
￿d;￿￿ y;fd;f￿ y;￿2
d;￿2
￿ y
￿
. The main di⁄erence now is that agents￿
prior beliefs are no longer reset based on observations of the true lagged values in each period.
Rather, beliefs from period t form the prior belief for period t+1. In essence, this change in
the information structure turns private agents￿beliefs into an additional set of endogenous
state variables which policy in￿ uences.
This adds another dimension to the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect. When agents can
see lagged true fundamentals, the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect is limited to private agents￿
current expectations. When agents cannot see lagged fundamentals, the policymaker￿ s choice
of the current interest rate now also a⁄ects future beliefs and thereby, future outcomes. This
46additional e⁄ect adds a set of new terms to the policymaker￿ s optimality condition
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In equilibrium, this optimality condition still implies a forward-looking optimal interest
rate level which is linear in
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
. When expressed in this form, the optimal
interest rate no longer moves one-for-one with the natural real rate and a part that￿ s linear
in
￿
￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
. To be precise, I denote the optimal interest rate and policy coe¢ cients under
this altered information structure by a superscript ￿￿ and show that
Proposition 10 In general, when agents cannot see lagged true states
i
￿￿
t 6= r
n
t + f
￿￿
￿ y ￿ yt + f
￿￿
￿ y;b￿ ytjt for any f
￿￿
￿ y ;f
￿￿
￿ y;b
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition behind this property, suppose instead that the interest rate
continues to respond one-for-one to rn
t = ￿
￿
dt ￿ ￿ddtjt
￿
. This o⁄sets the contemporaneous
e⁄ects of the natural real rate on outcomes so that ultimately, ~ yt and ￿t move only with
variations in the true level and belief about the output gap target. However, now that
agents cannot see lagged true states, the current forecast error made about demand carries
through to the next period and a⁄ects future outcomes through ￿ yt+1jt+1. Thus, dt and dtjt
have a new intertemporal e⁄ect on future outcomes through the forecast error dt ￿ dtjt. A
policymaker with an information advantage can detect this forecast error and foresee this
e⁄ect. This introduces a new element to the tradeo⁄he faces when deciding how to respond
to dt and dtjt; which alters the resulting optimal response. The following corollary gives
special cases where this new consideration does not apply and the policymaker again ￿nds
it optimal to set a nominal interest rate that moves one-for-one with the natural real rate.
Corollary 11 (i) Under ^ Kd = 0, ^ K￿ y = 0, or ￿￿ y = ￿d, the interest rate does not a⁄ect future
47beliefs and optimal policy is the same as the case where agents could see lagged true states.
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(ii) When ￿d = 0, the optimal interest rate responds one-for-one to the natural real rate, but
the responses to the output gap target and private agents￿belief about it di⁄er.
i
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￿ y ￿ yt + f
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Proof. See Appendix.
In the ￿rst set of special cases, beliefs become a function only of the current interest
rate in equilibrium so there is no e⁄ect of a marginal change in the interest rate on future
outcomes. In the second special case with ￿d = 0, though the current interest rate still
a⁄ects future outcomes through prior beliefs that agents carry into the next period, the
current forecast error for the demand shock has no intertemporal e⁄ect on future beliefs.
Then, the tradeo⁄ with respect to dt and dtjt becomes equivalent to the case above where
they only have contemporaneous e⁄ects.
1.6.4 Optimal policy under dynamic time-varying uncertainty
Here, I consider optimal policy under dynamically varying demand and output gap target
uncertainty of the kind assumed in Section 1.2. To review, in this speci￿cation, the shocks
￿d;t and ￿￿ y;t are serially uncorrelated, uncorrelated with each other, and normally distributed
with means zero and variances ￿2
d;t￿1 and ￿2
￿ y;t￿1, respectively. In the case of static variances,
I showed that the optimal policy features policy coe¢ cients f￿
￿ y and f￿
￿ y;b that depend on the
relative variance
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y. Because of this, I conjecture an equilibrium where policy coe¢ cients
are now time-varying through a dependence on the time-varying relative variances. I assume
that private agents know the entire history of variances so that they still know the true
current value of the policy coe¢ cients. Then, their beliefs take the same form as above
48with the only di⁄erence being time subscripts on the policy coe¢ cients. Due to this time
dependence, I conjecture that in equilibrium, ~ yt and ￿t are linear in
￿
dt; ￿ yt;dtjt; ￿ ytjt
￿
with
time-varying coe¢ cients. This means that the policymaker now takes as given that agents￿
expectations of future outcomes are linear in beliefs with time-varying coe¢ cients that he
takes as given.
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Beliefs are formed as follows
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 + Kd;t
￿
i
dis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + K￿ y;t
￿
i
dis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
where Kd;t =
fd;t
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d;t
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 + f2
￿ y;t
and K￿ y;t =
f￿ y;t
f2
d;t
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 + f2
￿ y;t
and the policymaker also takes Kd;t and K￿ y;t as given.
In this setting, the policymaker￿ s optimality condition has the same form as before
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿Rt
"
￿
￿t
where Rt is now characterized by a nonlinear stochastic di⁄erence equation whose forcing
variable is
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1 (see Appendix). Furthermore, the optimal interest rate is
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where f￿
￿ y;t is a function of Rt alone and f￿
￿ y;b;t can be written as
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491.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I explored the impact of a signaling channel on the conduct of optimal interest
rate policy as well as equilibrium responses to policy surprises. I found that a discretionary
policymaker who is better informed about an output gap target can in￿ uence in￿ ation ex-
pectations in a way that tilts the short-run in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ toward a policy that
maintains smaller in￿ ation ￿ uctuations. This e⁄ect is stronger when the policymaker has a
larger impact on in￿ ation expectations. As this in￿ uence grows, the optimal discretionary
policy approaches the optimal policy under commitment to a forward-looking interest rate
rule. Compared to the perfect information case, the signaling e⁄ect reduces the stabilization
bias which typically exists when the policymaker is unable to commit. This contributes
to the ￿nding that it is optimal for the policymaker to maintain some information advan-
tage, which helps to rationalize the Federal Reserve￿ s policy of publishing sta⁄ economic
projections with a ￿ve-year lag.
For a general interest rate rule, I showed that when the policymaker is better informed
about demand shocks (or shocks to the natural real rate of interest) and the policy response
to these shocks is inadequate, the it is possible to see positive responses of current economic
activity and forecasts to interest rate tightening. This matches the empirical patterns found
in the present paper as well as previous work in Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell, Evans,
Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013). Tang (2014a) provides
new empirical evidence showing that the responses of in￿ ation forecasts to positive interest
rate surprises are strongly positive when prior uncertainty about in￿ ation is high, as predicted
under this information setup.
Though this paper examined a model of monetary policy, the logic behind the optimal
policy results is generalizable to other settings where a policymaker possesses superior in-
formation and has the potential to in￿ uence outcomes through expectations. The positive
results showing that the economy can sometimes grow in response to a supposedly contrac-
tionary policy action can also manifest in other scenarios where policy is intended to be
50countercyclical, such as ￿scal policy.
A natural extension of this paper which I reserve for future work is a study of the impact
of incorporating a zero lower bound. In this environment, even optimal policy will not be
able to adequately respond to ￿ uctuations in the natural real rate, thus making it more likely
that supposedly expansionary policy actions, taken when the economy is close hitting to the
ZLB, can lead to further declines in economic activity.
Lastly, though the linearized form of the model used in this paper was crucial for ob-
taining closed-form results on optimal policy, I plan to revisit the optimal communication
policy question in a more realistic framework that includes higher-order welfare e⁄ects of
uncertainty as well as a channel for communication to impact the transmission of interest
rate policy through its e⁄ects on risk premia.
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Uncertainty and the Signaling
Channel of Monetary Policy:
Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The information advantage of the Federal Reserve has received an increasing amount of
empirical support over the past few decades. Media accounts of Federal Reserve policy
actions often interpret them as being indicative of the strength of the economy. The Federal
Reserve may have an information advantage for a few reasons. A direct source of information
advantage could come through access to con￿dential data. For example, the Federal Reserve
produces data on industrial production as well as many series related to the banking sector
so it￿ s very likely that, at the very least, the central bank has more detailed or more timely
information than the public regarding these variables. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve
Board employs nearly three hundred Ph.D. economists, not to mention those employed at
the various regional Reserve Banks. The vast resources dedicated to processing data which is
available to all agents could a⁄ord the Federal Reserve an advantage in forecasting relevant
52economic fundamentals. In this setting, monetary policy actions that respond to these
fundamentals will convey information to ￿nancial market participants in a process which I
will refer to as the signaling channel.
My previous work in Tang (2014b) explored the theoretical implications of the signaling
e⁄ect of monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where the central bank has an infor-
mation advantage over the demand level and an output gap target. That model is able to
produce positive responses of forecasts of economic activity to interest rate surprises when
the policy response to demand shocks is inadequate and positive interest rate surprises are
a strong enough signal of higher demand. In particular, the model produces implications
regarding the interaction between uncertainty and the e⁄ect that interest rate surprises have
on in￿ ation and output forecasts.
In this paper, I present new empirical evidence in support of this type of interaction
e⁄ect. More speci￿cally, I present empirical evidence of a positive e⁄ect of interest rate
surprises on in￿ ation forecasts which is concentrated in periods when forecasters reported
high uncertainty over the previously made forecast. This result adds to the existing empirical
evidence of a monetary policy signaling e⁄ect found in Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell,
Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013).
The main focus of my analysis is in￿ ation forecasts since they play a key role in many
macroeconomic models. Consequently, there is also a large body of empirical work on in￿ a-
tion forecasts serving as precedent for the following analysis. I use forecasts from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. I mea-
sure federal funds rate surprises using futures prices following Kuttner (2001) and estimate
a slightly positive e⁄ect of these surprises on in￿ ation forecasts over the 1989Q1-2011Q1
period. This echoes a result from an earlier sample in Romer and Romer (2000). I then
decompose this overall e⁄ect by showing that the e⁄ect is especially strong in periods when
forecasters had high uncertainty regarding their previous forecast. This further substantiates
an explanation based on a signaling e⁄ect of these policy actions. Competing explanations
53for the positive overall e⁄ect, such as a cost channel where higher interest rates raise ￿rms￿
￿nancing costs, do not naturally generate this type of interaction1. I repeat the analysis for
real output growth forecasts, also from the SPF, and ￿nd similar qualitative results though
these estimates are less precise.
In another set of empirical results, I estimate time-varying gain coe¢ cients measuring the
response of in￿ ation forecasts to general news about in￿ ation. I estimate the coe¢ cients at
an annual frequency for the 1971-2012 period and show that there is substantial variation in
this coe¢ cient over time. Furthermore, I show that these estimates are negatively correlated
with forecast dispersion and positively correlated with subjective uncertainty in a way that is
consistent with the predictions of the noisy information framework. This adds to the evidence
found in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012b) in
support of the noisy information framework.
The next subsection reviews the related literature. Section 2.2 sets up the model while
2.3 describes the data used. I present general time-varying estimates of the response of
in￿ ation forecasts to news about in￿ ation in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 estimates the e⁄ect of
interest rate surprises on in￿ ation forecast revisions and shows that the e⁄ects are indeed
more positive when prior uncertainty about in￿ ation is high. Section 2.6 repeats this analysis
using forecasts of real output growth and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.1.1 Related literature
This paper re￿nes the work in Romer and Romer (2000), Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and
Justiniano (2012), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) which suggest that interest rate
surprises convey information regarding the state of the economy. I show that the slightly
positive responses of in￿ ation forecasts to policy actions found in Romer and Romer (2000)
are also present in a later sample and are robust to using interest rate surprises derived
from federal funds futures prices. I relate this result more directly to a signaling e⁄ect of
1I show below that forecasters￿subjective uncertainty is not highly correlated with other measures of
economic activity or uncertainty.
54monetary policy by showing a positive interaction between these responses and subjective
uncertainty over previous in￿ ation forecasts. I also obtain similar results for real output
forecasts although the estimates are less precise. My results also relate to the work of Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012b) on the estimation of
noisy information models. I estimate higher frequency time-variation in the responses of
in￿ ation forecasts to news and show that these responses correlate with forecast dispersion
and prior uncertainty in the directions suggested by noisy information models.
Ellingsen and S￿derstr￿m (2001), Erceg and Levin (2003), and G￿rkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (2005b) use an interest rate signaling e⁄ect to explain various features of macro-
economic data including in￿ ation persistence and the response of the yield curve to monetary
policy actions. Melosi (2013) structurally estimates a dispersed information DSGE model
where monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule that responds to aggregate vari-
ables which individual ￿rms cannot observe. He shows that allowing for a monetary policy
signaling e⁄ect enables the model to ￿t in￿ ation forecast data from the SPF better than
the corresponding perfect information model. However, he does not allow for time-varying
uncertainty in his estimation.
2.2 Empirical model
The regressions below are motivated using a model that assumes an AR(1) reduced form
for in￿ ation along with a Taylor-style interest rate rule that responds directly to in￿ ation2.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012b) show that this
type of reduced-form framework characterizes in￿ ation forecast data well.
Suppose that in￿ ation follows an AR(1) process
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "t
2I show in the Appendix that the New Keynesian structural model in Tang (2014b) can be modi￿ed
slightly to give similar empirical relationships as the ones tested below.
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is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with time-varying
variances. Agents cannot observe ￿t directly but instead receive two signals: one from the
observed interest rate which responds to true in￿ ation and another composite signal which
contains idiosyncratic noise.
it = ￿￿t + ut
sjt = ￿t + ejt
I assume ￿ > 0 and that the two signal noise terms fut;ejtg are also serially uncorrelated
and normally distributed with variances that are identical across agents and possibly time-
varying. Agents additionally observe lagged in￿ ation without noise. This is a departure from
the empirical models used in previous studies which generally assume that agents cannot see
true in￿ ation at any lag. Another di⁄erence is the explicit inclusion of an interest rate signal
containing additional information about in￿ ation. A main element of this formulation is the
interest rate￿ s response to true in￿ ation. If, for example, the interest rate was a function only
of private beliefs about ￿t, then it would not convey any additional information to private
agents and it would not enter independently into forecasts.
Each agent j has the information set Ijt =
n
￿t￿1;it;st
j;(￿2
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to
and forms his conditional
expectation of current in￿ ation via a static Gaussian signal extraction problem which yields
￿tjjt = ￿￿￿t￿1 + K
i
t (it ￿ E [itj￿t￿1]) + K
s
t (sjt ￿ E [sjtj￿t￿1])
where Ki
t 2
￿
0;￿
￿1￿
and Ks
t 2 (0;1) are increasing in ￿2
";t￿1, which captures prior uncertainty.
This expression can be transformed into two di⁄erent testable relationships.
First, the news from both the interest rate and composite signal sjt can be combined into
a current nowcast error term which re￿ ects all current period news. This gives the following
equation for forecast revisions for di⁄erent horizons h ￿ 0
￿t+hjjt ￿ ￿t+hjj;t￿1 = Kt￿
h
￿
￿
￿t ￿ ￿tjj;t￿1
￿
+ (1 ￿ Kt)￿
h+1
￿
￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jj;t￿1
￿
+ errorjht (2.1)
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t + Ks
t 2 (0;1) and is decreasing in signal noise and increasing in prior
uncertainty ￿2
";t￿1. errorjht may be correlated across individuals and horizons but are un-
correlated across time and with the other RHS variables. This expression states that the
e⁄ect of general in￿ ation news on forecasts will be time-varying. In particular, the e⁄ect of
current nowcast errors on in￿ ation forecast revisions is increasing in prior uncertainty and
the e⁄ect of lagged forecast errors will be decreasing in prior uncertainty.
Secondly, the model also makes predictions about the e⁄ect of interest rate surprises on
in￿ ation forecast revisions. With additional data on aggregate interest rate surprises, one
can test the following relationship for aggregate forecast revisions
￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1 = ￿
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￿K
i
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￿
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￿
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￿ (1 ￿ K
s
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￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1
￿
+ errorht
The last error term in this equation is a function of the average noise in st and is not
correlated with the other RHS terms. This gives a regression equation that is nearly identical
to equation (5) in Romer and Romer (2000). The main di⁄erence is that while they use the
Federal Reserve￿ s forecasts to control for other in￿ ation-related news, all relevant news in
this model is captured by the lagged forecast and nowcast errors.
Extensions of the empirical model
I can allow for a standard direct negative e⁄ect of it on ￿t of the following form
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 ￿ ￿it + "t
where ￿ > 0 and the expressions for it and sjt continue to be those given above. This yields
a solution for ￿t that is similar to the above model
￿t = ￿ ￿￿￿t￿1 +
1
1 + ￿￿
"t ￿
￿
1 + ￿￿
ut where ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿
1 + ￿￿
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this case, forecast revisions evolve as
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where ￿ Ki
t may now take on negative values but both ￿ Ki
t and ￿ Ks
t are still increasing in ￿2
";t￿1.
If I do not allow agents to observe lagged in￿ ation, then agents￿forecasts are described
by a Kalman ￿lter3. In this case, aggregate forecast revisions evolve as
￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1 = ￿
h
￿ ^ K
i
t
￿
it ￿ itjt￿1
￿
+ ￿
h
￿ ^ K
s
t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1
￿
+ errorht
where ^ Ki
t 2
￿
0;￿
￿1￿
and ^ Ks
t 2 (0;1) are now increasing in prior uncertainty, V art￿1 (￿t),
which itself is increasing in ￿2
";t￿1. The lagged nowcast term drops out of the regression
equation. However, this term enters signi￿cantly in the regressions below, suggesting that
the assumption that agents can see lagged in￿ ation is valid.
2.3 Data
For aggregate in￿ ation forecasts, I use median forecasts from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The survey starts in 1968Q4
and is quarterly with about 40 respondents in each quarter. I look speci￿cally at quarterly
forecasts of the GNP/GDP de￿ ator (GDP starting in 1992). Real GNP/GDP growth and
unemployment forecasts are used for some robustness checks. One unique feature of the SPF
is that, in addition to point forecasts, it also asks respondents to report forecasted proba-
bility distributions for annual in￿ ation. This allows me to impute a measure of subjective
uncertainty over in￿ ation.
3This is the linear least-squares forecast which is also optimal if we additionally assume that agents￿prior
beliefs about the initial state ￿0 are normally distributed.
58For some speci￿cations, I also use the Federal Reserve￿ s Greenbook forecasts of the
GNP/GDP de￿ ator4 which are published with a ￿ve year lag starting in December 1965.
For actual data, I use real-time data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
taking values from a two-quarters ahead vintage (e.g., the 2001Q1 observation for in￿ ation
is taken from the 2001Q3 vintage). This timing is chosen to correspond to the ￿nal published
NIPA estimates prior to annual or benchmark revisions.
To measure policy surprises, I use prices for 30-day federal funds futures obtained from
Bloomberg which start in December 1988. I use the method described in Kuttner (2001) to
construct surprises on policy news days. I de￿ne these as days when the target rate changed
or scheduled Federal Open Market Committee meeting days starting in 1994 (some dating
adjustments were made following Kuttner (2003)). As described in Swanson (2006), the
FOMC only began issuing post-meeting press releases in 1994. Additionally, rate changes
were not strongly associated with meeting days prior to 1994. For instance, only 31% of
actual target changes from the start of 1989 to the end of 1993 were associated with sched-
uled meetings compared to 86% starting in 1994 until the target e⁄ectively hit zero in late
2008. Thus, pre-1994 meeting days when no change was made are not categorized as news
days, but the results are not sensitive to this choice. To get a measure of policy surprises
that corresponds to the quarterly SPF timing, I sum one-day policy surprises between SPF
deadlines5.
Finally, in the regressions estimating the e⁄ect of news from interest rate surprises, I
exclude dates after 2011Q1 due the Fed￿ s decision to begin regularly releasing economic
projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Bank presidents in conjunction with
post-meeting press releases. The results are not sensitive to this choice.
4The Greenbook switches to forecasting the GDP de￿ ator measure ￿ve months after the SPF switched
so these observations are excluded.
5Deadline dates are available starting in 1990Q2. Prior to that, I use the 15th of the middle month of
each quarter.
592.3.1 Imputing subjective uncertainty
I proxy subjective uncertainty using the SPF￿ s probability forecasts for the GNP/GDP de-
￿ ator where agents report probabilities of in￿ ation being in pre-de￿ned ranges. Starting in
1981Q3, the survey consistently contains these reports for both the current and following
years￿in￿ ation as measured by the percentage change in the annual averages of the price
index. To impute the variance associated with these forecasts, I ￿t a normal distribution to
the data by minimizing the sum of squared di⁄erences between the reports and the probabil-
ities for the same ranges implied by a normal distribution following Giordani and S￿derlind
(2003) and Lahiri and Liu (2006). More formally, for a given set of reported probabilities
fqng
N
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N
n=1, I solve the problem
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￿
￿￿￿2
I remove individual-level post-1991 means from these variances to account for a switch
from GNP to GDP measures and a change in the number of ranges provided in the survey
from 6 to 10. In the analysis below, I use the median of the adjusted variances of forecasts
for the next year￿ s in￿ ation as a proxy of subjective forecast uncertainty, denoted as Std￿
t .
The following table shows that this measure is not highly correlated with macroeconomic
variables or other measures of uncertainty commonly used in the literature on uncertainty
shocks6. This low correlation with other uncertainty measures is not surprising since they
capture many aspects of economic uncertainty and not just those related to in￿ ation. The low
correlation with macroeconomic variables indicates that regressions containing interactions
with this measure of subjective uncertainty are unlikely to be picking up nonlinearities or
state-dependence related to the business cycle.
6Uncertainty measures are from the dataset accompanying Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) as well
as the policy-related economic uncertainty described in Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) and available at
www.policyuncertainty.com.
60Table 2.1: Correlations between Std￿
t and macro variables
x xt￿1 xt xt+1
Macro Variables
In￿ ation ￿0:02 0:12 ￿0:09
Real GNP/GDP growth ￿0:08 0:02 0:10
Uncertainty Measures
Google econ uncertainty index 0:24** 0:13 0:12
Stock volatility 0:02 ￿0:11 ￿0:10
Policy uncertainty index 0:07 ￿0:05 ￿0:05
Notes: These correlations are computed with the longest samples available
in the data. The sample sizes vary between 110 and 124 quarters. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿
Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
2.4 Time-variation in sensitivity of in￿ ation forecasts
to news
I ￿rst examine the overall e⁄ect of all in￿ ation news on forecasts given in (2.1). Using 17,716
observations of individual level quarterly data over the period 1971-2012, I obtain annual
estimates using a nonlinear least squares estimation of the following equation with standard
errors clustered within quarters7.
￿t+hjjt ￿ ￿t+hjj;t￿1 = ￿ht + K
FE
yeart￿
h
￿
￿
￿t ￿ ￿tjj;t￿1
￿
+ K
NE
yeart￿
h+1
￿
￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jj;t￿1
￿
+ errorjht
Figure 2.1 shows estimates of my main coe¢ cients of interest which are the time-varying
responses of in￿ ation forecasts to current news.
7Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012a) also estimates time-varying sensivity of forecasts to news using a
di⁄erent empirical approach. They discuss low frequency changes in this parameter associated with the
Great Moderation.
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Figure 2.1: Annual estimates of KFE
yeart
There is substantial time-variation in this coe¢ cient. Table 2.2 shows that the estimates
correlate negatively with forecast dispersion (an imperfect proxy for idiosyncratic signal
noise8) and positively with my measure of prior uncertainty as predicted by the model.
Table 2.2: Correlations between ^ KFE
yeart and signal noise or prior uncertainty
Variable Correlation
Dispersion: h = 0 ￿0:39**
Dispersion: h = 1 ￿0:30*
Dispersion: h = 2 ￿0:36**
Dispersion: h = 3 ￿0:15
Dispersion: h = 4 ￿0:13
Lagged current year uncertainty 0:40**
Lagged next year uncertainty 0:38**
Notes: Correlations are calculated between annual coe¢ -
cient estimates and annual means of the variables. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿
Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respec-
tively.
8The proxy is imperfect due to a nonmonotonic relationship between idiosyncratic signal noise and forecast
dispersion. Forecast dispersion becomes decreasing in idiosyncratic signal noise when it is high relative to
the variability of in￿ ation innovations and the exogenous component of the interest rate. As sjt becomes
dominated by noise, agents optimally ignore these signals and forecast dispersion approaches zero.
62Meanwhile, time-variation in these estimates does not seem to be associated with macro-
economic variables or other common measures of uncertainty as shown in Table 2.3. The
fact that these correlations are lower than the ones in Table 2.2 suggests that the variation
in in￿ ation forecast sensitivity to news is more related to an information story than other
explanations.
Table 2.3: Correlations between ^ KFE
yeart and macro variables
x xyeart￿1 xyeart xyeart+1
Macro Variables
In￿ ation ￿0:03 ￿0:07 ￿0:09
Real GNP/GDP growth ￿0:05 0:28* 0:21
Uncertainty Measures
Google econ uncertainty index ￿0:18 ￿0:07 ￿0:14
Stock volatility 0:20 0:00 ￿0:05
Policy uncertainty index ￿0:02 ￿0:22 ￿0:18
Notes: Correlations are calculated between annual coe¢ cient estimates and
annual means of the variables. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and
10 percent, respectively.
2.5 E⁄ect of interest rate surprises on in￿ ation fore-
casts
In this section, I separately estimate the impact of interest rate news on in￿ ation forecasts
and present the main empirical result in support of the interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect. My
estimates echo the ￿ndings in Table 8 of Romer and Romer (2000) which shows that monetary
policy tightening seems to have a mildly positive (though not statistically signi￿cant) e⁄ect
on in￿ ation forecasts. This can be seen as estimating a version of (2.2) with constant
coe¢ cients.
My analysis di⁄ers from theirs in several ways. First, my sample period is 1989:Q1 to
632011:Q1 which has little overlap with their sample of 1974:Q3 to 1991:Q4 with the Volcker
years removed. Secondly, I use lagged forecast and nowcast errors as my summary measures
of "other news" as implied by the above empirical model while they used changes in the
Federal Reserve￿ s Greenbook forecast. Lastly, they used federal funds rate changes or a
dummy variable based on articles in the Wall Street Journal following Cook and Hahn
(1989a) and Cook and Hahn (1989b) to measure monetary policy actions. For my regressions,
I instead use interest rate surprises measured using daily federal funds futures prices which
arguably has less of an endogeneity problem.
Despite these di⁄erences, I am able to qualitatively replicate their result as shown in
Table 2.4. In fact, the regressions show that this positive e⁄ect of surprise interest rate
tightening on in￿ ation forecast revisions is actually signi￿cant at a 10% or better level for
all four forecast horizons. The coe¢ cients are larger than those estimated by Romer and
Romer (2000) owing to the fact that the average magnitude of interest rate surprises is only
about one-third the average size of target changes.
Table 2.4: Baseline e⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 0:304* 0:267** 0:332*** 0:181*
[1:81] [2:14] [2:76] [1:79]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 0:101*** 0:020 0:028 0:030
[2:69] [0:89] [1:27] [1:32]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 0:191*** 0:143*** 0:067*** 0:095***
[3:79] [4:30] [2:94] [3:55]
Adjusted R2 0:325 0:278 0:204 0:216
N 88 88 88 88
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1
and 1996:Q1 dropped due to switches in the SPF from the GNP to GDP
de￿ ator and then subsequently to the GDP price index making the lagged
forecast unavailable in those periods. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1,
5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are
given in brackets.
64To further build upon this and test the main prediction that Ki
t is higher when agents
have more uncertainty over the last forecast they made, I interact the news variables in
this regression with the measure of subjective prior uncertainty described above. Table 2.5
shows the results of interacting each news variable with a dummy indicating whether Std￿
t￿1
is below or above its median.
Table 2.5: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts with a high vs low prior
uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:081 0:110 0:114 0:144
[0:45] [0:85] [1:20] [1:49]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:666** 0:428** 0:756*** 0:212
[2:37] [2:05] [4:52] [0:84]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:064 ￿0:023 ￿0:007 0:026
[1:01] [￿0:61] [￿0:21] [0:73]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:116** 0:043 0:039 0:029
[2:35] [1:52] [1:54] [1:11]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:0:230*** 0:199*** 0:097*** 0:112***
[3:13] [4:45] [3:21] [3:11]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:141** 0:071* 0:042 0:066
[2:60] [1:93] [1:49] [1:65]
Std￿
t￿1 high 0:113* 0:068 0:082** 0:022
[1:82] [1:64] [2:26] [0:57]
Adjusted R2 0:335 0:313 0:276 0:189
N 88 88 88 88
P-value of F-test of
di⁄erence in it ￿ itjt￿1 coef 0:083 0:199 0:001 0:801
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 and 1996:Q1 dropped
due to switches in the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator and then subsequently to the GDP price
index making the lagged forecast unavailable in those periods. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at
1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in brackets.
Compared to the baseline results, the coe¢ cient on interest rates surprises in periods
of low prior uncertainty are smaller and not statistically signi￿cant while the coe¢ cients
65in periods of high uncertainty are higher and statistically signi￿cant (save for the farthest
horizon). F-tests show that the di⁄erences in these coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant
in a few of the horizons as well. In addition, the interactions on the news captured by the
lagged forecast and nowcast errors also go in the predicted directions.
Table 2.6 shows that estimating a continuous interaction with prior uncertainty produces
the same qualitative results. Here, the prior uncertainty measure is standardized to have
zero mean and standard deviation of one. Thus, the coe¢ cients for the main e⁄ects of
interest rate surprises, lagged forecast errors, and nowcast errors may be interpreted as the
average e⁄ect when prior uncertainty is at its mean value. In this set of results, it￿ s evident
that the interaction e⁄ect is stronger at shorter horizons. One candidate explanation of this
is that the Federal Reserve￿ s information advantage in forecasting in￿ ation is stronger at
lower horizons. Some evidence supporting this possibility is presented in Table 4 of Sims
(2003) which shows results of a test of whether the Federal Reserve￿ s in￿ ation forecast has a
lower RMSE than the SPF￿ s average forecast. The evidence presented there is stronger for
one-quarter-ahead forecasts than for four-quarter-ahead forecasts.
Lastly, comparing the adjusted R2 values to the baseline case indicates that allowing for
this interaction improves the model￿ s ability to explain forecast revisions.
66Table 2.6: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts with a continuous prior
uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 0:452*** 0:254 0:352** 0:147
[2:92] [1:63] [2:19] [1:07]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 0:422** 0:235* 0:187 ￿0:098
[2:07] [1:70] [1:64] [￿0:77]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 0:091** 0:022 0:028 0:034
[2:60] [0:99] [1:31] [1:48]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 0:070* 0:062** 0:038** 0:005
[1:73] [2:38] [2:15] [0:20]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 0:215*** 0:144*** 0:065*** 0:090***
[3:99] [4:30] [2:84] [3:07]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 ￿0:048 ￿0:071* ￿0:027 0:023
[￿0:79] [￿1:73] [￿0:93] [0:63]
Std￿
t￿1 0:015 0:019 0:046*** 0:004
[0:41] [0:88] [2:69] [0:22]
Adjusted R2 0:347 0:296 0:239 0:193
N 88 88 88 88
Notes: Std￿
t￿1 is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation of one. The sample is
quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 and 1996:Q1 dropped due to switches in
the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator and then subsequently to the GDP price index making the
lagged forecast unavailable in those periods. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent,
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in brackets.
2.5.1 Robustness checks
One might be concerned that forecasters take into account other variables when making
in￿ ation forecasts. To address this issue, I also run speci￿cations with added measures of
news about either real output growth or unemployment. These news terms are proxied
analogously with lagged forecast and nowcast errors. The tables given in the Appendix show
that the results remain unchanged. In fact, with these additional controls, the interaction
e⁄ect of prior uncertainty on the response to interest rate surprises becomes stronger.
I get similar results using the Federal Reserve￿ s Greenbook forecast revisions as the proxy
67for other news (following Romer and Romer (2000)) though I lose some observations due to
the Greenbook￿ s ￿ve year publication lag. The estimates are also almost identical with the
lagged SPF forecast on the right hand side with a coe¢ cient that is not constrained to one.
2.6 E⁄ect of interest rate surprises on output forecasts
In this section, I repeat the exercises in Section 2.5 for real output forecasts. Romer and
Romer (2000) ￿nds that the Federal Reserve also possesses an information advantage in
forecasting real output relative to the SPF though the evidence seems to be weaker than
that for in￿ ation forecasts (Sims (2003) con￿rms this di⁄erence as well). Thus, it may be
possible that a signaling e⁄ect of interest rate surprises also exists for real output.
All the variables used in these exercises are constructed in the same way as those corre-
sponding to the above in￿ ation measures. Table 2.7 shows that the prior uncertainty measure
for output exhibits slightly stronger, but still small, correlations with macroeconomic vari-
ables and other measures of uncertainty than the prior uncertainty measure for in￿ ation.
The contemporaneous correlation between Std￿
t and Std
y
t is .55.
Table 2.7: Correlations between Std
y
t and macro variables
x xt￿1 xt xt+1
Macro Variables
In￿ ation ￿0:12 ￿0:05 ￿0:19**
Real GNP/GDP growth ￿0:22** ￿0:05 ￿0:01
Uncertainty Measures
Google econ uncertainty index 0:28** 0:22** 0:12
Stock volatility 0:12 0:02 ￿0:09
Policy uncertainty index 0:17* 0:13 ￿0:04
Notes: These correlations are computed with the longest samples available
in the data. The sample sizes vary between 110 and 124 quarters. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿
Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
68Table 2.8 shows the baseline e⁄ect of surprise interest rate tightening on real output
forecast revisions. The coe¢ cients are large and positive for shorter forecast horizons but
turn negative at the farthest forecast horizon. Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) also ￿nd a
positive overall e⁄ect of interest rate surprises on real output forecasts from the Blue Chip
Economic Indicators survey that is generally larger and more statistically signi￿cant for
shorter horizons.
Table 2.8: Baseline e⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on output forecasts
Dependent variable: yt+hjt ￿ yt+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 1:245* 0:763 0:014 ￿0:314**
[1:94] [1:40] [0:07] [￿2:11]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 0:205*** 0:115*** 0:060** 0:027
[4:21] [2:92] [2:07] [1:25]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 0:204*** 0:096** 0:030 0:002
[3:73] [2:40] [1:47] [0:14]
Adjusted R2 0:468 0:315 0:097 0:027
N 89 89 89 89
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1
dropped due to the switch in the SPF from real GNP to real GDP making the
lagged forecast unavailable in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at
1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are
given in brackets.
Table 2.9 estimates the same equation with the addition of interactions with a variable
indicating whether Std
y
t￿1 is below or above its median. Compared to the baseline results,
the coe¢ cients on interest rates surprises in periods of high uncertainty are much larger
except for the farthest horizon. However, unlike the estimates for in￿ ation, the di⁄erence in
the e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant. Moreover, the interactions on the news captured by
the lagged forecast goes in the direction predicted by the model while the interactions for
nowcast errors do not.
69Table 2.9: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on output forecasts with a high vs low prior
uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: yt+hjt ￿ yt+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 low 1:022* 0:252 ￿0:140 ￿0:321**
[1:98] [0:54] [￿0:63] [￿2:25]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 high 2:058 1:921* 0:309 ￿0:338
[1:21] [1:69] [0:70] [￿0:86]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 low 0:249*** 0:129** 0:068 0:041
[3:81] [2:22] [1:63] [1:30]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 high 0:123** 0:059 0:039 0:009
[2:04] [1:54] [1:01] [0:38]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 low 0:220*** 0:150*** 0:043 ￿0:005
[3:36] [3:02] [1:48] [￿0:23]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 high 0:174** 0:044 0:016 0:003
[2:24] [0:87] [0:55] [0:13]
Std
y
t￿1 high ￿0:078 0:109 0:077 0:056
[￿0:46] [0:90] [0:77] [0:90]
Adjusted R2 0:468 0:337 0:067 0:005
N 89 89 89 89
P-value of F-test of
di⁄erence in it ￿ itjt￿1 coef 0:562 0:178 0:368 0:967
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to the
switch in the SPF from real GNP to real GDP making the lagged forecast unavailable in that period.
￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are given in brackets.
Table 2.10 shows that similar results can be obtained from an estimation with a contin-
uous interaction with prior uncertainty. Again, I standardize the prior uncertainty measure
to have zero mean and standard deviation of one. The point estimates on the interaction
between interest rate surprises and prior uncertainty are all positive as predicted by the
model, but none are statistically signi￿cant at standard levels. One possible explanation
for the evidence being weaker here is the above-mentioned fact that the Federal Reserve￿ s
information advantage is less strong for output than it is for in￿ ation. Another explanation
70is that real output growth is not characterized as well by an AR(1) process as in￿ ation is.
This could imply that there are omitted variables in the above regressions. This issue will
be addressed in future work.
Table 2.10: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on output forecasts with a continuous prior
uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: yt+hjt ￿ yt+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 1:266* 0:864* 0:026 ￿0:297*
[1:77] [1:68] [0:12] [￿1:79]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 0:166 0:809 0:325 0:201
[0:21] [1:17] [1:64] [1:27]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 0:199*** 0:104** 0:054* 0:025
[3:94] [2:60] [1:77] [1:12]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 ￿0:033 ￿0:019 ￿0:012 ￿0:016
[￿0:58] [￿0:48] [￿0:36] [￿0:72]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 0:197*** 0:091** 0:025 ￿0:002
[3:39] [2:36] [1:38] [￿0:10]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std
y
t￿1 ￿0:022 ￿0:077*** ￿0:044** ￿0:010
[￿0:51] [￿2:70] [￿2:16] [￿0:65]
Std
y
t￿1 0:033 0:146** 0:108*** 0:060*
[0:39] [2:63] [2:80] [1:87]
Adjusted R2 0:446 0:340 0:126 0:023
N 89 89 89 89
Notes: Std
y
t￿1 is standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation of one. The sample is
quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to the switch in the SPF from
real GNP to real GDP making the lagged forecast unavailable in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically
signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given
in brackets.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I presented a reduced-form model of in￿ ation where the nominal interest
rate responds directly to the true level of in￿ ation which is itself only seen by agents with
71a one-period lag. Using this model, I derived testable empirical implications for in￿ ation
forecast revisions. First, the model predicts that in￿ ation forecast revisions will respond
more to general in￿ ation news when prior uncertainty is high and news is less noisy. Since
the interest rate conveys information about the true level of in￿ ation in this model, it also
predicts that interest rate surprises can have a positive impact on in￿ ation forecast revisions
and that this e⁄ect will be increasing in forecasters￿prior uncertainty.
To test these implications, I constructed measures of subjective forecast uncertainty using
the responses to a question in the SPF asking forecasters to report probabilities that future
in￿ ation and output growth would fall within given ranges. First, I estimated general time-
variation in the response of in￿ ation forecasts to overall news and found that this does indeed
correlate positively with the imputed prior uncertainty measure. The estimates also correlate
negatively with forecast dispersion which acts as a proxy for noisiness of news.
Second, I estimated the e⁄ect of interest rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts. Without any
interactions with prior uncertainty, the baseline e⁄ects match the small positive e⁄ects found
in Romer and Romer (2000) and Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012). Adding
interactions with prior uncertainty con￿rm the model￿ s prediction that the e⁄ect is larger
when prior uncertainty is high. This decomposition of the e⁄ect of interest rates on in￿ ation
forecasts further substantiates the existence of a signaling e⁄ect. While other theories, such
as a cost channel, can explain the small positive baseline e⁄ect found in previous studies,
they do not naturally explain this interaction with prior uncertainty.
Lastly, I repeat the exercises using real output growth forecasts and ￿nd similar conclu-
sions though these estimates are not as precise. In the future, it would be interesting to see
whether this empirical relationship also exists for expectations derived from asset prices.
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FOMC Communication and Interest
Rate Sensitivity to News
3.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, it has become widely accepted that central bank communication
can be a valuable monetary policy tool. The aspect of central bank communications that has
received the most attention is the use of forward guidance since many studies have shown
that it may be used to stimulate demand when nominal interest rates are close to zero which
is a situation that many advanced economies currently ￿nd themselves in1. Much of the
empirical work on central bank communication has, likewise, also focused on the e⁄ect of
communications on interest rate expectations.
There has, however, been less attention paid to other dimensions of central bank commu-
nication such as its ability to convey information regarding the policy reaction function. In
this paper, I take a step in this direction by exploring the relationship between the language
used in FOMC texts and ￿nancial market responses to di⁄erent types of macroeconomic
news. In particular, this study looks for the existence of an interaction e⁄ect where empha-
1Some notable examples are Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) while Woodford
(2012) summarizes many of the key issues covered in this literature.
73sis of certain economic topics within FOMC communications might lead to stronger responses
of interest rates to news related to those topics. As central banks are increasingly taking
steps to improve the public￿ s understanding of their objectives and operations, it is important
to gain a better understanding of the potential for ￿nancial markets to glean information
about policy reaction functions from central banks￿communications.
In the current analysis, I focus on the topic of labor due to some relevant recent de-
velopments in Fed communication. As the analysis below shows, the extent of discussion
regarding labor market conditions in FOMC minutes and statements has grown rapidly dur-
ing the recent recession. One especially salient event occurred in December 2012, when the
FOMC decided to start including an explicit unemployment threshold in their statements.
However, rather than taking an event study approach, I instead make use of the large
amount of information available in FOMC texts by constructing a continuous measure cap-
turing the extent of labor-related discussion within these texts. I then relate ￿nancial market
responses to di⁄erent types of macroeconomic news to this measure using two di⁄erent ap-
proaches (both are inspired by the analysis in Swanson and Williams (2014)). The ￿rst
approach involves an initial step where I allow for unrestricted time-variation in the sensitiv-
ity of interest rates to labor news as well as all other news. I then relate my measures of labor
word use in FOMC texts to the di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news versus other news. The
second approach is a more parametric procedure where I estimate an equation expressing
changes in interest rates as a function of news where the di⁄erential response to labor-related
news is restricted to be a function of labor word use in FOMC texts. Both methods show
a positive relationship, and furthermore, this relationship is stronger for interest rates of
longer maturities.
The next subsection reviews the related literature. Section 3.2 gives background on FOMC
texts and describes the word use measure. Section 3.3 describes the estimation of time-
varying sensitivity to news while the relationship between these estimates and the word use
measures are explored in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the more parametric approach
74and 3.6 discusses robustness checks. In Section 3.7, I outline some issues that are left for
future work and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.1.1 Related literature
There are several existing papers measuring the sensitivity of interest rates to macroeconomic
news. Two recent examples are G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) and Faust, Rogers,
Wang, and Wright (2007). Swanson and Williams (2014) estimate time-varying sensitivity
to general macroeconomic news with an emphasis on showing its decline during the current
zero lower bound episode. In this paper, I largely follow their estimation procedures with
the key di⁄erence being a division of news into two categories: labor-related and other.
Thus far, there have been few attempts to relate changes in interest rate sensitivity
to news to central bank communications. One exception is an event study by Bernanke,
Reinhart, and Sack (2004) of the August 2003 introduction of the phrase "considerable
period" into the FOMC statement which is interpreted as indicating concern for the "jobless"
nature of the recovery. They ￿nd that sensitivity of 10-year Treasury yields to news regarding
nonfarm payroll employment is higher after this change.
The existing empirical work examining FOMC communications more generally has fol-
lowed a natural progression2. Some of the ￿rst papers in this area focused on assessing
whether central bank communications move markets per se by examining their e⁄ect on ￿-
nancial market volatility. Two notable papers in this category are Kohn and Sack (2004) and
G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) which both provide evidence that the statements
that accompany FOMC meetings have an e⁄ect on ￿nancial market variables beyond the
target change itself.
Once it was established that ￿nancial markets do indeed respond to communications,
attention was turned towards the question of whether these responses are in the expected
directions. The earlier studies categorized communications as "hawkish" versus "dovish"
2Much of this literature is reviewed in Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Haan, and Jansen (2008).
75through authors￿readings of FOMC communications (Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004)).
Recent papers have turned to more objective methods used in computer science to perform
this quanti￿cation (Lucca and Trebbi (2011)).
More recently, some authors have made e⁄orts to quantify FOMC communications along
more dimensions than just monetary policy stance. Boukus and Rosenberg (2006) uses
latent semantic analysis to extract themes from FOMC meeting minutes and show that
the prevalence of these themes have an e⁄ect on Treasury yields beyond just the release
of minutes. One drawback of this method is that the extracted themes are not readily
interpretable since they are linear combinations of underlying topics that explain the most
variation in the prevalence of words across documents. The true underlying topics are not
separately identi￿ed. In this paper, I measure the extent of discussion about the topic of
labor within FOMC communications by enumerating usage of labor-related words which I
later de￿ne3. This improves interpretability of the measure at the expense of objectivity.
Text analysis methods from computer science have been used more extensively in other
contexts in economics. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) construct an index of media slant of
newspapers by comparing the language to that in the 2005 Congressional Record. Antweiler
and Frank (2004) and Tetlock (2007) construct measures of investor sentiment form stock
market message boards and the Wall Street Journal￿ s daily "Abreast of the Market" column.
3.2 FOMC text data
3.2.1 Background on FOMC communications
The primary texts to be analyzed in this paper are the FOMC meeting minutes and policy
statements. The most timely communication issued by the FOMC regarding monetary policy
is the post-meeting policy statement. This document ￿rst appeared following the February
3Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) use a similar method to measure the Fed￿ s commitment to price-level
targeting rather than in￿ ation targeting during the tenures of recent FOMC chairmans.
761994 meeting. In mid-1999, the Committee began issuing statements following meetings
in which there had not been a policy change and it was announced in January 2000 that
statements would be issued following all regularly scheduled meetings.
Meeting minutes give a more extensive summary of the issues discussed at each FOMC
meeting. The publication of minutes in their present form began with those of the February
1993 meeting. The current minutes combine material previously covered by two separate
documents: the Record of Policy Actions and the Minutes of Actions. Prior to December
2004, minutes were published approximately three days following the next meeting. Since
then, publication has been accelerated to three weeks following the meeting.
In addition to these documents, the FOMC also releases lightly edited meeting transcripts
which are the most detailed record of meeting proceedings available. Due to their ￿ve-year
publication lag, transcripts are not being examined in the current paper as a form of FOMC
communication.
Lastly, some papers have also looked at central bankers￿speeches, interviews, congres-
sional testimonies, papers, and books as forms of central bank communication. Kohn and
Sack (2004) show that congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan has a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the unexplained variance of changes in various Treasury yields and interest rate
futures while his speeches do not. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) ￿nd that asset markets
reacted more strongly to speeches, interviews, and testimony by Chairman Greenspan than
those by other FOMC members.
3.2.2 Processing text
For the analysis, I will be using statements and minutes from meetings occurring between
January 1996 and January 20144. For statements, I remove the title of the press release
and procedural statements from the text. The procedural statements that are removed
4Some of the original texts were obtained from the data accompanying Zadeh and Zollmann (2009) which
is available from the authors￿websites. The remaining texts were downloaded from the Federal Reserve￿ s
website.
77include the sentences indicating members who voted in favor of the policy action as well as
member absences. Sentences describing dissenting votes are kept because these sometimes
contain information regarding the reason for dissent which may have economic content.
Sentences stating the discount rate action and the associated requests made by various
Reserve Banks are also removed as these do not contain economic content. For minutes,
I follow Boukus and Rosenberg (2006) in removing administrative items and only keeping
sections of text containing economic content. This text mainly consists of the part of the
minutes starting with a phrase similar to ￿The Committee then turned to a discussion of
the economic outlook," or, ￿The information reviewed at this meeting...￿ , but also includes
discussion regarding special studies conducted by the Federal Reserve sta⁄ or statements
regarding unconventional policy during the recent period.
After this pre-processing, I transform the remaining text into numeric data using tech-
niques common to many natural language processing procedures. First, I remove formatting,
punctuation, capitalization, and numbers. I then remove stop words which are commonly
used words such as "the", "and", "a", "that", etc.5. Next, the remaining words are stemmed
using the Porter Stemmer6 to reduce them to their roots. Finally, for each word within a
document, I calculate its proportion of use within the document so that each document is
ultimately represented by a vector of word use proportions which sums to 1.
Figure 3.1 shows an original FOMC statement and the list of words that remains after
this procedure.
5I use the list of stop words provided by Jason Chen and Siamak Faridani as part of their Natural
Language Processing toolbox for Matlab. The full list is available at
https://github.com/faridani/MatlabNLP/blob/master/nlp%20lib/corpora/English%20Stop%20Words/english.stop.
6Implementations of this algorithm in various programming languages are available at
http://tartarus.org/martin/PorterStemmer/index.html.
78FRB: Press Release￿FOMC statement￿January 22, 2008
The Federal Open Market Committee has decided to lower its target for the federal funds
rate 75 basis points to 3-1/2 percent.
The Committee took this action in view of a weakening of the economic outlook and
increasing downside risks to growth. While strains in short-term funding markets have eased
somewhat, broader ￿nancial market conditions have continued to deteriorate and credit has
tightened further for some businesses and households. Moreover, incoming information indicates
a deepening of the housing contraction as well as some softening in labor markets.
The Committee expects in￿ation to moderate in coming quarters, but it will be necessary
to continue to monitor in￿ation developments carefully.
Appreciable downside risks to growth remain. The Committee will continue to assess the
e⁄ects of ￿nancial and other developments on economic prospects and will act in a timely
manner as needed to address those risks.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Timothy
F. Geithner, Vice Chairman; Charles L. Evans; Thomas M. Hoenig; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S.
Kroszner; Eric S. Rosengren; and Kevin M. Warsh. Voting against was William Poole, who did
not believe that current conditions justi￿ed policy action before the regularly scheduled meeting
next week. Absent and not voting was Frederic S. Mishkin.
In a related action, the Board of Governors approved a 75-basis-point decrease in the
discount rate to 4 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by
the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and Minneapolis.
#
feder open market committe decid lower target feder fund rate basi point percent committe
action view weaken econom outlook increas downsid risk growth strain short term fund market
eas broader ￿nanci market condit continu deterior credit tighten busi household incom inform
deepen hous contract soften labor market committe expect in￿at moder quarter continu
monitor in￿at develop carefulli appreci downsid risk growth remain committe continu assess
e⁄ect ￿nanci develop econom prospect act time manner address risk vote william pool current
condit justi￿ polici action regularli schedul meet week
Figure 3.1: Example of text processing
Table 3.1 shows some properties of the processed texts. As can be seen from these word
counts, FOMC statements are much more succinct than meeting minutes and also use less
variety of language.
79Table 3.1: Properties of FOMC minutes and statements
Meeting minutes Statements
Total # of documents 145 134
Words per document
Mean 2571 144
Median 2196 95
Min 1521 42
Max 4444 454
Number of unique words across all documents 3500 882
Furthermore, statements have evolved more over time than minutes. Since the start of
the recent recession, the FOMC has been trying to convey more information in the post-
meeting statements. This change in the nature of FOMC statements is apparent in Figure
3.2. This graph plots the word counts of both texts as ratios of their pre-2008 averages.
The ￿gure shows that the word counts of statements were relatively stable until the recent
period, but are now more than 5 times as high as the pre-2008 average. Word counts of
meeting minutes have also grown during the recent recession, but not nearly as dramatically.
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Figure 3.2: Word counts as a ratio of pre-2008 averages
80Due to the greater detail included in FOMC meeting minutes, it may be reasonable to
believe that ￿nancial market participants extract more information regarding the Commit-
tee￿ s decision-making process from these documents. For both this reason and the apparent
evolution of the nature of FOMC statements, I will place greater emphasis on the results
below which involve minutes though results involving statements will also be presented.
3.2.3 Prevalence of labor-related words
To obtain a measure of the extent to which FOMC texts emphasized the topic of labor,
I de￿ne a set of labor-related words from the set of unique (stemmed) words across both
minutes and statements which are displayed in the following table7.
Table 3.2: Labor-related words
emploi job nonemploye unemploi work
employ jobless nonlabor unemploy worker
employe jobseek payrol vacanc workforc
hire labor underemploi vacant workweek
I then calculate the proportions of words in each document which appear within this set
to arrive at an index of labor word use for FOMC minutes and statements. The index is
dated according to the release date of each document8. Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of
this index for both FOMC minutes and statements.
7This method is admittedly highly subjective and alternative methods are discussed in Section 3.7.1.
8The release dates for documents were scraped from the historical calendar of monetary policy press
releases available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2014monetary.htm. One
correction was made for the publication of the December 19, 2000 meeting minutes which took place on
February 1, 2001 rather than January 4, 2001.
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Figure 3.3: Labor word use in FOMC texts
As can be seen, the index for FOMC statements displays higher variance than that
for minutes. 40 statements out of a total of 134 contain none of the words in the above
set of labor-related words and the prevalence of labor-related language in statements has
grown dramatically during the most recent recession. Labor word use in FOMC minutes
evolves more smoothly while re￿ ecting the same broad patterns of a decline in labor-related
discussion over the 2004-2008 period with a steady increase over the recent recession.
3.3 Estimating interest rate sensitivity to news
I follow the methods of Swanson and Williams (2014) to estimate interest rate sensitivity
to news. The main departure is that I categorize news as being related to labor or not and
separately estimate sensitivity to labor-speci￿c news versus other news. For the ￿rst exercise,
I estimate these time-varying sensitivities and then relate the FOMC￿ s use of labor-related
language to the estimated di⁄erential sensitivity to labor-speci￿c news relative to other
news. In Section 3.5, I take a more parametric approach and estimate a single equation
that models sensitivity to labor-speci￿c news as linear in the FOMC￿ s labor-related word
use while controlling for more general time-variation in sensitivity to all news.
823.3.1 Interest Rates and News Data
The interest rates I will examine include the secondary market rate on the 6-month Treasury
bill (obtained from the St. Louis Fed￿ s FRED database), a 1-year forward rate 4 years ahead,
as well as 1, 2, 5, and 10 year Treasury yields from G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007)9. I
consider the same twelve macroeconomic data releases as Swanson and Williams (2014) and
these are: initial jobless claims, nonfarm payroll employment, the unemployment rate, core
CPI in￿ ation, core PPI in￿ ation, consumer con￿dence, capacity utilization, new home sales,
leading indicators index, ISM manufacturing index, real GDP growth (advance), and retail
sales. The ￿rst three items in this list are categorized as being labor-speci￿c. To measure the
news content within these data releases, I take the di⁄erence between the actual release and
the median forecasts reported by Money Market Services10. Each individual news series is
divided by its standard deviation to facilitate comparison of coe¢ cients across di⁄erent news
series. As a robustness check, I sometimes include federal funds target surprises (computed
following the method in Kuttner (2001)) in the other news category. Each news series is set
to zero on days when there is no data release. The signs of unemployment rate and initial
jobless claims surprises are ￿ ipped so that all positive surprises represent favorable news.
3.3.2 Time-varying sensitivity to labor news
In this section, I follow the two-step estimation process used in Swanson and Williams (2014)
to arrive at daily estimates of sensitivity to labor and all other news. The ￿rst step involves
estimating the following equation using nonlinear least squares.
￿it = ￿s + ￿s￿News
labor
t + ￿s￿News
other
t + "t (3.1)
9Daily yields data are updated regularly and available from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html
10I￿ d like to thank Ali Ozdagli and Michelle Barnes for their help in obtaining this data.
83where ￿it is the one-day change in the relevant interest rate, Newslabor
t is a vector of the
three labor-related news realizations on date t, and Newsother
t is a vector of the nine other
news realizations on date t. ￿, ￿, and ￿ are allowed to vary over calendar years s with ￿ and
￿ normalized to average to 1 over the 1990-2000 period. Then, ￿ and ￿ can be interpreted
as coe¢ cients representing the average contribution of individual news releases to interest
rate changes during the baseline 1990-2000 period.
In the second stage of this estimation, the estimated ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ vectors from the ￿rst step
are used to construct one-dimensional series of labor and other news
\ Newslabor
t ￿ ^ ￿News
labor
t and \ Newsother
t ￿ ^ ￿News
other
t
Then, rolling regressions with one year windows11 whose midpoint is date ￿ are estimated
at a daily frequency to obtain daily estimates of sensitivity to labor and other news.
￿it = ￿￿ + ￿￿ \ Newslabor
t + ￿￿ \ Newsother
t + "t (3.2)
As shown in Swanson and Williams (2014), there is time-variation in sensitivity of interest
rates to macroeconomic news in general, even prior to the recent zero lower bound episode.
This method allows me to focus on the di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news in particular
while controlling for time-variation in interest rate sensitivity to all news in general.
All the regressions in this section are run over the January 1, 1990 to September 30, 2012
sample (excluding the week following September 11, 2001) where only days containing at
least one news item are included.
Table 3.3 shows the nonlinear least squares estimates for ￿ and ￿ in (3.1). These estimates
are broadly in line with those presented in Swanson and Williams (2014) which come from
estimating (3.1) with the restrictions ￿s = ￿s 8s. There are some patterns evident from
these estimates such as the relatively greater sensitivity of higher maturity yields to core
11Strictly speaking, the windows include the most recent 252 trading days which only approximately
corresponds to a calendar year.
84PPI in￿ ation and the relatively greater sensitivity of lower maturity yields to the leading
indicators index and real GDP growth.
Table 3.3: Interest rate sensitivity to individual news items
6-Month 1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead
Initial Claims 0:57*** 0:91*** 1:02*** 0:96*** 0:77*** 0:70***
[3:74] [4:91] [4:97] [4:55] [3:86] [3:14]
Nonfarm Payrolls 3:30*** 3:63*** 4:12*** 3:49*** 2:46*** 2:19***
[7:64] [7:98] [7:82] [6:51] [5:07] [3:96]
Unemployment Rate 0:94*** 1:05*** 1:08** 0:86** 0:52* 0:45
[2:88] [2:83] [2:57] [2:28] [1:79] [1:50]
Core CPI In￿ ation 0:99*** 2:13*** 2:54*** 2:63*** 2:28*** 2:56***
[3:04] [4:98] [5:05] [5:03] [4:52] [4:37]
Core PPI In￿ ation ￿0:02 0:41 0:57 0:65 0:96** 0:33
[￿0:09] [0:88] [1:19] [1:44] [2:27] [0:77]
Consumer Con￿dence 0:83*** 1:79*** 1:90*** 1:79*** 1:64*** 1:23**
[2:98] [4:07] [3:90] [3:28] [3:22] [2:09]
Capacity Utilization ￿0:23 1:73** 2:35*** 2:46*** 1:64*** 1:94***
[￿0:29] [1:98] [3:05] [3:76] [3:05] [3:34]
New Home Sales 0:75** 1:26*** 1:48*** 1:63*** 1:57*** 1:58***
[2:11] [2:95] [3:15] [3:56] [3:80] [3:32]
Leading Indicators 2:08*** 0:76 0:37 0:07 0:15 ￿0:53
[2:66] [1:25] [0:66] [0:12] [0:29] [￿0:83]
ISM Manufacturing 1:07*** 2:91*** 3:77*** 3:82*** 3:27*** 3:30***
[2:60] [6:49] [7:34] [7:37] [6:79] [5:77]
Real GDP (adv) 0:72** 1:03* 1:05 0:71 0:41 0:72
[2:02] [1:80] [1:36] [0:78] [0:52] [0:78]
Retail Sales 1:07** 2:12*** 2:45*** 2:45*** 2:49*** 1:77***
[2:55] [3:65] [3:99] [3:91] [3:90] [2:64]
Adjusted R2 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:12 0:1 0:07
N 2801 2801 2801 2801 2801 2801
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are given in brackets.
Figure 3.4 plots daily estimates of sensitivity to labor news and other news obtained
from rolling regressions of (3.2). The solid portions of each line indicate that the estimates
are positive and signi￿cant at the 10% level while dotted portions indicate estimates that
85are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. None of the estimates are signi￿cantly negative12.
Due to the normalization of ￿s and ￿s in the estimation of (3.1), the magnitudes of these
estimates can be interpreted as sensitivity relative to the "normal" 1990-2000 period. These
estimates show appreciable di⁄erences in interest rates￿sensitivity to labor news apart from
other news. This is especially apparent for longer maturity yields where the sensitivity to
labor news rose to more than four times the baseline level in the post-2004 period while
sensitivity to other news was rarely more than double its baseline level.
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Figure 3.4: Time-varying sensitivity of interest rates to labor news and other news
12I follow Swanson and Williams (2014) in adjusting the standard errors for the use of generated regressors
by using the estimated standard errors of the f￿sg and f￿sg from the estimation of (3.1) as benchmarks.
Since these annual estimates will correspond with those of (3.2) when the rolling window covers the calendar
year, the di⁄erence in standard errors of these estimates is attributable to the use of generated regressors in
(3.2). This gives a scaling factor for those dates where the window corresponds to calendar years. Linear
interpolation is then used to obtain scaling factors for the intervening dates.
863.4 Relating sensitivity to FOMC labor word use
In this section, I explore the relationship between the FOMC￿ s labor word use and the
estimated di⁄erential sensitivity of interest rates to labor news over other news. Figure 3.5
plots these series with labor word use from FOMC minutes. In the plots, the relationships
appear tighter for interest rates of longer maturities and this feature is con￿rmed below.
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Figure 3.5: FOMC minutes labor word use and di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news
For the remainder of this section, the units of observation are periods of time between
either FOMC minutes or statements. The sensitivity measures are averages of the daily esti-
mates between the current and next publication date of the relevant text. Unless otherwise
indicated, the analyses are run over the January 1996 to September 2012 period13.
The next two tables give correlations which show more clearly that the relationship
between FOMC word use and di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news is closer for interest rates
13The results are not sensitive to starting the analysis for FOMC statements in January 2000, when the
committee began regularly issuing statements following every meeting.
87of longer maturities. In each table, the ￿rst three lines show correlations with labor word
use in the current release using samples starting in di⁄erent years. The last three lines do
the same with a moving average of word use from the four most recent releases. Correlations
for FOMC minutes grow stronger towards the latter part of the sample which may be due
to increased ￿nancial market attention to the meeting minutes.
Table 3.4: Correlations of di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news and labor word use in FOMC
minutes
6-Month 1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead N
Current release
Starting in 1996 0:23*** 0:04 0:14 0:19** 0:18** 0:24*** 129
Starting in 2000 0:22** 0:12 0:25** 0:32*** 0:32*** 0:39*** 103
Starting in 2004 0:37*** 0:18 0:30** 0:38*** 0:39*** 0:46*** 70
4-release MA
Starting in 1996 0:28*** ￿0:01 0:09 0:15* 0:15* 0:21** 126
Starting in 2000 0:31*** 0:12 0:23** 0:32*** 0:32*** 0:39*** 103
Starting in 2004 0:45*** 0:19 0:29** 0:38*** 0:39*** 0:47*** 70
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 3.5: Correlations of di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news and labor word use in FOMC
statements
6-Month 1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead N
Current release
Starting in 1996 ￿0:13 ￿0:08 0:09 0:20** 0:23** 0:33*** 118
Starting in 2000 ￿0:17* ￿0:14 0:04 0:17* 0:20** 0:31*** 112
Starting in 2004 ￿0:09 ￿0:25** ￿0:07 0:07 0:12 0:31*** 76
4-release MA
Starting in 1996 ￿0:17* ￿0:12 0:07 0:21** 0:26*** 0:38*** 115
Starting in 2000 ￿0:19** ￿0:17* 0:03 0:18* 0:23** 0:36*** 112
Starting in 2004 ￿0:11 ￿0:32*** ￿0:12 0:04 0:13 0:33*** 76
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
88Next, I present results of regressing di⁄erential labor news sensitivity on the word use
measures. In Figure 3.5, it appears that there may be some growth in the di⁄erential
sensitivity to labor news over time (particularly in the longer maturity interest rates) so
I also present results of regressing di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news on the word use
measures while additionally controlling for a time trend. The coe¢ cients presented are
standardized so that the magnitudes of the e⁄ect are in standard deviation units for both
the left- and right-hand side variables.
Table 3.6 presents the results for labor word use in FOMC minutes with interest rates of
di⁄erent maturities in columns and di⁄erent speci￿cations in rows. There ￿rst two speci￿-
cations use the labor word use from the current release and a four-release moving average,
respectively. These results re￿ ect the correlations shown in rows 1 and 4 of Table 3.4. The
third speci￿cation includes the word use from the four most recent releases in an uncon-
strained manner. The table presents the sum of coe¢ cients on all the lags along with the
p-values of F-tests of these sums being greater than zero. It￿ s apparent that these results
are little changed from those for the moving average. The ￿nal three speci￿cations repeat
the ￿rst three with the addition of a time trend. It￿ s clear that the addition of a time trend
results in a more tightly identi￿ed e⁄ect of labor word use in FOMC minutes on di⁄erential
sensitivity of interest rates to labor-related news while the point estimates actually increase
slightly. Furthermore, the addition of a time trend greatly improves the ￿t as re￿ ected in
the higher adjusted R2 values.
89Table 3.6: Regressions of di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news on labor word use in FOMC
minutes
6-Month 1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead N
Current release 0:23** 0:04 0:14 0:19* 0:18* 0:24** 129
[2:27] [0:37] [1:44] [1:89] [1:76] [2:39]
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:05 ￿0:01 0:01 0:03 0:03 0:05
4-release MA 0:28** ￿0:01 0:09 0:15 0:15 0:21** 126
[2:49] [￿0:14] [0:94] [1:52] [1:55] [2:20]
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:07 ￿0:01 0:00 0:01 0:02 0:04
Sum of coe¢ cients on
4 latest releases 0:33** ￿0:02 0:11 0:18 0:18 0:25** 126
F-test p-value 0:02 0:88 0:38 0:15 0:14 0:03
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:05 ￿0:02 ￿0:00 0:01 0:00 0:03
Current release 0:23** 0:05 0:16 0:21** 0:20** 0:26*** 129
[2:28] [0:48] [1:59] [2:22] [2:19] [3:14]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:04 0:17 0:22 0:34 0:33 0:44
4-release MA 0:28** 0:03 0:14 0:21** 0:21** 0:28*** 126
[2:54] [0:30] [1:45] [2:36] [2:53] [3:69]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:07 0:16 0:21 0:35 0:36 0:48
Sum of coe¢ cients on
4 latest releases 0:33** 0:03 0:16 0:24** 0:25** 0:33*** 126
F-test p-value 0:01 0:78 0:17 0:03 0:02 0:00
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:05 0:15 0:21 0:34 0:35 0:47
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are in brackets. Standardized coe¢ cients are shown for ease of interpretation.
Table 3.7 presents the corresponding results for labor word use in FOMC statements.
Again, it￿ s clear that there is a stronger relationship for interest rates of greater maturities.
Unlike FOMC minutes, these results are more sensitive to the addition of a time trend since
90labor word use in FOMC statements is more correlated with time14.
Table 3.7: Regressions of di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news on labor word use in FOMC
statements
6-Month 1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead N
Current release ￿0:13* ￿0:08 0:09 0:20** 0:23*** 0:33*** 118
[￿1:92] [￿0:93] [1:10] [2:53] [2:69] [4:01]
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:01 ￿0:00 ￿0:00 0:03 0:04 0:10
4-release MA ￿0:17** ￿0:12 0:07 0:21*** 0:26*** 0:38*** 115
[￿2:45] [￿1:44] [0:89] [2:80] [3:28] [5:00]
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:02 0:01 ￿0:00 0:04 0:06 0:14
Sum of coe¢ cients on
4 latest releases ￿0:20** ￿0:14 0:08 0:26*** 0:31*** 0:46*** 115
F-test p-value 0:02 0:16 0:37 0:01 0:00 0:00
time trend no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 ￿0:01 ￿0:02 ￿0:03 0:01 0:03 0:12
Current release ￿0:08 ￿0:22** ￿0:06 0:01 0:02 0:11 118
[￿0:81] [￿2:20] [￿0:60] [0:14] [0:25] [1:28]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:02 0:09 0:10 0:21 0:25 0:35
4-release MA ￿0:09 ￿0:26** ￿0:08 0:02 0:04 0:15* 115
[￿0:94] [￿2:61] [￿0:83] [0:18] [0:49] [1:79]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:03 0:09 0:09 0:19 0:25 0:36
Sum of coe¢ cients on
4 latest releases ￿0:11 ￿0:32** ￿0:10 0:02 0:05 0:18* 115
F-test p-value 0:36 0:01 0:41 0:88 0:66 0:09
time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:01 0:07 0:06 0:17 0:23 0:34
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are in brackets. Standardized coe¢ cients are shown for ease of interpretation.
14Over the sample used in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, a time trend alone explains more than 20% of the variation
in labor word use in FOMC statements, but less than 0.2% for FOMC minutes.
913.5 A more parametric approach
In this section, I consider a more parametric estimation where the di⁄erential sensitivity to
labor news is constrained to be a linear function of FOMC labor word use (along with a
time trend in some speci￿cations). I continue to control for time-variation in sensitivity to
all news at the same frequency as the relevant FOMC text. That is, I use nonlinear least
squares to estimate
￿it = ￿r + f (WUr)￿News
labor
t + ￿
all
r
￿
￿News
labor
t + ￿News
other
t
￿
+ "t (3.3)
where the di⁄erences from (3.1) are that ￿ and ￿
all are now allowed to vary at the frequency
of FOMC releases. Constraints are imposed such that the values of f (WUr) and ￿
all
r average
to 1 over the 1996-2000 period to allow for identi￿cation of ￿ and ￿.
Table 3.8 shows the results from estimating (3.3) for both indices of word use. The ￿rst
speci￿cation uses the labor word use from the current release of FOMC minutes without a
time trend while the second speci￿cation includes a time trend. The last two speci￿cations
are the same results for labor word use in FOMC statements. For these regressions, the word
use measures are divided by their standard deviation while the interest rate changes are kept
in unadjusted levels. Thus, the interpretation of the coe¢ cients di⁄ers slightly from those
in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Magnitudes aside, these results re￿ ect the same patterns evident in
Section 3.4 which are that an increase in labor-related word use in FOMC communications
are associated with larger responses of interest rates to labor-related news after controlling
for general time variation in the size of responses to all news. Furthermore, the relationship
appears to be slightly stronger for FOMC minutes than statements perhaps owing to the
greater detail contained in FOMC minutes regarding the decision process of Committee
members. Again, the table shows that these results are robust to the addition of a time-
trend in f (WUr).
92Table 3.8: Parametric nonlinear regressions with di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news being
a linear function of labor word use in FOMC texts
1-Year 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
1-Year Fwd
4 Yrs Ahead N
Minutes (current release) 0:34 1:20** 1:41* 1:86* 4:26 2093
[0:92] [2:24] [1:93] [1:76] [1:43]
time trend no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:16 0:16 0:14 0:11 0:10
Minutes (current release) 0:34 1:12** 1:40** 1:91* 4:31 2093
[0:95] [2:15] [2:00] [1:78] [1:54]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:16 0:16 0:14 0:11 0:10
Statement (current release) 0:26 0:76* 1:20** 1:04* 1:29* 2116
[0:94] [1:93] [2:40] [1:88] [1:86]
time trend no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0:17 0:16 0:14 0:10 0:09
Statement (current release) 0:65 1:16** 1:50** 1:09 0:93 2116
[1:40] [2:05] [2:21] [1:56] [1:11]
time trend yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0:17 0:16 0:14 0:10 0:09
Notes: ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics are in brackets.
3.6 Robustness checks
As the above tables indicate, the relationship between FOMC word use and di⁄erential
sensitivity of interest rates to labor news beyond sensitivity to general news is robust to
the inclusion of time trends. The analysis above was also repeated with federal funds rate
surprises included in the category of other non-labor news. The addition of this piece of
news helps to smooth out the rolling estimates of sensitivity to other news so that the large
spikes present in the latter part of the sample are eliminated. The resulting estimates of
di⁄erential sensitivity to labor news retain their positive relationship with labor word use
in both FOMC minutes and statements. Repeating the parametric exercise in the previous
93section with federal funds rate surprises in the Newsother
t vector also yields results similar to
those in Table 3.8.
The results of the parametric exercise in the previous section were also robust to con-
trolling for time-variation in sensitivity to all news at a coarser annual frequency. Including
signed squared news terms in sensitivity estimates to control for the possibility of responses
being greater for larger surprises did not alter the results either.
3.7 Future work
3.7.1 Alternative text analysis methods
The measure of the extent of labor-related discussion in FOMC texts used in the above
analysis sacri￿ced objectivity for ease of interpretation. One way to discipline this process
is to use a more objective selection process to select labor-related words. One method that
can be explored in future work is to measure cosine similarity (commonly used in latent
semantic analysis) between FOMC texts and other labor-related documents. There are
several natural choices for these external documents. To maintain objectivity, one can use the
press releases pertaining to the same labor news variables used in the sensitivity estimates.
Another possibility is to use speeches made by FOMC members which are about the labor
market as indicated by the speech title. This latter method maintains some subjectivity in
the classi￿cation of speech topics, but it could yield a better approximation to the speci￿c
language used by central bankers in discussing labor market conditions.
Another approach is to model a wider class of topics rather than restricting attention to
a single topic. As discussed in the introduction, this is the approach taken by Boukus and
Rosenberg (2006). Broadly speaking, they apply principal components analysis to the vectors
of word use proportions that represent each document. Therefore, their analysis su⁄ers from
the usual problem that the themes (or principal components) are identi￿ed only up to a
rotation and they are unknown linear combinations of the true underlying topics. To build
94on this method, one can attempt to extract the underlying topics by imposing restrictions
on the resulting topics or by bringing in extra information from external documents like the
ones discussed in the previous paragraph.
More generally, one could apply existing topic modeling methods to FOMC texts. The
idea behind these methods is to model documents as being unknown combinations of un-
derlying topics while topics themselves are modeled as parametric distributions over words.
This generates a likelihood function so that the underlying parameters governing the doc-
ument generating process may be estimated using either maximum likelihood or Bayesian
methods. It may be possible to use information from external documents in these methods
as well. One natural use for them is to generate priors on the distributions over words that
represent each topic.
3.7.2 Dealing with endogeneity
The preceding analysis established a positive relationship between labor word use in FOMC
texts and interest rate sensitivity to labor news. However, it does not attempt to establish
causation. It may be possible that there are events driving both interest rate sensitivity to
certain types of news and increased discussion of those same topics in FOMC texts. It could
also be the case that the FOMC discusses some topics more because they observe ￿nancial
markets exhibiting greater sensitivity to certain events.
There are several possibilities for further exploration of this issue. One method is to
use additional controls that may be driving both sensitivity and word use. In terms of
economic variables, a natural set of controls to use are the variables underlying the labor
news measures used above. Preliminary analysis shows that the results given above are robust
these additional controls. Alternatively, one could also control for word use measures from
other documents that could provide a good summary of economic conditions that may be
driving both interest rate sensitivity and word use in FOMC texts. These other documents
may include ￿nancial news or FOMC meeting transcripts. The transcripts are the most
95accurate account of meeting discussions available, but are published with a ￿ve year lag.
Di⁄erences in word use between FOMC minutes or statements and these other documents
might better re￿ ect a "pure communication" component. It may also be possible to exploit
changes in chairmans or members of the Committee over time.
3.7.3 Decomposing sensitivity to news
One last conceptual issue that remains is the interpretation of time variation in interest rate
sensitivity to news. Roughly speaking, the response of asset prices to macroeconomic news
can be broken down into two components: (i) the amount by which market participants
update their beliefs about underlying state variables in response to the news and (ii) the
e⁄ect that these state variables have on asset prices15. The ￿rst component can be interpreted
as the informativeness of news while, in the case of Treasury yields, the second component
captures both the policy reaction function and the e⁄ect of the state variables on term
premia. Hence, FOMC communication that indicates a change in the reaction function
should work through this second component. Thus, it would be useful to further decompose
asset price responses to macroeconomic news in order to both better understand the factors
driving time-variation in sensitivity as well as to assess how changes in language used in
FOMC texts a⁄ect these factors.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I presented a novel measure of the extent to which FOMC texts were skewed
towards labor-related language used in FOMC texts. This measure marks one of the ￿rst
attempts to quantify FOMC communications along a dimension other than the intended
direction of future policy rates. I then showed an interaction e⁄ect where an increase in labor-
related word use in FOMC texts is positively associated with the extent to which interest
15Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2007) provides a succinct mathematical exposition of this idea.
96rates￿response to labor-related news exceeds their response to all other news. Furthermore,
the relationship seems to be especially strong for interest rates of longer maturities.
In terms of policy implications, it￿ s not yet clear whether it￿ s desirable for FOMC com-
munications to a⁄ect ￿nancial market variables in this way. One immediate implication is
that increased central bank discussion of speci￿c economic variables could raise ￿nancial
market volatility in response to data releases. Since there is inherently noise accompanying
this news, this increased sensitivity of ￿nancial market variables may not be e¢ cient.
Going forward, it would be interesting to extend this type of analysis to more topics as
well as other asset classes and news events. It would also be useful to decompose the time-
variation in the sensitivity of interest rates to news into changes in beliefs about the central
bank policy reaction function versus changes in the informativeness of news or the sensitivity
of term premia to news. Relating these di⁄erent components to FOMC communication will
help to illuminate the channels through which communication impacts sensitivity.
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103Appendix A
Supplement to Chapter 1
A.1 Aggregate equilibrium conditions with idiosyncratic
government spending shocks
In this section, I derive equilibrium conditions for an economy where ￿rms face idiosyncratic government
spending shocks. In this environment, it is consistent for consumers and ￿rms not to have information
about current aggregate outcomes. This yields a condition for the aggregate output gap which is identical
to equation (1.1) in the model in the main text. The in￿ ation condition di⁄ers from equation (1.2) in a few
ways which I outline at the end of the section.
A.1.1 Setup
The setup shares many features with Lorenzoni (2010). There is a continuum of yeoman farmer households
with identical preferences and technology who produce di⁄erentiated goods and face a Calvo friction.
Each period contains three stages. In stage 1, the policymaker sees the entire history of aggregate
government spending and output gap target levels fgt; ￿ ytg and sets the nominal interest rate it conditional
on these aggregate states. In the private sector, all households have the same beginning-of-period information
which contains true realizations of past state variables and the current nominal interest rate so that their
Stage 1 information set is I1
t =
￿
it;gt￿1; ￿ yt￿1￿
. In this stage, pre-commitments are made regarding aggregate
nominal consumption.
In stage 2, each worker-￿rm j now realizes his ￿rm-speci￿c government demand shock, gjt, where the
104idiosyncratic component of gjt is iid. Firms who are able to reset prices then choose prices based their updated
Stage 2 information sets I2
jt = gjt [ I1
t . I do not include past observations of gjt in these information sets
since they are irrelevant for current and future payo⁄s once gt￿1 is known. All ￿rms set prices simultaneously
so these decisions are made without knowledge of the current aggregate price. The household receives no
further information about ￿ yt.
In stage 3, all prices are revealed and the consumer optimally allocates the pre-committed amount of
nominal spending across varieties j. The revelation of prices in this stage also reveals the true aggregate
states and households carry this knowledge into Stage 1 of the next period.
Prior to the realizations of fgjtg, ex-ante risks are the same across households. I assume that households
perfectly risk-share by trading in a complete set of contingent claims in Stage 1. These claims pay out in
Stage 1 of the next period so that the amount of wealth each consumer starts the period with is the same
across agents.
I assume that the idiosyncratic component of government spending is such that the resulting log-
linearized total demand faced by each ￿rm j is given by
yjt =
C
Y
ct +
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gjt ￿ "(pjt ￿ pt)
= yt +
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
!jt ￿ "(pjt ￿ pt)
since yt =
C
Y
ct +
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gt by market clearing
where
gjt = gt + !jt; !jt ￿ iid N
￿
0;￿2
!
￿
(A.1)
Meanwhile, I continue to assume AR(1) forms for the aggregate shocks
gt = ￿ggt￿1 + ￿g;t; ￿g;t ￿ iid N
￿
0;￿2
g
￿
￿ yt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + ￿￿ y;t; ￿￿ y;t ￿ iid N
￿
0;￿2
￿ y
￿
(A.2)
A.1.2 Consumption
Preferences are identical across households and the same as the model in the main text
maxE
1 X
t=0
￿
t [U (Ct) ￿ V (Lt)]; where Ct ￿
￿Z 1
0
C
"￿1
"
jt dj
￿ "
"￿1
;" > 1
105All households have access to the same full basket of goods in stage 3 so there￿ s only one relevant
aggregate in￿ ation rate. Then, since all households make pre-commitments to nominal spending in Stage 1
based on the same information set and facing the same idiosyncratic risks, they all choose the same aggregate
nominal consumption which yields the following Euler equation in log-linearized form
ct = E
￿
ct+1jI1
t
￿
+
Uc
UccC
￿
it ￿ E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿￿
Note that combining this consumption Euler equation with the resource constraint yields the same
condition for the aggregate output gap as in equation (1.1) since I can write
~ yt = E
￿
~ yt+1jI1
t
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿￿
+ dt ￿ E
￿
dt+1jI1
t
￿
(A.3)
where ~ yt ￿ yt ￿ yn
t =
C
Y
ct +
’
￿ + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gt
and dt ￿
’
￿ + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gt
as in the main text and importantly, the information set I1
t is also the same as the one used in the main
text. This de￿nition of the aggregate demand shock dt also gives
dt =
’
￿ + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gt = ￿ddt￿1 + ￿d;t (A.4)
where ￿d = ￿g and ￿d;t =
’
￿ + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
￿g;t
Purchases of varieties j are made in Stage 3 after prices are revealed so that
cjt = ct ￿ "(pjt ￿ pt)
A.1.3 Production and price-setting
In Stage 2, a worker-￿rm j learns the government portion of their demand gjt so their information set is
I2
jt ￿
￿
it;gt￿1; ￿ yt￿1;gjt
￿
. They face the demand function
yjt =
C
Y
ct +
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gjt ￿ "(pjt ￿ pt)
However, they do not see aggregate prices and so they do not know how much they￿ ll ultimately sell for a
given price pjt.
106Technology is again linear for each worker-￿rm
Yjt = ALjt
where the nominal cost of labor (which is a pseudo-wage) is given by the MRS multiplied by the aggregate
price index which has the following log-linear form (where ’;￿ retain the de￿nitions in (1.3))
wjt = ’ljt + ￿
C
Y
ct + pt
The log-linearized pricing condition for a ￿rm is then the following
p￿
jt = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k E
￿
wj;t+kjI2
jt
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿
C
Y
ct + E
￿
’y￿
jt + ptjI2
jt
￿
￿
+ ￿￿E
￿
p￿
j;t+1jI2
jt
￿
where I use a star on y￿
jt to highlight that reset prices depend on output among price resetters which is
di⁄erent from output among non-resetters. Using the ￿rms￿demand function, this can be transformed to
p￿
jt = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
(￿ + ’)
C
Y
ct + ’
￿
1 ￿
C
Y
￿
gjt ￿ ’"p￿
jt + (1 + ’")E
￿
ptjI2
jt
￿
￿
+ ￿￿E
￿
p￿
j;t+1jI2
jt
￿
I assume that the Calvo shock is independent of the idiosyncratic component of government spending
such that the average government spending shock among price resetters is equal to the average among all
the ￿rms. That is, I assume the following where I order ￿rms so that the set of price resetters are those
indexed by j 2 [￿;1]
1
1 ￿ ￿
Z 1
￿
gjtdj = gt
Then, as long as p￿
jt is linear in the variables in I2
jt, this gives
1
1 ￿ ￿
Z 1
￿
p￿
jtdj = p￿
t ￿
Z 1
0
p￿
jtdj
Secondly, I note that the iid nature of the idiosyncratic component of government spending shocks along
with the posited linearity of p￿
jt implies that
E
￿
p￿
j;t+1jI2
jt
￿
= E
￿
p￿
t+1jI2
jt
￿
107Then, the aggregate price index implies the usual log-linearized ￿rst-order dynamics
pt = ￿pt￿1 +
Z 1
￿
p￿
jtdj = ￿pt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)p￿
t (A.5)
Then, expectations have to satisfy
E
￿
ptjI2
jt
￿
= ￿pt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
p￿
tjI2
jt
￿
The aggregate price relation also gives the following property
(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
p￿
t+1jI2
jt
￿
= E
￿
￿t+1jI2
jt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
ptjI2
jt
￿
Aggregating the individual reset prices over resetters j 2 [￿;1] and using these properties then gives
(1 ￿ ￿)p￿
t =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿ + ’)
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)"’
~ yt +
￿￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)"’
E
￿
￿t+1jI2
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿
ptjI2
t
￿
(A.6)
where with a slight abuse of notation, I denote aggregate expectations with
E
￿
xjI2
t
￿
￿
Z 1
0
E
￿
xjI2
jt
￿
dj
This delivers the Phillips curve in this setting
￿t =
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)"’
E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿
+
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)"’
~ yt
+
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)"’
￿
E
￿
￿t+1jI2
t
￿
￿ E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)
2
￿
￿
E
￿
p￿
tjI2
t
￿
￿ p￿
t
￿
(A.7)
This aggregate in￿ ation condition along with (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), (A.5), (A.6), and an interest rate that￿ s
linear in fgt;ytg give a set of linear stochastic di⁄erence equations that de￿ne the equilibrium. Thus, it will
be the case that agents￿choices will be linear in the variables in their information sets as I conjectured
earlier1.
In particular, behavior of the aggregate output gap and in￿ ation are given by (A.3) and (A.7) which are
the counterparts to the key equilibrium conditions (1.1) and (1.2) from the main text. The only di⁄erences
in equilibrium behavior of aggregate variables comes from the di⁄erences in the in￿ ation equation. Looking
at (A.7), it￿ s clear that explicitly accounting for idiosyncratic shocks yields a Phillips curve that di⁄ers from
1Lorenzoni (2010) proves this in a model that has a similar structure.
108(1.2) in the main text in two ways:
1. The coe¢ cients are scaled down by a multiplicative factor 1
1+(1￿￿￿)"’ < 1 due to the yeoman farmer
decentralized labor market setup.
2. There are two new terms due speci￿cally to the idiosyncratic shocks and information sets.
￿ E
￿
￿t+1jI2
t
￿
￿E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿
re￿ ects the di⁄erence in aggregate beliefs that comes from individual
agents having the idiosyncratic signals fgjtg. E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿
will be a prior based on the histories
￿
gt￿1; ￿ yt￿1￿
plus a term re￿ ecting news from it. E
￿
￿t+1jI2
t
￿
will be the same prior plus
a term incorporating the same news from it as well as another term capturing news from
the idiosyncratic signals whose noise averages out to zero in aggregate. Hence, the di⁄erence
between these beliefs will be linear in the news terms with coe¢ cients that are related to
the informativeness of the extra signals fgjtg. In equilibrium, these news terms, and hence
E
￿
￿t+1jI2
t
￿
￿ E
￿
￿t+1jI1
t
￿
, are linear in f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg.
￿ E
￿
p￿
tjI2
t
￿
￿ p￿
t will be linear in the belief errors E
￿
gtjI2
t
￿
￿ gt and E
￿
￿ ytjI2
t
￿
￿ ￿ yt which are
themselves linear in f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg.
In summary, the in￿ ation condition di⁄ers from the one used in the main text due to a change of
coe¢ cients and extra direct e⁄ects of the shocks f￿d;t;￿￿ y;tg. This will change the exact expressions for the
responses of endogenous variables to shocks. In addition, the government spending shock now enters into the
NKPC, thus giving it properties of an additional cost-push shock which poses an in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄
for the policymaker. The qualitative aspects of the paper￿ s results remain intact.
A.2 Solution under arbitrary policy coe¢ cients
Rearranging equilibrium conditions (1.1) and (1.2) gives the following system
"
~ yt
￿t
#
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
￿
"
1
￿
#
dt+1jt +
"
1
￿
#
dt ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
it
Conjecturing that the output gap and in￿ ation are both linear in
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
leads to the following
implied form for expectations
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= M
"
dt+1jt
￿ yt+1jt
#
= M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
109Using this along with expression (1.4) for the interest rate then gives
"
~ yt
￿t
#
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
￿
"
1
￿
#
￿ddtjt
+
"
1
￿
#
dt ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
￿
fddt + f￿ y￿ yt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
￿
Using this to evaluate the one-period-ahead expectation and matching coe¢ cients gives the solution for M
M = ￿
"
1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) ￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
#
with ￿d ￿
1
(1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿￿d) ￿ ￿
￿￿d
and ￿￿ y ￿
1
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
This immediately gives the solution for one-period-ahead expectations and substituting this back into the
above expression gives the solution for current outcomes, both as functions of current beliefs and true states
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= ￿
"
1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿d
1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿￿ y
￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿d
￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
"
~ yt
￿t
#
=
"
￿ 1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) ￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
#
dtjt
+
"
￿ 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b) + 1
￿f￿ y
￿￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) + ￿
￿f￿ y
#
￿ ytjt +
"
1 ￿ 1
￿fd ￿ 1
￿f￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿f￿ y
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
(A.8)
Longer horizon forecasts then evolve as
"
~ yt+hjt
￿t+hjt
#
= ￿
"
1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿h
d
1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿h
￿ y
￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿h
d
￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿h
￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
Setting dtjt = dt and ￿ ytjt = ￿ yt leads to the perfect information responses in Section 1.3.1.
"
~ yPI
t
￿PI
t
#
= ￿
"
1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)) ￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
"
~ yPI
t+hjt
￿PI
t+hjt
#
= ￿
"
1
￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿h
d
1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿h
￿ y
￿
￿￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))￿h
d
￿
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)￿h
￿ y
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
Responses for ~ rt can be obtained using these solutions and the de￿nition ~ rt ￿ it ￿ ￿t+1jt ￿ ￿
￿
dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿
.
The signs of responses depend crucially on the signs of ￿d and ￿￿ y. In particular, these coe¢ cients need
110to be positive to ensure that responses go the intuitive way (i.e., the perfect information responses of the
output gap and in￿ ation to a positive interest rate surprise are negative). I can show that Assumption 1
achieves this since for a given ￿ 2
￿
￿d;￿￿ y
￿
the corresponding ￿ has the same sign as
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿
￿
￿
￿ = ￿￿2 ￿
￿
1 + ￿ +
￿
￿
￿
￿ + 1
This is a U-shaped parabola with 2 real roots. The larger root is greater than one.
1 + ￿
2￿
+
￿
￿ +
q￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿
￿2
￿ 4￿
2￿
￿ 1 for ￿ ￿ 1
Then, since ￿d;￿￿ y < 1 must hold in order for the exogenous states to be stationary, ￿d and ￿￿ y must be below
the smaller root of the parabola for ￿d;￿￿ y to be positive. Thus, I impose
￿d;￿￿ y < ￿ ￿ ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿ ￿
q￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿
￿2
￿ 4￿
2￿
where
￿
￿
=
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿
1 +
’
￿
￿
Rearranging this shows that ￿ ￿ = ￿ for ’ = 0. Combining this with the fact that
@￿ ￿
@ ￿
￿
=
1
2￿
2
41 ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿ q￿
1 + ￿ + ￿
￿
￿2
￿ 4￿
3
5 < 0
shows that ￿ ￿ < ￿ for ’ > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To arrive at the results under imperfect information, I ￿rst express the interest rate surprise as a function
of the policy coe¢ cients and the relative variance
i
surp
t ￿ it ￿ E [xtjIt n it]
= (1 + fd;bKd;t + f￿ y;bK￿ y;t)(fd￿d;t + f￿ y￿￿ y;t)
=
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
fd
| {z }
￿d
￿d;t +
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
f￿ y
| {z }
￿￿ y
￿￿ y;t
111Then, under Assumptions 2 and 5, it￿ s clear that
di
surp
t
d￿d;t
= ￿d > 0 > ￿￿ y =
di
surp
t
d￿￿ y;t
From here, impulse responses for ~ yt and ￿t can be obtained from the equilibrium given above and belief
formation which gives
ddtjt
d￿d;t
= fdKd;t;
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
= f￿ yKd;t
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
= fdK￿ y;t;
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
= f￿ yK￿ y;t
where Kd;t =
fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
and K￿ y;t
f￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
Putting this all together gives the following relative responses to the exogenous shocks
d~ yt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t
=
1
￿￿ y
￿
@~ yt
@￿ yt
+
@~ yt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+
@~ yt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
￿
= ￿
1
￿
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d [(fd + fd;b)(1 ￿ ￿￿d) ￿ ￿￿d]fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
d￿t=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t
=
1
￿￿ y
￿
@￿t
@￿ yt
+
@￿t
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+
@￿t
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
￿
= ￿
￿
￿
￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d [fd + fd;b ￿ ￿￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿d) ￿ ￿￿d]fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
d~ yt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t
=
1
￿d
￿
@~ yt
@dt
+
@~ yt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
+
@~ yt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿d;t
￿
=
1
￿
1
fd
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ yfd + ￿f2
￿ y ￿ ￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))f2
d
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
d￿t=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t
=
1
￿d
￿
@￿t
@dt
+
@￿t
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿d;t
+
@￿t
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿d;t
￿
=
￿
￿
1
fd
￿￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ yfd + ￿f2
￿ y ￿ ￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))f2
d
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
Assumption 1 gives ￿d;￿￿ y > 0 as discussed in the previous section. For the relative responses to ￿￿ y;t,
Assumption 2 ensures that the sign is opposite of the sign of the numerators. For the numerators, the same
112assumption ensures that the ￿rst term is positive while the second terms are negative as long as Assumption
6 holds since
(fd + fd;b)(1 ￿ ￿￿d) ￿ ￿￿d < 0 and fd + fd;b ￿ ￿￿￿d (1 ￿ ￿d) ￿ ￿￿d < 0
, fd + fd;b < min
￿
￿￿d
1 ￿ ￿￿d
;￿d (￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿d) + ￿)
￿
=
￿￿d
1 ￿ ￿￿d
where the last equality comes from the fact that ￿d > 0. Meanwhile, this same fact gives
￿￿d
(1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿￿d)
￿ ￿￿d <
￿￿d
1 ￿ ￿￿d
and
￿￿d
(1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿￿d)
￿ ￿
Thus, Assumption 6 is su¢ cient to guarantee that these second terms in the numerators of
d~ yt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t and
d￿t=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t are negative while the last fact shows that this assumption places a tighter condition than the
one in Assumption 5. Then, it￿ s clear that
d~ yt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t and
d￿t=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t can be positive if the second terms
in the numerator are large (i.e., when
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
is large). For the relative responses to ￿d;t, the ￿rst terms are
negative while the last 2 terms are positive under Assumption 5. Then, it￿ s clear that they can be positive
if the last two terms in the numerator are large (i.e., when
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
is large).
The scaled covariance between an outcome xt and the interest rate surprise is given by
Covt￿1 (xt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
=
dxt
d￿d;t￿d￿2
d;t￿1 + dxt
d￿￿ y;t￿￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
￿2
d￿2
d;t￿1 + ￿2
￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
=
dxt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t
f2
d
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
+
dxt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t
f2
￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
so that
Covt￿1 (￿t;i
surp
t )
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
= ￿
￿
￿
￿￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
Covt￿1 (~ yt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
= ￿
1
￿
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
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d
Covt￿1(￿t;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t )
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
=
￿
￿
￿￿ y (fd + fd;b) ￿ ￿d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))
h
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
i2 fdf￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) > 0
d
Covt￿1(~ yt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t )
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
=
1
￿
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(fd + fd;b) ￿ ￿d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))
h
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
i2 fdf￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) > 0
These 2 assumptions are also su¢ cient to ensure that these scaled covariances are positive for large enough
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
.
The responses of forecasts of horizons h ￿ 1 and the real interest rate gap can be signed in a similar
manner.
d~ yt+hjt
d￿￿ y;t
=
@~ yt+hjt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+
@~ yt+hjt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
= ￿
1
￿
f￿ y
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d￿h
d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
d￿t+hjt
d￿￿ y;t
=
@￿t+hjt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
d￿￿ y;t
+
@￿t+hjt
@dtjt
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
= ￿
￿
￿
fy
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d￿h
d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
dxt+hjt
d￿d;t
=
fd
f￿ y
dxt+hjt
d￿￿ y;t
for xt+hjt 2
￿
~ yt+hjt;￿t+hjt
￿
d~ rt
d￿d;t
=
dit
d￿d;t
￿
d￿t+1jt
d￿d;t
￿ ￿
ddt
d￿d;t
+ ￿￿d
ddtjt
d￿d;t
=
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ yfd ￿ ￿f2
￿ y + ￿d (1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))f2
d
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
d~ rt
d￿￿ y;t
=
dit
d￿￿ y;t
￿
d￿t+1jt
d￿￿ y;t
￿ ￿
ddt
d￿￿ y;t
+ ￿￿d
ddtjt
d￿￿ y;t
=
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f2
￿ y + [￿ + ￿d (1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))]fyfd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
Since the responses of forecasts under the individual shocks are proportional to each other, the scaled
covariance between forecasts and the interest rate surprise can be found by looking just at the relative
114response to the output gap target shock
Covt￿1
￿
xt+hjt;i
surp
t
￿
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
=
dxt+hjt=d￿d;t
di
surp
t =d￿d;t
f2
d
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
+
dxt+hjt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t
f2
￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y
=
dxt+hjt=d￿￿ y;t
di
surp
t =d￿￿ y;t
so that
Covt￿1
￿
￿t+hjt;i
surp
t
￿
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
= ￿
￿
￿
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d￿h
d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
Covt￿1
￿
~ yt+hjt;i
surp
t
￿
V art￿1 (i
surp
t )
= ￿
1
￿
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)f￿ y + ￿d￿h
d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))fd
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
Assumptions 2 and 5 are again su¢ cient to ensure that these scaled covariances are positive for large enough
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
and that
d
Covt￿1(￿t+hjt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t )
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
=
￿
￿
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y (fd + fd;b) ￿ ￿d￿h
d (fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))
h
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
i2 fdf￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) > 0
d
Covt￿1(~ yt+hjt;i
surp
t )
V art￿1(i
surp
t )
d
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
=
￿￿ y￿h
￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
(fd + fd;b) ￿ ￿d￿h
d (1 ￿ ￿￿d)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d))
￿
h
fd (fd + fd;b)
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
i2 fdf￿ y (f￿ y + f￿ y;b) > 0
Looking back at the equilibrium solution, it￿ s clear that setting fd = ￿ and fd;b = ￿￿￿d results in the
coe¢ cients on dtjt and dt being zero. Using these parameter values in the responses immediately gives the
properties presented in Section 1.3.2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Here, I repeat the equations summarizing the policymaker￿ s problem described in Section 1.4
min
idis
t ;~ yt;￿t
ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
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~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt
where
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1 + Kd
￿
idis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + K￿ y
￿
idis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿
with M;Kd;K￿ y taken as given.
Then, I can write the output gap deviation and in￿ ation in matrix form as the following function of
current beliefs and idis
t
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
￿
"
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
￿
￿
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
￿
#
dtjt
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
f￿ y;b￿ ytjt +
"
1
￿
#
dt ￿
"
1
0
#
￿ yt ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
idis
t (A.9)
By plugging in beliefs, this can be transformed into the following function of exogenous states and idis
t
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
= ￿
"
1 ￿ Kdfd ￿Kdf￿ y
￿K￿ yfd 1 ￿ K￿ yf￿ y
#"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
1 ￿1
￿ 0
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
+
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
idis
t
where ￿ ￿
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
1
￿f￿ y;b
￿
￿
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
￿ ￿
￿f￿ y;b
#
(A.10)
and
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
￿ ￿
"
Kd
K￿ y
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
=
2
4
@~ yt
@idis
t
+
@~ yt
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t
+
@~ yt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
@￿t
@idis
t
+ @￿t
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t
+ @￿t
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
3
5
In this form, it￿ s clear that the discretionary policymaker has no control over time t+1 or later outcomes
and the problem simpli￿es to
min
idis
t
1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
subject to (A.10)
116which clearly gives the optimality condition
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)H~ y;i +
"
￿
￿tH￿;i = 0 ) ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿R
"
￿
￿t
matching the form given in the proposition with R =
H￿;i
H~ y;i =
@￿t
@idis
t
+
@￿t
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t
+
@￿t
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
@~ yt
@idis
t
+
@~ yt
@dtjt
ddtjt
didis
t
+
@~ yt
@￿ ytjt
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
.
Solving for ~ yt using this optimality condition and substituting this into the in￿ ation condition gives
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt ￿ R"￿t + ￿￿ yt
By restricting attention to nonnegative values of R, I can iterate this forward while using the fact that
￿ yt+hjt = ￿h
￿ y￿ ytjt to get a solution for ￿t in terms of
￿
￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
. Substituting that expression for ￿t back into
the optimality condition gives the solution for ~ yt in terms of the same state variables
￿t =
￿
1 + R"
￿ yt +
￿￿￿ y￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿ ytjt
~ yt =
1
1 + R"
￿ yt ￿
R"￿￿￿ y ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿ ytjt
Then, this gives expressions for expectations ~ yt+1jt and ￿t+1jt which immediately reveals the equilibrium
value of M as a function of R
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
=
2
4
0
1￿￿￿￿ y
1￿￿￿￿ y+R"
0 ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y+R"
3
5
| {z }
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
These can be used along with (1.1) to back out the implied nominal interest rate in terms of
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
it = ￿
￿
dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿
+ ￿t+1jt + ￿
￿
~ yt+1jt ￿ ~ yt
￿
= ￿dt ￿ ￿￿ddtjt | {z }
rn
t
￿￿
1
1 + R" | {z }
f￿
￿ y(R)
￿ yt + ￿
￿
1
1 + R"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
| {z }
f￿
￿ y;b(R)
￿ ytjt (A.11)
Using these optimal response coe¢ cients along with the expression for M gives the equilibrium condition
for R
R = ￿
￿￿￿ y
(1￿￿￿￿ y+R")(1+R")K￿ y ￿ 1
￿
￿￿￿￿ yR"
(1￿￿￿￿ y+R")(1+R")K￿ y ￿ 1
￿
since K￿ y = ￿
1
￿
1 + R"
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
(A.12)
117Here, it￿ s clear that when ￿￿￿ y = 0, the terms involving K￿ y drop out of this expression and it gives R = ￿.
Rearranging (A.12) gives
0 = ￿￿￿￿ y
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
+ (R ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
+ 1
￿
(A.13)
To focus on equilibrium values for R which give ￿nite policy response coe¢ cients, I impose 1 + R" 6= 0 and
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R" 6= 0 which allows me to reduce this equilibrium condition to a third-order polynomial
0 = R
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿ + (R ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
(A.14)
= "2￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
R3 + "
￿
2 ￿ ￿￿￿ y ￿ "￿
￿ ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
R2
+
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 +
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
(1 ￿ "￿)
￿
￿ "￿
￿
R ￿ ￿
￿
1 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿ ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
￿
Since the ￿rst coe¢ cient in the polynomial is positive while the last is negative, Descartes￿rule of signs says
that there must be at least one positive root for any values of the middle two coe¢ cients.
Again, attention is limited to positive solutions for R. To see that R ￿ ￿, note that rearranging (A.13)
gives
R ￿ ￿ =
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
R2" + ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿ 0 for R ￿ 0
Using the expression in (A.14) gives the upper bound R ￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
R
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿ = ￿(R ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
￿ 0 for R ￿ ￿
Implicitly di⁄erentiating (A.14) gives
dR
d
￿
￿2
d=￿2
￿ y
￿ = ￿
(R ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y +
￿
(R ￿ ￿)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
+ (1 + R")
￿
" +
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
￿ ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
< 0
Now, I look at the cases given by the limits of
￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y.
￿ When
￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 1: In this case, referring back to (A.12), it￿ s clear that K￿ y ! 0 and R = ￿ is the unique
solution in this limit. To see that this is the solution of the perfect information case, note that the
policymaker￿ s problem in that setting is
min
idis
t
1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
118subject to (A.10) but with dtjt = dt and ￿ ytjt = ￿ yt. Then, it￿ s clear that the optimality condition is the
same as the one given in the proposition with R = ￿.
￿ When
￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 0: Equation (A.12) shows that
R !
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
since K￿ y ! ￿
1 + R"
￿
Now, I show that this is equivalent to the case of a commitment to a rule of the form
it = rn
t + fc
￿ y￿ yt + fc
￿ y;b￿ ytjt
First, I substitute these coe¢ cients into the solution under a given rule derived earlier in the Appendix
and given in (A.8))
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
=
2
4
￿ 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
+ 1
￿fc
￿ y
￿￿
￿￿￿ y
￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
+ ￿
￿fc
￿ y
3
5 ￿ ytjt +
"
￿ 1
￿fc
￿ y ￿ 1
￿￿
￿fc
￿ y
#
￿ yt
where equilibrium beliefs in this limit are given by
￿ ytjt = ￿ yt +
￿
fc
￿ y
￿d;t
Then, the policymaker who can commit to this rule solves
min
fc
￿ y;fc
￿ y;b
ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
where
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
=
2
4
￿ 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
￿ 1
￿￿
￿￿￿ y
￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
3
5 ￿ yt +
2
4
￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿￿
1 +
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
￿
+ 1
￿￿￿￿ y
￿
1 +
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
￿
+ ￿
3
5￿d;t
Then, the two optimality conditions are given by
0 =
@
@fc
￿ y
ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
) 0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 ￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
+ "￿t
￿
"
￿
1
￿
￿ yt +
fc
￿ y;b
￿
fc
￿ y
￿2￿d;t
#
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@
@fc
￿ y;b
ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
) 0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 ￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
+ "￿t
￿￿
￿
1
￿
￿ yt ￿
1
fc
￿ y
￿d;t
￿
Both conditions are satis￿ed by a policy that maintains
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿
"
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿t 8t
which is equivalent to the optimality condition of the discretionary policy with R ! ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y in this
limit.
Lastly I show that the same discretionary optimal policy condition is obtained if I start with agents who
suppose that current policy responds linearly to the entire history of shocks fdt; ￿ ytg. That is, I replace the
supposed behavior of current policy in equation (1.12) with
it =
1 X
k=0
fhist
d (k)dt￿k +
1 X
k=0
fhist
￿ y (k) ￿ yt￿k (A.15)
(In equilibrium, a rule that also includes current and lagged private agent beliefs can be written in this form
since private agent beliefs are a function of lagged and current state variables in equilibrium.)
Then, beliefs are given by a static Gaussian signal extraction problem where
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
=
"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
Khist
d
Khist
￿ y
#
[it ￿ E [itjIt n it]] (A.16)
where E [itjIt n it] =
￿
fhist
d (0)￿d + fhist
d (1)
￿
dt￿1
+
￿
fhist
￿ y (0)￿￿ y + fhist
￿ y (1)
￿
￿ yt￿1 +
1 X
k=2
￿
fhist
d (k)dt￿k + fhist
￿ y (k) ￿ yt￿k
￿
(A.17)
and Khist
d =
fhist
d (0)￿2
d ￿
fhist
d (0)
￿2
￿2
d +
￿
fhist
￿ y (0)
￿2
￿2
￿ y
, Khist
￿ y =
fhist
￿ y (0)￿2
￿ y
￿
fhist
d (0)
￿2
￿2
d +
￿
fhist
￿ y (0)
￿2
￿2
￿ y
To proceed, I now conjecture that the equilibrium solution for the endogenous outcomes ~ yt and ￿t are linear
in the full history of shocks, thus resulting in expectations of the form
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= Mhist
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
+
1 X
k=1
Mhist
d (k)dt￿k +
1 X
k=1
Mhist
￿ y (k) ￿ yt￿k
120Again, this allows me to write the output gap deviation and in￿ ation as
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
=
1 X
k=0
Hhist
d (k)dt￿k +
1 X
k=0
Hhist
￿ y (k) ￿ yt￿k +
"
Hhist
~ y;i
Hhist
￿;i
#
it (A.18)
where
"
Hhist
~ y;i
Hhist
￿;i
#
￿
 "
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
Mhist
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
￿d 0
￿￿d 0
#!"
Khist
d
Khist
￿ y
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
and
￿
Hhist
d (k);Hhist
￿ y (k)
￿1
k=0 are functions of Mhist;Khist
d ;Khist
￿ y ;
￿
fhist
d (k);fhist
￿ y (k);Mhist
d (k);Mhist
￿ y (k)
￿1
k=0
This again reduces the discretionary policy problem to
min
it
1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
subject to (A.18)
which gives
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿Rhist "
￿
￿t where Rhist =
Hhist
￿;i
Hhist
~ y;i
This is equivalent to the solution above as long as the equilibrium condition for Rhist is the same. The rest
of this section proves this.
Using the equilibrium conditions gives the following expression for expectations
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
=
2
4
0
1￿￿￿￿ y
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist"
0 ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist"
3
5
| {z }
Mhist
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
and an interest rate that responds only to current true states and beliefs
i￿
t = ￿dt ￿ ￿￿ddtjt ￿ ￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿ yt + ￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
￿ ytjt
Combining (A.15) and (A.16) shows that equilibrium beliefs are a function only of time t and t ￿ 1 funda-
mentals
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
=
"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
Khist
d
Khist
￿ y
#
￿
fhist
d (0)(dt ￿ ￿ddt￿1) + fhist
￿ y (0)
￿
￿ yt ￿ ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿￿
Then, comparing (A.15) to the optimal interest rate proves that fhist
d (k) = fhist
￿ y (k) = 0 for k ￿ 2.
Using these equilibrium beliefs in the expression for i￿
t allows me to obtain the remaining coe¢ cients
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fhist
d (0);fhist
d (1);fhist
￿ y (0);fhist
￿ y (1)
￿
i￿
t = ￿dt ￿ ￿￿d
￿
￿ddt￿1 + Khist
d
￿
fhist
d (0)(dt ￿ ￿ddt￿1) + fhist
￿ y (0)
￿
￿ yt ￿ ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿￿￿
￿ ￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿ yt
+ ￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿￿
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + Khist
￿ y
￿
fhist
d (0)(dt ￿ ￿ddt￿1) + fhist
￿ y (0)
￿
￿ yt ￿ ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
￿￿￿
= ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿dKhist
d fhist
d (0) +
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y fhist
d (0)
￿
dt
￿ ￿
￿
￿d
￿
1 ￿ Khist
d fhist
d (0)
￿
￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y fhist
d (0)
￿
￿ddt￿1
￿ ￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
+ ￿dKhist
d fhist
￿ y (0) ￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y fhist
￿ y (0)
￿
￿ yt
+ ￿
￿
￿dKhist
d fhist
￿ y (0) +
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿￿
1 ￿ Khist
￿ y fhist
￿ y (0)
￿￿
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
which gives
fhist
d (0) =
￿
1 + ￿￿dKhist
d ￿ ￿
￿
1
1+Rhist" ￿ 1
￿￿ y
1
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y
fhist
￿ y (0) =
￿￿ 1
1+Rhist"
1 + ￿￿dKhist
d ￿ ￿
￿
1
1+Rhist" ￿ 1
￿￿ y
1
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y
Substituting this into the expression for Khist
￿ y gives ￿dKhist
d as a function of Khist
￿ y .
Khist
￿ y = ￿
1
￿
￿
1 + Rhist"
￿
(1 + Rhist")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿
1 + ￿￿dKhist
d ￿ ￿
￿
1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
Khist
￿ y
￿
) ￿dKhist
d =
0
@ 1
1 + Rhist"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿
￿
1 + Rhist"
￿2 ￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
1 + Rhist"
1
AKhist
￿ y ￿
1
￿
Then, using the expression for Rhist and the equilibrium expression for Mhist gives
Rhist = ￿
￿￿ y(1￿￿￿￿ y+ ￿
￿+￿)
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist" Khist
￿ y ￿ ￿dKhist
d ￿ 1
￿
￿￿ y(1￿￿￿￿ y+ ￿
￿)
1￿￿￿￿ y+Rhist"Khist
￿ y ￿ ￿dKhist
d ￿ 1
￿
= ￿
￿￿￿ y +
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿￿￿
1 + Rhist"
￿2 ￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿
￿Rhist"￿￿￿ y +
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿￿
(1 + Rhist")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿
where I again restrict attention to ￿nite interest rate coe¢ cients by looking only for solutions where 1 +
Rhist" 6= 0 and 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist" 6= 0.
Rearranging this gives
0 = ￿￿￿￿ y
￿￿
Rhist￿2
" + ￿
￿
+
￿
Rhist ￿ ￿
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + Rhist"
￿￿￿
1 + Rhist"
￿2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
+ 1
￿
122which indeed matches equilibrium condition (A.13) derived above for R thus showing that the equilibrium
is the same when I generalize private agents￿belief about current policy to the form in (A.15).
A.4.1 Proof of Corollary 3
The proof above of Proposition 2 gave the forms of f￿
￿ y (R) and f￿
￿ y;b (R) in (A.11). There, it was also shown
that the perfect information discretionary policy optimality condition is
~ yPI
t ￿ ￿ yt = ￿"￿PI
t
Again, using this condition along with the NKPC in equation (1.2) gives
￿PI
t =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt and ~ yPI
t =
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt
Then, this gives expressions for expectations
￿PI
t+1jt =
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt and ~ yPI
t+1jt =
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt
which can again be used along with (1.1) to back out the implied optimal nominal interest rate in terms of
fdt; ￿ ytg
i
￿;PI
t = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)dt | {z }
rn
t
￿ ￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt = rn
t +
￿
f￿
￿ y (￿) + f￿
￿ y;b (￿)
￿
￿ yt
Returning to the imperfect information case, I next show how the interest rate behavior can be altered to
ensure determinacy so that the equilibrium in equations (1.16) and (1.17) is the unique path in this model.
To do this, I add to the interest rate a term that reacts to deviations of ￿t from its intended equilibrium
path
i￿
t = rn
t + f￿
￿ y (R) ￿ yt + f￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ytjt + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿￿
t)
= rn
t +
￿
f￿
￿ y (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ yt +
￿
f￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y;b
￿
￿ ytjt + ￿￿￿t
where ￿￿
t =
￿
1 + R" | {z }
￿￿ y
￿ yt +
￿￿￿ y￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
(1 + R")
| {z }
￿￿ y;b
￿ ytjt is the intended equilibrium
Clearly, along the intended stationary equilibrium path, ￿t = ￿￿
t so that the response of i￿
t to state variables
is the same as without this extra term. What this term does change are the dynamics of [~ yt ￿t]
0 since the
123system of equilibrium conditions now becomes
"
~ yt
￿t
#
=
2
4
1
1+￿￿
￿
￿
1￿￿￿￿
￿+￿￿￿
￿
1+￿￿
￿
￿
￿
￿+￿
1+￿￿
￿
￿
3
5
| {z }
A
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
￿
2
4
1
￿+￿￿￿
￿
￿+￿￿￿
3
5
￿￿
f￿
￿ y (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ yt +
￿
f￿
￿ y;b (R) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ y;b
￿
￿ ytjt
￿
Then, determinacy of [~ yt ￿t]
0 is guaranteed by the largest eigenvalue of A being less than one
maxfeig (A)g =
1+￿+ ￿
￿
1+￿￿
￿
￿ ￿
r￿
1+￿+ ￿
￿
1+￿￿
￿
￿
￿2
￿ 4
￿
1+￿￿
￿
￿
2
< 1 , ￿￿ > 1
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Here, the equilibrium conditions in matrix form are
"
~ yCB
t
￿t
#
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#"
~ yCB
t+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
it +
"
￿x
￿￿
#
zt (A.19)
where the shocks are given by
"
z1;t
z2;t
#
=
"
￿11 0
￿21 ￿22
#"
z1;t￿1
z2;t￿1
#
+ et, et ￿ iid N (0;￿) with ￿ diagonal
In the perfect information case, a discretionary policymaker solves
min
it;~ yCB
t ;￿t
1
2
￿￿
~ yCB
t
￿2
+
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
subject to (A.19) where ~ yCB
t+1jt and ￿t+1jt are taken as given
which clearly yields
~ yCB
t = ￿"￿t
Private agents suppose that the interest rate it is
it = F1z1;t + F2z2;t + F2;bz2;tjt
while their information set is
￿
it;zt
1;z
t￿1
2
￿
. Again, I reframe the policymaker￿ s problem as a choice of idis
t
where implemented policy is it = idis
t + F2;bz2;tjt. Then, the same process described in Section 1.2.3 shows
124that beliefs are the following function of idis
t and exogenous lagged variables
z2;tjt = ￿row 2
"
z1;t￿1
z2;t￿1
#
+ Kz
 
idis
t ￿ F2￿row 2
"
z1;t￿1
z2;t￿1
#!
= (I ￿ KzF2)￿row 2
"
z1;t￿1
z2;t￿1
#
+ Kzidis
t
Then, conjecturing a linear solution for ~ yCB
t and ￿t again leads to a linear conjecture for expectations
"
~ yCB
t+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= M1z1;t+1jt + M2z2;t+1jt = (M1￿11 + M2￿21)z1;t + M2￿22z2;tjt
The current outcomes can then be written in terms of exogenous states and idis
t
"
~ yCB
t
￿t
#
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
(M1￿11 + M2￿21)z1;t +
"
￿x
￿￿
#
zt + ￿z2;tjt ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
idis
t
=
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
(M1￿11 + M2￿21)z1;t +
"
￿x
￿￿
#
zt (A.20)
+ ￿(I ￿ KzF2)￿row 2
"
z1;t￿1
z2;t￿1
#
+
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
idis
t
where ￿ ￿
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M2￿22 ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
F2;b and
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
￿ ￿Kz ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
Then, the discretionary policy problem becomes
min
idis
t
1
2
￿￿
~ yCB
t
￿2
+
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
subject to (A.20)
which yields the optimality condition
~ yCB
t = ￿
H￿;i
H~ y;i
"
￿
￿t
I again limit attention to equilibrium solutions where
H￿;i
H~ y;i ￿ 0. Then, substituting this into the in￿ ation
equation and solving forward for ￿t gives
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt ￿
H￿;i
H~ y;i
"￿t + ￿￿;1z1;t =
￿￿;1
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
2
4I￿
￿
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
￿11
3
5
￿1
z1;t
125Then, the optimality condition gives
~ yCB
t = ￿
H￿;i
H~ y;i
"
￿
￿￿;1
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
2
4I￿
￿
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
￿11
3
5
￿1
z1;t
This shows that ￿ uctuations in the welfare-relevant outcomes ~ yCB
t and ￿t are only caused by z1;t and
changes in z2;t and z2;tjt do not a⁄ect these outcomes in equilibrium and so
d~ yCB
t
dz2;t
=
d￿t
dz2;t
=
d~ yCB
t
dz2;tjt
=
d￿t
dz2;tjt
= 0
These expressions also reveal that M2 = 0 and give the equilibrium expression for M1 since
"
~ yCB
t+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
=
"
￿
H￿;i
H~ y;i
"
￿
1
#
￿￿;1
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
2
4I￿
￿
1 +
H￿;i
H~ y;i"
￿11
3
5
￿1
| {z }
M1
￿11z1;t
Then,
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
=
 "
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M2￿22 ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
F2;b
!
Kz ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
= ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
(1 + F2;bKz) )
H￿;i
H~ y;i
= ￿
and the discretionary policy optimality condition is equivalent to the perfect information case.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
I repeat the equilibrium conditions here for convenience
~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt
The optimal discretionary interest rate policy under perfect information implements ~ yPI
t ￿ ￿ yt = ￿"￿PI
t
which yields the solution
"
~ yPI
t ￿ ￿ yt
￿PI
t
#
=
"
￿"￿
￿
#
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿ yt
126The optimal discretionary interest rate policy under imperfect information implements ~ yt￿ ￿ yt = ￿R "
￿￿t
which yields the following solution (as shown in the proof of Proposition 2)
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
=
"
￿R"
￿
#
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿
+ ￿ yt
￿
The equilibrium belief error is
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt =
￿
K￿ yf￿
￿ y (R) ￿ 1
￿
￿￿ y;t + K￿ y￿￿d;t = ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿￿ y;t ￿
1 + R"
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
￿d;t
which gives
ECB
t
h￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿2i
=
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
for s > t
ECB
t
￿￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿
￿ ys
￿
= ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
for s > t
Thus, in equilibrium
lPI
t ￿
1
2
h￿
~ yPI
t ￿ ￿ yt
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿PI
t
￿2i
=
1
2
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2 ￿ y2
t
lt ￿
1
2
h
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
i
=
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
￿
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿
+ ￿ yt
￿2
ECB
t LPI
t+1 ￿ ECB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)1
2
￿￿
~ yPI
s ￿ ￿ ys
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿PI
s
￿2￿
=
1
2
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
ECB
t Lt+1 ￿ ECB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)1
2
￿
(~ ys ￿ ￿ ys)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
s
￿
=
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
"￿
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿
+ ￿ ys
￿2#
=
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
8
<
:
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
2(1 + R") ￿ ￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
9
=
;
127The di⁄erence in the expected future welfare loss is then
ECB
t
￿
Lt+1 ￿ LPI
t+1
￿
=
1
2
 
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 ￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
!
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
￿
1
2
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
￿
2(1 + R") ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ y + 1
To see that the ￿rst term is negative, note that Proposition 2 showed that R 2
h
￿; ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
i
. Then, since
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 =
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2 for R = ￿
while
d
dR
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 = 2"2
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
R ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿3 ￿ 0 for R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
This proves that
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 ￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2 for R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
The second term is clearly negative since 2(1 + R") ￿ ￿￿￿ y ￿ 1 + 2R" ￿ 0.
The di⁄erence in the current period loss is
lt ￿ lPI
t =
1
2
 
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 ￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
!
￿ y2
t
+
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿
￿￿￿ y
1 + R"
￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿2
+ 2
￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿
￿ yt
￿
Again, the ￿rst term is negative, but the second term may be positive and larger than the ￿rst term.
A.6.1 Proof of Corollary 6
If I exogenously impose that ￿ ysjs = ￿ ys, then this is equivalent to setting
ECB
t
h￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿2i
= ECB
t
￿￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿
￿ ys
￿
= 0
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ECB
t
￿
Lt+1 ￿ LPI
t+1
￿
=
1
2
 
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 ￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
!
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
￿ 0 if R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
If I exogenously impose R = ￿, then the di⁄erence in the expected future welfare loss is then
ECB
t
￿
Lt+1 ￿ LPI
t+1
￿
=
1
2
"￿￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)
￿
￿￿￿ y
1 + "￿
ECB
t
h￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿2i
+ 2ECB
t
￿￿
￿ ysjs ￿ ￿ ys
￿
￿ ys
￿
￿
=
1
2
"￿￿￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
￿￿￿ y
1 + "￿
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)
￿
ECB
t
h
￿ y2
sjs
i
￿ ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿￿
+
"￿￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
1
1 + "￿
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1) ￿
ECB
t
￿
￿ ysjs￿ ys
￿
￿ ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿￿
This is clearly weakly negative if
ECB
t
h
￿ y2
sjs
i
￿ ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
and ECB
t
￿
￿ ysjs￿ ys
￿
￿ ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
for s > t
Note that this is equivalent to
V arCB
t
￿
ysjs
￿
￿ V arCB
t (ys) and CovCB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
￿ V arCB
t (ys)
since ECB
t ￿ ysjs = ECB
t ￿ ys for s > t so that
CovCB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
= ECB
t
￿
￿ ysjs￿ ys
￿
￿
￿
ECB
t0 ￿ ys
￿2
V arCB
t
￿
ysjs
￿
= ECB
t
h
￿ y2
sjs
i
￿
￿
ECB
t ￿ ys
￿2
V arCB
t (ys) = ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
￿
￿
ECB
t ￿ ys
￿2
Then, another set of equivalent conditions is
V arCB
t
￿
ysjs
￿
￿ V arCB
t (ys) and CorrCB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
=
CovCB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
q
V arCB
t (ys)V arCB
t
￿
ysjs
￿ ￿ 1
since this gives
CovCB
t
￿
￿ ysjs; ￿ ys
￿
￿
q
V arCB
t (ys)V arCB
t
￿
ysjs
￿
￿ V arCB
t (ys)
129A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Here, I consider the case where the central bank directly communicates dt to private agents prior to observing
it. Then, agents infer ￿ yt upon observing it. In equilibrium, since agents know beliefs will be correct with
dtjt = dt and ￿ ytjt = ￿ yt. However, a key feature of this setup is that the interest rate retains its signaling
e⁄ect on ￿ ytjt since from the policymaker￿ s point of view, beliefs are the following function of idis
t .
￿ ytjt =
1
f￿ y
￿
idis
t ￿ fddt
￿
Thus, the policymaker￿ s choice has a marginal impact of K￿ y ￿
d￿ ytjt
didis
t
= 1
f￿ y on beliefs.
Denoting this case with superscript d, (A.12) shows that the in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ is at its steepest
possible value
Rd =
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
with the following equilibrium outcomes under the optimal discretionary interest rate policy after taking
into account that beliefs are correct in equilibrium
￿d
t =
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿ yt and ~ yd
t ￿ ￿ yt = ￿
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿ yt
Then, the associated welfare loss terms are
ld
t ￿
￿
~ yd
t ￿ ￿ yt
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿d
t
￿2
=
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿ y2
t
ECB
t Ld
t+1 ￿ ECB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)1
2
￿￿
~ yd
s ￿ ￿ ys
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿d
s
￿2￿
=
1
2
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ y2
s
￿
Compared to the case of full communication, communicating only dt is strictly preferable for any real-
izations of the current shocks.
ld
t ￿ lPI
t =
1
2
 
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
!
￿ y2
t ￿ 0
ECB
t
￿
Ld
t+1 ￿ LPI
t+1
￿
=
1
2
 
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
!
￿2
￿ y￿ y2
t + 1
1￿￿￿2
￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿2
￿ y
￿ 0
Both the current period welfare loss and expected future loss are lower in the case of communicating only
130dt since
￿￿￿ y ￿ 0 and "￿ ￿ 0 )
"￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
￿2
On the other hand, when the case of communicating only dt is compared to the no additional commu-
nication case, neither case produces unambiguously lower losses for either current period or expected future
welfare.
ld
t ￿ lt =
1
2
 
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
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"￿ y2
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￿
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￿￿￿ y
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￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
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￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿
￿ yt
￿
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￿
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￿
=
1
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￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2
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￿2
￿ y￿ y2
t + 1
1￿￿￿2
￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿2
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+
1
2
1
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"
￿
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￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
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￿
2(1 + "R) ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿￿￿ y￿2
d￿2
￿ y
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d + ￿2
￿ y
The ￿rst term in each of these expressions is negative and re￿ ects the bene￿t of maximizing the interest
rate￿ s e⁄ect on in￿ ation expectations, thereby achieving the largest possible reduction in the stabilization
bias through the signaling channel. To see that it￿ s always negative, note the following
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
=
R2" + ￿
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d
dR
R2" + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 = ￿2"
￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
R
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿3 ￿ 0 for R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
so that
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿2
+ "￿
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿2 for R 2
￿
￿;
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
The second term in ECB
t
￿
Ld
t+1 ￿ Lt+1
￿
is positive since 2(1 + R") ￿ ￿￿￿ y ￿ 1 + 2R" ￿ 0. This re￿ ects the
loss of the bene￿t of decoupling the comovement in agents￿beliefs about the output gap target and its true
value. Thus, whether this type of partial communication is bene￿cial for expected future welfare losses is
ambiguous for general parameter values. Meanwhile, the second term in ld
t ￿ lt can always be positive for
large enough negative realizations of
￿
￿ ytjt ￿ ￿ yt
￿
￿ yt so this di⁄erence stays ambiguous even for a ￿xed set of
parameter values.
The following can be shown for special parameterizations:
￿ As ￿2
d ! 0 while ￿2
￿ y stays positive, R ! ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y . As the demand shock becomes more negligible,
131so does the e⁄ect of communicating its true value. Even without any additional communication, the
interest rate￿ s signaling e⁄ect on in￿ ation expectations is already high so the further reduction in the
stabilization bias from communicating dt disappears. Furthermore, as ￿2
d ! 0, private agents￿forecast
errors regarding the output gap target become negligible and their beliefs ￿ ytjt approach the true ￿ yt so
the bene￿t of reducing their comovement by not directly communicating also disappears.
lim
￿2
d!0
ECB
t Lt+1 ! ECB
t Ld
t+1
lim
￿2
d!0
lt ! ld
t if ￿d;t = 0
Here, the bene￿t of not communicating the true value of ￿ yt remains so that
lim
￿2
d!0
ECB
t Lt+1 < ECB
t LPI
t+1 and lim
￿2
d!0
lt < lPI
t
￿ As ￿2
￿ y ! 0 while ￿2
d stays positive, R ! ￿ . In this case, the in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ disappears
entirely and the economy approaches one in which the ￿ exible price equilibrium is always e¢ cient and
is achievable regardless of the information setting.
lim
￿2
￿ y!0
ECB
t Lt+1 ! ECB
t Ld
t+1 = ECB
t LPI
t+1 if ￿ yt = 0
lim
￿2
￿ y!0
lt ! ld
t = lPI
t if ￿￿ y;t = ￿ yt = 0
￿ If ￿￿￿ y = 0, then the in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ is no longer a⁄ected by private agents￿beliefs since
in￿ ation is driven purely by current marginal costs. Then, the information setting again becomes
irrelevant.
ECB
t Lt+1 = ECB
t Ld
t+1 = ECB
t LPI
t+1 if ￿￿￿ y = 0
lt = ld
t = lPI
t if ￿￿￿ y = 0
132A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
I now introduce a cost-push shock that private agents are perfectly informed about (i.e., It =
￿
it;vt;dt￿1; ￿ yt￿1￿
)
so that the equilibrium conditions become
~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt + vt
Conjecturing a solution that￿ s linear in the expanded set of state variables
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ yt; ￿ ytjt;vt
￿
results in
expectations of future outcomes of the form
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
+ Mv￿vvt
Beliefs are now formed according to the supposition that
it = fddt + f￿ y￿ yt + fvvt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
and I again de￿ne the interest rate policy problem as a choice of a discretionary component of the interest
rate idis
t where the ￿nal realized nominal rate is
it = idis
t + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
Beliefs can be derived using the same procedure as Section 1.2.3 which results in
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
=
"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
Kd
K￿ y
#
￿
idis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 ￿ fvvt
￿
where Kd =
fd
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
+f2
￿ y
and K￿ y =
f￿ y
f2
d
￿2
d
￿2
￿ y
+f2
￿ y
as before and are again taken as given constants by the discretionary
policymaker.
Following the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2, I use the form of expectations and beliefs to write
the output gap deviation and in￿ ation in terms of the exogenous states and idis
t so that the discretionary
133policy problem becomes
min
idis
t
1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
where
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
= ￿
"
1 ￿ Kdfd ￿Kdf￿ y
￿K￿ yfd 1 ￿ K￿ yf￿ y
#"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
1 ￿1
￿ 0
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
+
 "
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
Mv￿v +
"
0
1
#
￿ ￿
"
Kdfv
K￿ yfv
#!
vt +
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
idis
t
￿ ￿
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
1
￿f￿ y;b
￿
￿
￿d + 1
￿fd;b
￿ ￿
￿f￿ y;b
#
"
H~ y;i
H￿;i
#
￿ ￿
"
Kd
K￿ y
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
Then, clearly, the optimality condition is again
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿R
"
￿
￿t with R =
H￿;i
H~ y;i
Substituting this into the equilibrium conditions and solving again for the endogenous variables as I did in
the proof of Proposition 2 gives
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt ￿ R"￿t + ￿￿ yt + vt
=
￿
1 + R"
￿ yt +
￿
1 + R"
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿ ytjt +
1
1 ￿ ￿￿v + R"
vt
~ yt =
1
1 + R"
￿ yt ￿
R"
1 + R"
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y +
Hi;2
Hi;1"
￿ ytjt ￿
R "
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿v + R"
vt
and
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
=
2
4
0
1￿￿￿￿ y
1￿￿￿￿ y+R"
0 ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y+R"
3
5
| {z }
M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
+
2
4 ￿
R "
￿
1￿￿￿v+R"
1
1￿￿￿v+R"
3
5
| {z }
￿v
Mv
vt
Then, this implies that the interest rate can be written in terms of
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ y; ￿ ytjt;vt
￿
i￿
t = ￿
￿
dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿
+ ￿t+1jt + ￿
￿
~ yt+1jt ￿ ~ yt
￿
= ￿
￿
dt ￿ ￿ddtjt
￿
| {z }
rn
t
￿￿
1
1 + R" | {z }
f￿
￿ y(R)
￿ yt + ￿
￿
1
1 + R"
￿
1
￿￿ y
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + R"
￿
| {z }
f￿
￿ y;b(R)
￿ ytjt + ￿
1
￿￿v + R "
￿ (1 ￿ ￿v)
1 ￿ ￿￿v + R"
| {z }
f￿
v(R)
vt
134It￿ s clear that the equilibrium conditions between
n
M;K￿ y;f￿
￿ y;f￿
￿ y;b;R
o
are the same here as in the previous
case without the additional cost push shock and so the equilibrium value(s) of R are also the same.
In the perfect information case, conjecturing a solution that￿ s linear in state variables fdt; ￿ yt;vtg results
in expectations of future outcomes of the form
"
~ yPI
t+1jt
￿PI
t+1jt
#
= M
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
+ Mv￿vvt
Then, the output gap deviation and in￿ ation written in terms of exogenous variables along with the interest
rate is
"
~ yPI
t ￿ ￿ yt
￿PI
t
#
=
 
￿ +
"
1 ￿1
￿ 0
#!"
dt
￿ yt
#
+
 "
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
Mv￿v +
"
0
1
#!
vt ￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
idis
t
Thus, the discretionary policy problem is equivalent to minimizing the current period loss subject to this
condition. Then the perfect information discretionary policy optimality condition and equilibrium conditions
(including the interest rate behavior) are again the same as the imperfect information case with ￿ in place
of R.
A.9 Overreaction to the additional cost-push shock
This section shows that when a separate cost-push shock is added to the model, the optimal interest rate
under discretion no longer corresponds to the optimal commitment to a forward-looking rule in the limit
where the interest rate has its largest e⁄ect on ￿ ytjt.
In the limit where
￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 0, it￿ s still the case that R ! ￿
1￿￿￿￿ y since K￿ y ! ￿1+R"
￿ . However, this is not
equivalent to commitment to a rule of the form
it = rn
t + fc
￿ y￿ yt + fc
￿ y;b￿ ytjt + fc
vvt
The belief ￿ ytjt in the limit where
￿
2
d
￿2
￿ y ! 0 is again given by
￿ ytjt = ￿ yt +
￿
fc
￿ y
￿d;t
Following the same steps given in Section A.2 to obtain a solution under a given linear interest rate rule
135provides me with the solution
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
= ￿
2
4
￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
+ 1
￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
fc
￿ y + fc
￿ y;b
￿
3
5 ￿ yt ￿
2
4
￿￿ y￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + ￿
￿
￿￿
1 +
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
￿
+
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
￿￿￿ y￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + ￿
￿ + ￿
￿￿
1 +
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
￿
+ ￿
f
c
￿ y;b
fc
￿ y
3
5￿d;t
+
2
4
1
￿￿v￿ 1
￿f
c
v(1￿￿￿v)
(1￿￿v)(1￿￿￿v)￿ ￿
￿￿v
1￿￿v￿ ￿
￿f
c
v
(1￿￿v)(1￿￿￿v)￿ ￿
￿￿v
3
5vt
Then, the optimality conditions for fc
￿ y and fc
￿ y;b are the same as in the proof of Proposition 2
0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 ￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
+ "￿t
￿
"
￿
1
￿
￿ yt +
fc
￿ y;b
￿
fc
￿ y
￿2￿d;t
#
and 0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 ￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
+ "￿t
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿ yt ￿
1
fc
￿ y
￿d;t
￿
The new optimality condition for fc
v is
0 =
@
@fc
v
ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0 1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
) 0 = ECB
t0
1 X
t=t0
￿
t￿t0
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt) +
"
￿
￿t
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿v
￿
vt
Now, it￿ s clear that there￿ s no single optimal ratio between ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt and ￿t that could satisfy all of these.
Using the equilibrium solutions for ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt and ￿t and evaluating expectations from an ex-ante un-
conditional perspective gives the following set of equations that satisfy all three optimality conditions and
determine the optimal policy rule coe¢ cients
0 =
￿
1
￿
￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿￿
f
￿;c
￿ y + f
￿;c
￿ y;b
￿
+ 1
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
+ "
￿
￿
￿￿ y
￿
f
￿;c
￿ y + f
￿;c
￿ y;b
￿
0 = ￿￿ y￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y +
￿
￿
￿
 
1 +
f
￿;c
￿ y;b
f
￿;c
￿ y
!
+
f
￿;c
￿ y;b
f
￿;c
￿ y
+ "
 
￿￿￿ y￿￿ y
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y +
￿
￿
+ ￿
￿
 
1 +
f
￿;c
￿ y;b
f
￿;c
￿ y
!
+ ￿
f
￿;c
￿ y;b
f
￿;c
￿ y
!
0 =
1
￿￿v ￿ 1
￿f￿;c
v (1 ￿ ￿￿v)
(1 ￿ ￿v)(1 ￿ ￿￿v) ￿ ￿
￿￿v
+ "
1 ￿ ￿v ￿ ￿
￿f￿;c
v
(1 ￿ ￿v)(1 ￿ ￿￿v) ￿ ￿
￿￿v
The resulting solutions are
f
￿;c
￿ y = ￿￿
1
1 + "￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
f
￿;c
￿ y;b = ￿
 
1
1 + "￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ y
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿ y
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y + "￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
!
f￿;c
v = ￿
1
￿￿v + "
1￿￿￿v (1 ￿ ￿v)
1 ￿ ￿￿v + "￿
1￿￿￿v
136Then, it￿ s clear that
f￿;c
v = f￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿v
￿
6= f￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
= ￿
1
￿￿v + "
1￿￿￿￿ y (1 ￿ ￿v)
1 ￿ ￿￿v + "￿
1￿￿￿￿ y
and
f￿;c
v = f￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿v
￿
< f￿
v
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ y
￿
i⁄ ￿v < ￿￿ y
since f￿0
v (R) = ￿
"
￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿v)(1 ￿ ￿v) ￿ ￿
￿￿v
[1 ￿ ￿￿v + R"]
2 > 0 when ￿v 2 [0;￿ ￿)
A.10 Proof of Proposition 9
I repeat the equilibrium conditions here for convenience
~ yt = ~ yt+1jt ￿
1
￿
￿
it ￿ ￿t+1jt
￿
+ dt ￿ dt+1jt
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt + ￿~ yt
The optimal discretionary interest rate policy under perfect information implements ~ yPI
t = ￿"
￿
￿PI
t ￿ ￿ ￿t
￿
which yields the solution
"
~ yPI
t
￿PI
t ￿ ￿ ￿t
#
=
"
"
￿1
#
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + "￿
￿ ￿t
The optimal discretionary interest rate policy under imperfect information implements ~ yt = ￿R "
￿ (￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t)
which yields the following solution
"
~ yt
￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t
#
=
"
￿R "
￿
1
#
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R"
￿
R"￿￿￿ ￿
1 + R"
￿
￿ ￿tjt ￿ ￿ ￿t
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿t
￿
with equilibrium interest rate behavior given by
it = ￿dt ￿ ￿￿ddtjt | {z }
rn
t
￿￿
R "
￿
1 + R" | {z }
f￿
￿ ￿(R)
￿ ￿t + ￿
￿
1
1 + R"
￿
1
￿￿ ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R"
￿
R
"
￿
| {z }
f￿
￿ ￿;b(R)
￿ ￿tjt
where ￿￿ ￿ ￿
1
(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿
137The equilibrium belief error is
￿ ￿tjt ￿ ￿ ￿t = (K￿ ￿f￿
￿ ￿ (R) ￿ 1)￿￿ ￿;t + K￿ ￿￿￿d;t = ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿
2
d
￿2
￿ ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿ +
￿
R "
￿
￿2￿￿ ￿;t ￿
(1 + R")R "
￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿ +
￿
R "
￿
￿2￿d;t
which gives
ECB
t
h￿
￿ ￿sjs ￿ ￿ ￿s
￿2i
=
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿ +
￿
R "
￿
￿2 > 0 for s > t
ECB
t
￿￿
￿ ￿sjs ￿ ￿ ￿s
￿
￿ ￿s
￿
= ￿
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
(1 + R")
2 ￿2
d
￿2
￿ ￿ +
￿
R "
￿
￿2 < 0 for s > t
Thus, in equilibrium
lPI
t ￿
1
2
h￿
~ yPI
t
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿PI
t ￿ ￿ ￿t
￿2i
=
1
2
"
￿ (1 + "￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿)
2
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + "￿)
2 ￿ ￿2
t
lt ￿
1
2
h
~ y2
t +
"
￿
(￿t ￿ ￿ ￿t)
2
i
=
1
2
"
￿
￿
1 + R2 "
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R")
2
￿
R"￿￿￿ ￿
1 + R"
￿
￿ ￿tjt ￿ ￿ ￿t
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿t
￿2
ECB
t LPI
t+1 ￿ ECB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)1
2
￿￿
~ yPI
s
￿2
+
"
￿
￿
￿PI
s ￿ ￿ ￿s
￿2￿
=
1
2
"￿(1 + "￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + "￿)
￿2 1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
￿
￿ ￿2
s
￿
ECB
t Lt+1 ￿ ECB
t
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)1
2
￿
~ y2
s +
"
￿
(￿s ￿ ￿ ￿s)
2
￿
=
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R")
2
1 X
s=t+1
￿
s￿(t+1)ECB
t
"￿
R"￿￿￿ ￿
1 + R"
￿
￿ ￿sjs ￿ ￿ ￿s
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿s
￿2#
=
1
2
"
￿
R2" + ￿
￿
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ + R")
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The di⁄erence in the expected future welfare loss is then
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138The proof of Proposition 5 showed that the ￿rst term is negative since R 2
h
￿; ￿
1￿￿￿￿ ￿
i
. The second term is
clearly positive. Thus, the implications of full communication for expected future welfare will depend on the
parameterization. Unlike the case with an output gap target, output ￿ uctuations and deviations of in￿ ation
from target will actually be smaller when the in￿ ation target ￿ ￿tjt moves with true in￿ ation ￿ ￿t. However, no
direct communication comes with a bene￿t of disciplining discretionary interest rate policy so the net e⁄ect
is ambiguous.
The di⁄erence in the current period loss is
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Again, the ￿rst term is negative, but the second term may be positive and larger than the ￿rst term depend
on the realizations of shocks even for a given set of parameter values.
Here, I consider the case where the central bank directly communicates dt to private agents prior to
observing it. Then, agents infer ￿ ￿t upon observing it. In equilibrium, since agents know beliefs will be
correct with dtjt = dt and ￿ ￿tjt = ￿ ￿t. However, a key feature of this setup is that the interest rate retains its
signaling e⁄ect on ￿ ￿tjt since from the policymaker￿ s point of view, beliefs are the following function of idis
t .
￿ ￿tjt =
1
f￿ ￿
￿
idis
t ￿ fddt
￿
Thus, the policymaker￿ s choice has a marginal impact of K￿ ￿ ￿
d￿ ￿tjt
didis
t
= 1
f￿ ￿ on beliefs.
Denoting this case with superscript d, (A.12) shows that the in￿ ation-output tradeo⁄ is at its steepest
possible value
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￿
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with the following equilibrium outcomes under the optimal discretionary interest rate policy after taking
into account that beliefs are correct in equilibrium
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Then, the associated welfare loss terms are
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Compared to the case of full communication, communicating only dt is strictly preferable for any real-
izations of the current shocks since
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Compared to the baseline no direct communication case,
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For general parameter values, both terms in ECB
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are negative since the second term is clearly
negative while
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Meanwhile, ld
t ￿ lt will again depend on realizations of shocks and can be positive for a large positive
realization of
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Therefore, it￿ s clear in the case of an in￿ ation target, partial communication of only the demand level dt
140minimizes the discounted net present value of expected future losses. In this case, the central bank is able to
better achieve the in￿ ation target if agents are perfectly aware of it in equilibrium. With only two shocks in
this model, this can be achieved with direct communication by the central bank about both shocks or either
one of the shocks prior to the realization of the interest rate. Revealing only dt ex-ante gives a discretionary
interest rate policy the largest incentive to reduce the stabilization bias and thus this partial communication
policy is optimal for expected future welfare. However, the communication policy that minimizes the current
period loss will still depend on the realizations of shocks even for a ￿xed set of parameter values.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 10
In the case that lagged observations are not seen perfectly, beliefs are now given by a Kalman ￿lter. To solve
for these beliefs, recall that the latent states and the interest rate signal are perceived by the private agents
to be of the form
dt = ￿ddt￿1 + ￿d;t; ￿d;t ￿ N
￿
0;￿2
d
￿
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0;￿2
￿ y
￿
it = fddt + f￿ y￿ yt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
The circularity of the signal can again be resolved by conjecturing a belief structure and then writing
the problem in expectational errors de￿ned as x
surp
t ￿ xt ￿ xtjt￿1. The conjecture I use is
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Thus, the expectational errors can be written in state-space form as
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141In this case, the steady-state Kalman ￿lter gives
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This ful￿lls our original conjecture with
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and the property that fd ^ Kd + f￿ y ^ K￿ y = 1 is maintained.
Then, I again de￿ne the interest rate as it = idis
t + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt so that beliefs as a function of past
beliefs and idis
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Then, I follow the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2 and use the linear form of expectations
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(A.23)
Now, the discretionary policymaker￿ s problem can be written as the following Bellman recursion where
his choice today now has an e⁄ect on the expected future welfare loss since today￿ s beliefs become the prior
142for period t + 1 beliefs
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Then, the FOC and EC combine to give the optimality condition
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Matching coe¢ cients gives the same equilibrium value for M as a function of the interest rate coe¢ cients
as the case derived in Appendix A.2 where agents could see lagged beliefs.
Then, to see if an interest rate of the form
it = rn
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Then, this gives
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143and similarly for ￿t+1. This means the policymaker￿ s optimality condition simpli￿es to
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Thus, the optimality condition cannot be satis￿ed under the premise that it = rn
t + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt for
general parameter values.
A.11.1 Proof of Corollary 11
Recall that the policymaker￿ s optimality condition is
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drop out and it collapses to the same condition as before.
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Substituting this into the equilibrium conditions shows that the interest rate rule features the same re-
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since it no longer a⁄ects the future belief ￿ yt+1jt+1. This can be broken down into the following subcases:
1. ^ K￿ y = 0 (, ^ Kd = 1
fd): In this case, equilibrium beliefs are given by
￿ ytjt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1jt￿1
dtjt =
1
fd
￿
idis
t ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ yt￿1jt￿1
￿
144Then, the interest rate only a⁄ects the current belief dtjt and not future beliefs.
2. ^ Kd = 0 (, ^ K￿ y = 1
f￿ y): In this case, equilibrium beliefs are given by
dtjt = ￿ddt￿1jt￿1
￿ ytjt =
1
f￿ y
￿
idis
t ￿ fd￿ddt￿1jt￿1
￿
Again, the interest rate only a⁄ects the current belief ￿ ytjt and not future beliefs.
3. ￿d = ￿￿ y = ￿: Note that it￿ s always possible to write beliefs as a distributed lag of interest rate news
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
=
"
￿ddt￿1jt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1jt￿1
#
+
"
^ Kd
^ K￿ y
#
￿
idis
t ￿ fddtjt￿1 ￿ f￿ y￿ ytjt￿1
￿
dtjt = ^ Kd
1 X
j=0
￿
j
d
￿
idis
t￿j ￿ idis
t￿jjt￿j￿1
￿
￿ ytjt = ^ K￿ y
1 X
j=0
￿
j
￿ y
￿
idis
t￿j ￿ idis
t￿jjt￿j￿1
￿
When the autocorrelations are equal, the interest rate itself becomes AR(1) with an innovation that
is the composite of the two underlying shocks
idis
t+1 = fddt+1 + f￿ y￿ yt+1 = ￿idis
t + fd￿d;t + f￿ y￿￿ y;t
Then, beliefs collapse to a function of just today￿ s interest rate in equilibrium.
dtjt = ^ Kd
1 X
j=0
￿j ￿
idis
t￿j ￿ ￿idis
t￿j￿1
￿
= ^ Kdidis
t
￿ ytjt = ^ K￿ y
1 X
j=0
￿j ￿
idis
t￿j ￿ ￿idis
t￿j￿1
￿
= ^ K￿ yidis
t
In the special case where ￿d = 0, equilibrium beliefs are given by
￿ yt+1jt+1 = ￿￿ y￿ ytjt + ^ K￿ y
￿
fddt+1 + f￿ y￿ yt+1 ￿ f￿ y￿￿ y￿ ytjt
￿
) ECB
t ￿ yt+1jt+1 = ￿￿ y￿ ytjt + ^ K￿ yf￿ y￿￿ y
￿
￿ yt ￿ ￿ ytjt
￿
and the RHS is now only a function of ￿ yt and ￿ ytjt. Then, it￿ s veri￿ed that the optimality condition holds
with fd = ￿, fd;b = ￿￿￿d. In general, the coe¢ cients f￿ y and f￿ y;b will di⁄er from the case where lags can be
145seen since the coe¢ cients in that case only set the LHS to zero.
A.12 Optimal policy under time-varying uncertainty
This section looks at optimal discretionary policy when uncertainty in the exogenous states is time-varying
dt = ￿ddt￿1 + ￿d;t; ￿d;t ￿ N
￿
0;￿2
d;t￿1
￿
and is serially uncorrelated
￿ yt = ￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 + ￿￿ y;t; ￿￿ y;t ￿ N
￿
0;￿2
￿ y;t￿1
￿
and is serially uncorrelated
Private agents￿information sets are It =
n
it;dt￿1; ￿ yt￿1;
￿
￿2
d
￿t
;
￿
￿2
￿ y
￿t
;ft
o
where ft denotes the vector of time
t interest rate responses to the state variables
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ yt; ￿ ytjt
￿
.
Beliefs can be derived in the same way as in Section 1.2.3. The only di⁄erence now is that the belief
coe¢ cients contain time-varying policy coe¢ cients.
Kd;t =
fd;t
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
f2
d;t
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y;t
and K￿ y;t =
f￿ y;t
f2
d;t
￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ f2
￿ y;t
Then, if I specify implemented policy as
it = idis
t + fd;b;tdtjt + f￿ y;b;t￿ ytjt
Beliefs are again linear in idis
t
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
=
"
1 ￿ Kd;tfd;t
￿K￿ y;tfd;t
#
￿ddt￿1 +
"
￿Kd;tf￿ y;t
1 ￿ K￿ y;tf￿ y;t
#
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1 +
"
Kd;t
K￿ y;t
#
idis
t
Longer horizon forecasts will continue to be dt+hjt = ￿h
ddtjt and ￿ yt+hjt = ￿h
￿ y￿ ytjt.
I then posit that equilibrium expectations are linear in these beliefs with time-varying coe¢ cients
"
~ yt+1jt
￿t+1jt
#
= Mt
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
146Then, ~ yt ￿ ￿ yt and ￿t can again be written in terms of exogenous states and idis
t
"
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt
￿t
#
= ￿t
"
1 ￿ Kd;tfd;t ￿Kd;tf￿ y;t
￿K￿ y;tfd;t 1 ￿ K￿ y;tf￿ y;t
#"
￿ddt￿1
￿￿ y￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
1 ￿1
￿ 0
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
+
"
H~ y;i;t
H￿;i;t
#
idis
t
where ￿t ￿
"
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
Mt
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
￿d + 1
￿fd;b;t
1
￿f￿ y;b;t
￿
￿
￿d + 1
￿fd;b;t
￿ ￿
￿f￿ y;b;t
#
and
"
H~ y;i;t
H￿;i;t
#
￿ ￿t
"
Kd
K￿ y
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
In this form, it￿ s again true that the discretionary policymaker has no control over time t + 1 or later
outcomes and the problem simpli￿es to
min
idis
t
1
2
￿
(~ yt ￿ ￿ yt)
2 +
"
￿
￿2
t
￿
subject to the preceding equation
Thus, the FOC is analogous to the constant variances case but with a time-varying Rt
~ yt ￿ ￿ yt = ￿Rt
"
￿
￿t, where Rt =
H￿;i;t
H~ y;i;t
Using this FOC and the structural equations to back out the optimal equilibrium it, gives
￿t = ￿￿t+1jt ￿ Rt"￿t + ￿￿ yt =
￿
1 + Rt"
￿ yt +
￿￿￿￿ y
1 + Rt"
E
￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿
￿ ￿
￿It
￿
￿ ytjt
~ yt = ￿ yt ￿ Rt
"
￿
￿t =
1
1 + Rt"
￿ yt ￿
Rt"￿￿￿ y
1 + Rt"
E
￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿
￿ ￿
￿It
￿
￿ ytjt
when limT!1
￿QT
k=0
￿
1+Rt+k"
￿
￿t+Tjt = 0. Then, expectations are
￿t+1jt = ￿E
￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿ ￿
￿
￿It
￿
￿￿ y￿ ytjt
~ yt+1jt =
￿
1 ￿ E
￿
Rt+1"
￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿￿
￿
￿ ￿It
￿￿
￿￿ y￿ ytjt
By taking ￿ ytjt out of the expectations, I￿ m assuming (and later show) that Rt will be a function of current
and past relative variances which are not informative about future levels of the output gap target.
147Then, this implies that the interest rate can be written in terms of
￿
dt;dtjt; ￿ y; ￿ ytjt
￿
it = rn
t + ￿t+1jt + ￿
￿
~ yt+1jt ￿ ~ yt
￿
= ￿dt ￿ ￿￿ddtjt ￿ ￿
1
1 + Rt"
￿ yt
+ ￿E
￿
1 +
￿
￿
￿
￿ Rt+1" +
Rt"￿
1 + Rt"
￿￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿
jIt
￿
￿￿ y
| {z }
f￿
￿ y;b;t
￿ ytjt
In addition, the above expressions for ￿t+1jt; ~ yt+1jt gives an expression for the equilibrium Mt
Mt =
2
4
0 1 ￿ E
h
Rt+1"
￿
1
1+Rt+1" +
￿￿￿ y
(1+Rt+1")(1+Rt+2") + :::
￿￿
￿ ￿It
i
0 ￿E
h
1
1+Rt+1" +
￿￿￿ y
(1+Rt+1")(1+Rt+2") + :::
￿
￿ ￿It
i
3
5
Using this in the expression for [H~ y;i;t H￿;i;t]
0 and combining this with the expressions for f￿
￿ y;b;t; and
K￿ y;t gives a non-linear stochastic di⁄erence equation implicitly relating Rt to future fRt+kgk￿1 where the
driving variable is the relative variance level
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
.
Rt =
H￿;i;t
H~ y;i;t
"
H~ y;i;t
H￿;i;t
#
=
 "
1 1
￿
￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
#
Mt
"
￿d 0
0 ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
0 1
￿f￿
￿ y;b;t
0 ￿
￿f￿
￿ y;b;t
#!"
Kd;t
K￿ y;t
#
￿
"
1
￿
￿
￿
#
where f￿
￿ y;b;t = ￿E
￿
1 +
￿
￿
￿
+
Rt"￿
1 + Rt"
￿ Rt+1"
￿￿
1
1 + Rt+1"
+
￿￿￿ y
(1 + Rt+1")(1 + Rt+2")
+ :::
￿
jIt
￿
￿￿ y
Mt =
2
4
0 1 ￿ E
h
Rt+1"
￿
1
1+Rt+1" +
￿￿￿ y
(1+Rt+1")(1+Rt+2") + :::
￿￿
￿
￿It
i
0 ￿E
h
1
1+Rt+1" +
￿￿￿ y
(1+Rt+1")(1+Rt+2") + :::
￿
￿
￿It
i
3
5
K￿ y;t = ￿
1
￿
1 + Rt"
(1 + Rt")
2 ￿2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
+ 1
If the relative variance
￿
2
d;t
￿2
￿ y;t is Markov, then it may be possible to show that the key variable Rt should
depend only on
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
and
￿
2
d;t
￿2
￿ y;t. Likewise, f￿
￿ y;b;t would also have this property.
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Supplement to Chapter 2
B.1 Empirical relationship from structural model
In this section, I show that giving private agents an additional signal about ￿t and using a special parame-
terization where ￿d = ￿￿ y = ￿ allows the structural model in Tang (2014b) to produce the same key regression
equation as the reduced-form empirical model. In fact, it can be shown that this parameterization allows
a VAR(1) representation of the structural model (derivations available upon request). As in that paper, I
continue to assume that ￿ 2 [0;￿ ￿) where where ￿ ￿ ￿
1+￿+ ￿
￿￿
q
(1+￿+ ￿
￿)
2
￿4￿
2￿ ￿ ￿. I also continue to assume
that there￿ s a given interest rate rule
it = fddt + fd;bdtjt + f￿ y￿ yt + f￿ y;b￿ ytjt
where f￿ y < 0, f￿ y + f￿ y;b < 0, fd > 0, and fd + fd;b > 0.
The Appendix of Tang (2014b) showed that the equilibrium solutions for the output gap and in￿ ation
under an interest rate of this form are
"
~ yt
￿t
#
=
"
￿ 1
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿￿(fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
#
dtjt
+
"
￿ 1
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(f￿ y + f￿ y;b) + 1
￿f￿ y
￿￿
￿￿(f￿ y + f￿ y;b) + ￿
￿f￿ y
#
￿ ytjt +
"
1 ￿ 1
￿fd ￿ 1
￿f￿ y
￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿f￿ y
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
where ￿d = ￿￿ y =
1
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿
￿￿
149Imagine now that agents receive another signal which is
st = ￿t + ￿s;t = ￿ddt + ￿￿ y￿ yt + ￿d;bdtjt + ￿￿ y;b￿ ytjt + ￿s;t, ￿s;t ￿ N
￿
0;￿2
s;t￿1
￿
where the ￿￿ s are the coe¢ cients in the solution for ￿t. Then, the private agents￿belief formation problem
can be written in state-space form as
"
dt
￿ yt
#
= ￿
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
#
;
"
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
#
￿ N (0;￿d;￿ y;t￿1) where ￿d;￿ y;t￿1 ￿
"
￿2
d;t￿1 0
0 ￿2
￿ y;t￿1
#
"
it
st
#
=
"
fd f￿ y
￿d ￿￿ y
#"
dt
￿ yt
#
+
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
+
"
0
1
#
￿s;t
I follow the procedure of Svensson and Woodford (2003) to deal with the circularity involved with signals it
and sjt depending on beliefs. I conjecture a form of beliefs and then write the system in innovations. The
conjecture is
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
= ￿
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
+ Kt
 "
it
sjt
#
￿
"
fd f￿ y
￿d ￿￿ y
#
￿
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
￿
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#!
= ￿
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
+ Kt
"
fd f￿ y 0
￿d ￿￿ y 0
#
2
6
6
4
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
￿s;t
3
7
7
5
Then, writing the system in expectational errors de￿ned as xerr
t ￿ xt ￿ E [xtjIt n fit;sjtg] yields
"
derr
t
￿ yerr
t
#
￿
"
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
#
"
i
surp
t
s
surp
t
#
=
 
I +
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#
Kt
! "
fd f￿ y
￿d ￿￿ y
#"
derr
t
￿ yerr
t
#
+
"
0
￿s;t
#!
150Then, beliefs are
"
derr
tjt
￿ yerr
tjt
#
= E
""
derr
t
￿ yerr
t
#
jIt n fit;sjtg;i
surp
t ;s
surp
jt
#
= ￿d;￿ y;t￿1
"
fd ￿d
f￿ y ￿￿ y
# 
I +
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#
Kt
!0
￿
￿1
i;s;t
"
i
surp
t
s
surp
jt
#
where ￿i;s;t ￿
 
I +
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#
Kt
! "
fd f￿ y
￿d ￿￿ y
#
￿d;￿ y;t￿1
"
fd ￿d
f￿ y ￿￿ y
#
+
"
0 0
0 ￿2
s;t￿1
#!
￿
 
I +
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#
Kt
!0
and
"
dtjt
￿ ytjt
#
= ￿
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
+
"
derr
tjt
￿ yerr
tjt
#
This matches the conjecture above with
Kt ￿
"
Ki
d;t Ks
d;t
Ki
￿ y;t Ks
￿ y;t
#
= ￿d;￿ y;t
"
fd ￿d
f￿ y ￿￿ y
# "
fd f￿ y
￿d ￿￿ y
#
￿d;￿ y;t
"
fd ￿d
f￿ y ￿￿ y
#
+
"
0 0
0 ￿2
s;t￿1
#!￿1
=
2
4
￿
￿
2
￿ f2
￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1 + fd￿2
s;t￿1
￿
￿2
d;t￿1 ￿f2
￿ y￿2
d;t￿1￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ￿
￿2 ￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿2
d;t￿1 + ￿2
s;t￿1
￿
f￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1 ￿￿f￿ yfd￿2
d;t￿1￿2
￿ y;t￿1
3
5
￿
f2
d￿2
d;t￿1 + f2
￿ y￿2
￿ y;t￿1
￿
￿2
s + ￿2f2
￿ y￿2
d;t￿1￿2
￿ y;t￿1
since
h
￿d ￿￿ y
i
=
h
￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿f￿ y
i
Then, using the fact that f￿ y < 0 < fd, I obtain the following properties for ￿xed interest rate rule coe¢ cients
Ki
￿ y;t < 0 < Ki
d;t;Ks
d;t;Ks
￿ y;t; fdKi
d;t + f￿ yKi
￿ y;t = 1; fdKs
d;t + f￿ yKs
￿ y;t = 0
151Then, I can write forecast revisions and the lagged nowcast error as the following
￿tjt ￿ ￿tjt￿1 = ￿
￿
￿
￿
h
fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) f￿ y + f￿ y;b
i
￿
 "
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
￿
"
dt￿1jt￿1
￿ yt￿1jt￿1
#!
￿
￿
￿
￿
h
fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) f￿ y + f￿ y;b
i
Kt
"
fd f￿ y 0
￿d ￿￿ y 0
#
2
6
6
4
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
￿s;t
3
7
7
5
￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1 = ￿
￿
￿
￿
h
fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) f￿ y + f￿ y;b
i "
dt+hjt
￿ yt+hjt
#
￿
"
dt+hjt￿1
￿ yt+hjt￿1
#!
= ￿h ￿
￿tjt ￿ ￿tjt￿1
￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 =
h
￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿
￿￿
￿f￿ y
i
 "
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
￿
"
dt￿1jt￿1
￿ yt￿1jt￿1
#!
where
"
dt￿1
￿ yt￿1
#
￿
"
dt￿1jt￿1
￿ yt￿1jt￿1
#
=
"
f￿ y
fd
￿1
#
h ￿
Ki
￿ y;tfd + Ks
￿ y;t￿
￿
1 ￿ 1
￿fd
￿￿ ￿
Ki
￿ y;t ￿ ￿
￿Ks
￿ y;t
￿
f￿ y ￿ 1 Ks
￿ y;t
i
2
6
6
4
￿d;t￿1
￿￿ y;t￿1
￿s;t￿1
3
7
7
5
"
fd f￿ y 0
￿d ￿￿ y 0
#
2
6 6
4
￿d;t
￿￿ y;t
￿s;t
3
7 7
5 =
 
I +
"
fd;b f￿ y;b
￿d;b ￿￿ y;b
#
Kt
!￿1 "
i
surp
t
s
surp
t
#
This allows me to write forecast revisions as linear in the lagged nowcast error, the interest rate surprise,
and other in￿ ation news.
￿tjt ￿ ￿tjt￿1 = ￿
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where i
surp
t = it ￿ E [itjIt n fit;stg]
s
surp
t = ￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 + ￿
1
￿
￿
￿
fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
fd
f￿ y
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
￿￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1
￿
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152Further algebraic manipulation yields a relationship of the same form given by the above empirical model
￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1 = ￿hKi
t (it ￿ E [itjIt n fit;stg]) + ￿hKs
t
￿
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1
￿
+ ￿h+1KNE (1 ￿ Ks
t)
￿
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1
￿
+ ￿hKs
t￿s;t
where KNE = ￿
1
￿
￿
￿
fd + fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
fd
f￿ y
(f￿ y + f￿ y;b)
￿
does not depend on variances
When I additionally assume that fd < ￿ and fd+fd;b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿), this is su¢ cient (but not always necessary)
to obtain the following properties:
1. Ki
t may be positive; Ks
t ￿ 0; KNE ￿ 0
2. Ki
t increases with ￿2
s;t￿1 for
￿
2
d;t￿1
￿2
￿ y;t￿1
large enough, Ki
t decreases with ￿2
￿ y;t￿1 and increases with ￿2
d;t￿1
3. Ks
t decreases with ￿2
s;t￿1, Ks
t increases with ￿2
￿ y;t￿1 and ￿2
d;t￿1
153B.2 Robustness checks
Table B.1: Baseline e⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts controlling for
news about real output growth
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 0:233 0:234 0:285** 0:133
[1:14] [1:61] [2:25] [1:24]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 0:095** 0:019 0:029 0:033
[2:31] [0:80] [1:31] [1:46]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 0:210*** 0:150*** 0:073*** 0:099***
[3:41] [3:84] [3:01] [3:54]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 0:002 0:003 0:010 0:013
[0:07] [0:25] [1:01] [1:19]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 0:028 0:009 0:006 0:003
[0:97] [0:47] [0:44] [0:20]
Adjusted R2 0:324 0:265 0:200 0:215
N 88 88 88 88
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to
the switch in the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator making the lagged forecast unavailable
in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
154Table B.2: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts controlling for news
about real output growth with a high vs low prior uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low ￿0:070 0:035 0:066 0:102
[￿0:27] [0:22] [0:57] [0:83]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:689** 0:484** 0:667*** 0:123
[2:13] [2:12] [3:44] [0:48]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:054 ￿0:022 ￿0:007 0:027
[0:75] [￿0:50] [￿0:21] [0:71]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:114** 0:037 0:046* 0:039
[2:03] [1:14] [1:69] [1:48]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:267*** 0:205*** 0:103*** 0:115***
[3:35] [4:07] [3:12] [2:84]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:138** 0:063* 0:056* 0:079*
[2:47] [1:69] [1:77] [1:84]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low ￿0:004 0:013 0:006 0:007
[￿0:14] [0:65] [0:50] [0:45]
yt ￿ ytjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high ￿0:005 ￿0:014 0:019 0:021*
[￿0:18] [￿0:80] [1:63] [1:80]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:065 0:013 0:010 0:007
[1:36] [0:46] [0:55] [0:32]
yt￿1 ￿ yt￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high ￿0:001 ￿0:001 0:008 0:004
[￿0:03] [￿0:07] [0:39] [0:21]
Std￿
t￿1 high 0:152* 0:084 0:094** 0:034
[1:83] [1:65] [2:28] [0:70]
Adjusted R2 0:340 0:297 0:265 0:171
N 88 88 88 88
P-value of F-test of
di⁄erence in it ￿ itjt￿1 coef 0:070 0:111 0:010 0:943
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to the switch in
the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator making the lagged forecast unavailable in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿
Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
155Table B.3: Baseline e⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts controlling for
news about unemployment
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 0:208 0:197 0:210* 0:130
[1:02] [1:36] [1:79] [1:19]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 0:090** 0:012 0:015 0:023
[2:01] [0:43] [0:65] [1:00]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 0:198*** 0:148*** 0:075*** 0:099***
[3:48] [4:07] [3:54] [3:73]
Ut ￿ Utjt￿1 ￿0:084 ￿0:072 ￿0:093 ￿0:078
[￿0:36] [￿0:50] [￿1:12] [￿0:81]
Ut￿1 ￿ Ut￿1jt￿1 ￿0:196 ￿0:117 ￿0:281* ￿0:030
[￿0:62] [￿0:56] [￿1:70] [￿0:18]
Adjusted R2 0:324 0:277 0:272 0:213
N 88 88 88 88
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to
the switch in the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator making the lagged forecast unavailable
in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿ Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
156Table B.4: E⁄ect of federal funds rate surprises on in￿ ation forecasts controlling for news
about unemployment with a high vs low prior uncertainty interaction
Dependent variable: ￿t+hjt ￿ ￿t+hjt￿1
h = 0 1 2 3
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low ￿0:093 0:031 0:047 0:119
[￿0:42] [0:23] [0:47] [1:01]
it ￿ itjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:846*** 0:435** 0:548*** 0:069
[2:75] [2:22] [2:79] [0:23]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:051 ￿0:032 ￿0:012 0:023
[0:75] [￿0:83] [￿0:38] [0:60]
￿t ￿ ￿tjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:131*** 0:047* 0:029 0:021
[3:08] [1:80] [1:16] [0:76]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low 0:224*** 0:195*** 0:095*** 0:110***
[4:89] [6:30] [4:11] [3:33]
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:115** 0:052 0:035 0:067*
[2:38] [1:48] [1:38] [1:77]
Ut ￿ Utjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low ￿0:514** ￿0:325** ￿0:206** ￿0:116
[￿2:05] [￿2:37] [￿2:09] [￿0:78]
Ut ￿ Utjt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high 0:357** 0:224** 0:033 ￿0:042
[2:37] [2:18] [0:43] [￿0:42]
Ut￿1 ￿ Ut￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 low ￿0:095 0:166 ￿0:014 0:079
[￿0:19] [0:58] [￿0:06] [0:31]
Ut￿1 ￿ Ut￿1jt￿1 ￿ Std￿
t￿1 high ￿0:461 ￿0:482* ￿0:458** ￿0:172
[￿1:27] [￿1:91] [￿2:30] [￿0:69]
Std￿
t￿1 high 0:183** 0:092* 0:091** 0:023
[2:23] [1:82] [2:43] [0:46]
Adjusted R2 0:407 0:353 0:327 0:170
N 88 88 88 88
P-value of F-test of
di⁄erence in it ￿ itjt￿1 coef 0:015 0:097 0:026 0:880
Notes: The sample is quarterly data from 1989:Q1 to 2011:Q1 with 1992:Q1 dropped due to the switch in
the SPF from the GNP to GDP de￿ ator making the lagged forecast unavailable in that period. ￿￿￿=￿￿=￿
Statistically signi￿cant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
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